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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Who Counts?  How the State (Re)creates Households. (August 2007) 
Carol Sue Walther, B.S., Indiana University; 
B.A., Indiana University; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 
 
Prior research focused upon the intersection of race, ethnicity, citizenship and 
identity produced as a result of the Census Schedule. In this dissertation, I focus on the 
Census, as an instrument of the state, to capture the process of inclusion and exclusion as 
it relates specifically to the intersection of sexualities and family formation. Using 
Sewell’s (1992) concept of dual structures, that is, cultural schemas and resources, I 
argue that sexuality is structural.  
Using mixed-methodology and three different data sources, I produce five 
different indices to determine settlement patterns of same-sex households in various 
geographic areas. Secondly, drawing on variables operationalized as cultural schema and 
resources, I identify characteristics of metropolitan areas that have arguably been related 
to levels of gay and lesbian concentration. In the multivariate context, the variables that 
are most influential in predicting levels of gay and lesbian concentration are physical 
temperature index, poverty rate, and heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables focusing 
on characteristics of the metropolitan areas of relevance mainly to gays and lesbians 
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such as those dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to 
sexual orientation, as well as the presence of political and religious conservatism are 
either not statistically important predictors or exhibited minimal influences.  
Through the Internet survey and thirty interviews, I examine how gay and lesbian 
couples answered the Census Schedule. The highest percentage of individuals marked 
single on the Census Schedule, suggesting that partnered homosexuals are being 
underenumerated by the Census Bureau. Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the 
state, two underlying ideas influence individuals’ enactments of agency: legal 
consciousness and statistical consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people’s lay 
understandings of the law, while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge 
of statistics. In both cases the production of legal interpretation and statistics by 
authoritative sources is then variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary 
citizens for their distinct purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally 
unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being socially constructed in specific historical-
cultural contexts. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal point 
of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
On one level it is the simplest of efforts – a counting of noses, a headcount – 
necessary for the apportionment of the Congress and state legislatures.  On 
another, it is a most complex exercise, involving the collection of many bits of 
information on – among other things – families, households, housing, consumer 
patterns, work, mobility, race, and ethnicity (Anderson 1988: 1-2). 
 The United States’ Constitution1 declares that a Census should be taken every ten 
years for the purpose of apportionment for a representative democracy. Ideally, every 
household is counted in the Census. However, for the founders, the meaning of those 
who participated in civil society,  the concept of “one man, one vote,” and thus those 
who really counted meant one English-speaking, land-owning, male citizen who was 
preferably Protestant (Prewitt 2003; Rodríguez 2000 ). Not all families count or were 
counted.   
  The Census Bureau, over time, has determined the need to encourage different 
demographic groups to participate, and complete the Census schedule. For instance, in 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Sociological Review. 
 
1 Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states: “Representatives and direct Taxes 
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including 
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress 
of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law 
direct.” Initially, the census was to be delivered to the Congress within 9 months of it taking (Title 13, 
United States Code; U.S. Department of Commerce 1995: 1-4). In 1975, Title 13 was amended with 
Public Law 94-171 which changed the time to one year instead of 9 months for delivery.  
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1990 the Census Bureau produced advertisements to encourage Americans to fill out the 
census form. One such advertisement was directed toward Native Americans and read, 
“Only you can tell us!” (U.S. Commerce Department 1990: 5-23-5-25; 1-19-1-21). To 
solicit enumeration of racially diverse populations, the Census Bureau in 1990 and 2000 
provided census forms in Spanish, Chinese, and other languages, as well as offered a toll 
free number for those who had questions about the forms (Badgett and Rogers 2005; Fay 
and Krejsa 2003). Thus, the Census Bureau has increasingly sought the broadest 
participation possible in the census.  
  Political interest groups have prompted contestation about enumeration on the 
Census Schedule as they have advocated for increased recognition, inclusion, and 
representation on the Census Schedule. For example, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans 
lobbied for inclusion on the 1970 census as a separate ethnicity question (Bean and 
Tienda 1987; Rodríguez 2000). In 1980 various pan-Asian-American groups petitioned 
for inclusion on the Census schedule, eliciting new racial categories with the opportunity 
to identify specific Asian groups (Lee 1993). In 2000, multiracial people could self-
identify on the census schedule because of compromises between various groups and the 
Census Bureau (Williams 2006).   
 Likewise, in 2000 the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a gay political 
organization, ran a campaign entitled “Make Your Families Count.” The HRC sent 
emails to its membership encouraging them to mark their relationship on the Census 
schedule.  While the HRC did not challenge the language of the Census schedule 
specifically, they sought increased recognition through the improved enumeration of 
     
                                  
   
3
gays and lesbians. As a result, the census reported an increase of male and female same-
sex couples (Simon and O’Connor 2003).2  
 Despite these recent efforts to increase participation, there have been struggles 
over what constitutes a family. Ultimately, these struggles are rooted in how the state, 
and the Census as its instrument for this explicitly purpose, determines measurement 
(Anderson 1988: 4; Smith 1992).  Census data have been misconstrued in regards to race 
(El-Badry and Swanson 2004; Gatson 2004; Rodríguez 2000; Zuberi 2001), ethnicity 
(Kertzer and Arel 2001; Waters 1990), poverty, income and occupations (Anderson 
1990; Newman 2000), household definition (Romero 1990; Ruggles and Brower 2003; 
Smith 1992) and sexuality and the status of same-sex households. My dissertation 
examines how the state determines what constitutes a family and in turn how those 
couples themselves construct their household definitions.  
1.2. Major Questions 
 Categories in the census shape how groups are conceptualized and then how 
resources are subsequently allocated.  Such categories are created or constructed based 
on social understandings at particular points in history. This issue of social construction 
is one of sociology’s fundamental insights:  the application of a label or a category 
shapes the expectations of individuals and groups and institutions; these expectations, in 
turn, shape attitudes and behaviors.    
                                                 
2 In a 3 month period, 92 newspaper articles were published about the enumeration of gay and lesbian 
couples. 
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My research centers on the question of how the state determines processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in contemporary society. In particular, I am interested in 
whether and to what extent official statistics collected by the state reflect and affect the 
social structure as it pertains to race, class, gender, and sexualities, and intersections 
across these social groupings.  Towards this end, I focus on the Census as an instrument 
of the state to capture the process of inclusion and exclusion as it relates specifically to 
the intersection of sexualities and family formation. I examine four main questions 
related to the census: 1) How has the census configuration of family and sexuality 
affected self-identified same sex households? 2) How do different measures or indices of 
gay and lesbians affect conclusions drawn about prevalence and geographic location? 3) 
How do social environments affect influence settlement patterns of gay and lesbian 
couples? 4). How do individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the census categories 
and how do they socially construct their relationships?  
 While in recent decades those in the Census Bureau realized that they could 
enumerate same-gender couples on the census, this realization has not come about 
without significant debate, including concerns about potential misunderstandings of 
census terminology, possible stigma, and issues of self-identification (Black et al. 2000; 
Chevan 1995; Phua and Kaufman 1999; Rosenfeld 2007). Such issues of stigmatization 
and self-identification lead to questions of different personal and institutional privileges 
based on presumptions of heterosexuality.   
 A cultural debate over the definition of what makes up an efficient and functional 
family demarcates the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate societal definitions 
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(Allen and Demo 1995; Carrington 1999; Santorum 2005; Waite and Gallagher 2001). 
One side of the cultural debate represents those who argue that marriage should only 
occur between “one man and one woman” (Dobson 2004; Santorum 2005), while others 
(Cott 2000; Moats 2004) advocate that marriage should occur between two loving 
people, whether they are of the same-sex or not. Even within the gay and lesbian 
communities, not all people agree whether energy should be expended fighting for 
marriage rights, nor whether its presence defines a family (Graffe 1999).  
 The Census Bureau has constructed a definition of household which is 
represented by a heterosexual family or relationship. For instance, the unmarried partner 
category was added to the 1990 census schedule because of the increase in heterosexual 
cohabitation. However its inclusion also enabled the enumeration of same-sex couples. 
While there is no one statistically dominant family type in the United States, there exists 
the ideology of the Standard North American Family (SNAF), which is the ideology of a 
heterosexual family with children (Smith 1993: 52). Smith (1993) argues that this 
Standard North American Family ideology is located across discourses and influences 
institutions including the Census Bureau. Furthermore, even in heterosexual family 
formations, the Census Bureau has difficulty enumerating diverse heterosexual families.  
Romero (1993) conducted a qualitative study of El Salvadorian households in San 
Francisco, California to determine the undercount of immigrants. She found that many 
people were not counted due to multiple families living within the same household.   
Specifically for gay and lesbian households, Fields and Clark (1999) examined the 
editing process of the Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal conducted in April, 1998 in 
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Sacramento, California and in South Carolina. They found that same-sex couples who 
marked spouse were older, had children, owned property, and were less likely to have 
moved in the last five years. Taking the Census Schedule as a “cultural toolkit” (Swidler 
1986), I will analyze the currently used definitions of the Census and show how gay men 
and lesbians blur the boundaries of these definitions. 
 In examining the Census as a cultural tool, we have to examine the field of 
demography.  Many researchers have recently called for demography to open up to other 
theoretical perspectives. Horton (1999) introduced a new paradigm, “critical 
demography” which he defines as analytical, theory-driven, reflexive and challenging of 
the status quo. He contrasts critical demography with conventional demography which 
he defines as data-driven, assumptive, and acquiescent to the prevailing social order 
(Horton 1999). Riley and McCarthy (2003) argue that the postmodern and feminists 
perspectives have a dramatic effect on the theoretical understanding of demographic 
processes (Riley 1997). Watkins (1993) in her article, “If All We Knew About Women 
was What We Read in Demography, What Would We Know?” argues that demography 
has focused exclusively on fertility to the exclusion of other demographic processes for 
women. Because of the exclusion of men, Poston and Chang (1999) propose comparing 
male and female fertility theories and find that female fertility models do not do as well 
in explaining male fertility. Kuumba (1999) examines how global population policy 
maintains racial, class, and gender exploitation by via variation funding in administered 
to various non-governmental organizations.   
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 Using Sewell’s (1992) concept of dual structure and critical demography, I ask to 
what extent sexualities exist as a social structure that empowers and constrains resources 
such as marriage and family.  Sewell (1992) argues that there is  
a dialectical relationship between culture as meaning system and culture as practice.  
It is the structural features of culture (its meaning-system qualities) that make 
innovative cultural practices possible. Cultural structures consist of both schemas 
and resources, but their schemas are open to multiple interpretations and their 
resources can be deployed for a variety of purposes….we might say that the 
possibilities for cultural agency are embedded within cultural structures (1999: 13). 
Gay men and lesbians historically and currently are denied resources based on 
heteronormative privileges and sanctions. A good example of resources being denied for gay 
men and lesbians involves the workplace (Embrick, Walther, and Wickens 2007; Humphrey 
1999; Schneider 1986). Other examples of resources being denied to gay men and lesbians 
are marriage (except in Massachusetts), adoption, and inheritance rights (Bennett and Gates 
2004; Cahill 2004; Cott 2000; Defense of Marriage Act of 1996; Eskridge 2001; Graff 1999; 
Moats 2004; Mello 2004; Rauch 2004; Wolfson 2004). Historically, examples of resources 
denied include housing (Chauncey 1994) and association in bars (Kennedy and Davis 1993).  
1.3. Rationale 
 While other research has examined race, ethnicity, citizenship and identity 
produced as a result of the census schedule, I critically examine gay and lesbian 
household formation derived data from the 2000 U.S. Census. While other quantitative 
work has examined gay and lesbian relationships (Baumle, Compton, and Poston 2007; 
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Bennett and Gates 2004; Dang and Frazer 2004; Gates and Ost 2004; Walther and 
Poston 2004), the literature predominately focuses on the prevalence or description of 
same-sex households3. For example, Dang and Frazer (2004) compare percentages of 
African American gay male and lesbian couples to White gay male and lesbian couples 
on income, education, and home ownership, but do not extend the comparison into other 
aspects. Gates and Ost (2004) map the number of gay male and lesbian couples in the 
United States.  Previously, it was difficult to have a national sample of gay men and 
lesbians with which to measure basic demographic characteristics. While Sewell’s 
construction has been applied to race (Bonilla-Silva 1996; Duster 2001; Lewis 2004) and 
same-sex marriage (Hull 2006), it has rarely been applied to sexualities (see Barnard 
2004 and Rich 1986 for the exceptions). Gay men and lesbians historically (Chauncey 
1994; Kennedy and Davis 1993, among a few) and currently (Mello 2004; Moats 2004, 
among a few) are denied resources.  My dissertation moves away from describing 
demographic characteristics to other aspects of the lives of gay men and lesbians, 
theorizing demography as a set of practices deployed in culturally meaningful ways.  In 
a struggle for symbolic and material resources, being seen as a viable category is a 
beginning salvo in changing hegemonic understandings of identity and political power. 
1.4. Investigation of the Research Questions 
To answer the first research question, namely, how has the census configuration 
of family and sexuality affect self-identified same sex households, I provide in Chapter 
                                                 
3 Baumle, Poston, and Compton (2007) is an important exception.  
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II a literature review of how the household categories have been constructed in the 
census.   
To answer the second and third research questions, namely, how do different 
measures or indices of gay and lesbians affect conclusions drawn about prevalence and 
geographic location and how do social environments affect influence settlement patterns 
of gay and lesbian couples, I propose five different indices to measure the concentrations 
of gay and lesbian households. I then show that one index is a better demographic 
measurement of the prevalence of same-gender households.  
Using an index, I identify the kinds of characteristics of metropolitan areas that 
may be related to their levels of gay and lesbian concentration. It makes sense to 
hypothesize that gays and lesbians will live in areas with favorable social environments 
such as low unemployment and mild climates. For instance, Kahn (1995) has argued that 
gay and lesbian adults tend to settle in areas where wages are high and rental prices are 
low, and his colleagues have also noted the importance of the area’s social attitudes, 
political orientation and religious fundamentalists. Moreover, O’Reilly and Webster 
(1998) have written that the social and political characteristics of communities should be 
associated with the levels of gay and lesbian concentration. Given that people generally 
have freedom to move and live where they would like (exceptions include people living 
in segregated cities), gay and lesbian couples may well reside where they can use and 
receive the most value for their resources. As such, a gay or lesbian couple may not 
receive the most value living in metropolitan areas with a large Republican and/or 
Southern Baptist membership. The Republican Party has long been identified, rightly or 
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wrongly, as having an anti-homosexual orientation. Although there is a vocal 
homosexual group in the Republican Party (the Log Cabin Republicans), its influence on 
the party is thought to be minimal (O’Reilly and Webster 1998; 501; Green et al. 1995; 
Guth 1995). Also, the Southern Baptist conference regularly passes resolutions that 
consider homosexuality as an “abomination in the eyes of God” (Steinfels 1988: 6).  
Accordingly, I hypothesize that in metropolitan areas with high percentages of Southern 
Baptist membership and high percentages of Republican voting, the concentrations of 
gay and lesbian households should be low.  
 The literature also suggests that adult amenities such as employment and physical 
climate should be correlated with levels of partnering in general. If physical climate 
plays a role in the settlement patterns of gay men and lesbians, I would expect a negative 
association between July temperature and gay and lesbian concentrations because most 
individuals do not wish to live in areas which are extremely hot, preferring mild 
climates.  
 To investigate the fourth research question, namely, how do individual gay and 
lesbian couples respond to the census categories and how do they socially construct their 
relationships, I conducted a series of interviews. I expect to find shared gay and lesbian 
networks among gay men and lesbians who discussed how to fill out the census form. 
Many (Kertzer and Arel 2001; Nobles 2000; 2002; Rodríguez 2000; Waters 1990) have 
examined racial and ethnic identity and its impact on the completion of census 
schedules. I expect that gay men and lesbians will impose different identity 
positionalities to the census schedule. Smith-Lovin (2003) highlights three primary 
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elements that contribute to an individual’s socially-constituted identities: particular roles 
(e.g. parent, student, friend), social groups and organizations (e.g. church, leisure groups, 
professional organizations), and category memberships (e.g. gender, race, class, sexual 
orientation) (King 1988). The significance attributed personally to any of these three 
components should depend on the social significance infused in the labels. 
Category memberships accentuate one’s group location in a socially stratified 
society. That power and resources are inequitably distributed based on these social 
categories should cause them to frequently imbue more personal and social significance. 
Our social markers – race, class, gender, sexual orientation – have through historical and 
political processes gained significance to others and to ourselves. But because we inhabit 
various identity markers at the same time, those disenfranchised on multiple levels may 
inhabit a “multiple consciousness,” in which they constantly negotiate their different 
identities in different contexts (King 1988; Ellemers et al. 2002). I hypothesize that when 
couples are open about defining their relationship, they are more likely to adopt a couple 
identity and thus fill out the 2000 census schedule indicating husband or wife.   
1.5. Data and Methods 
  In this dissertation, I use a mixed-methodology of interviews, surveys, and 
secondary data. To answer the second and third research question, I used secondary data 
from the 2000 Census data in which I propose five different indices to measure and 
count gay men and lesbian and then analyze the properties of each measure. After 
composing the five different indices, I then argue that one index is the best demographic 
measure of same-sex couples. Using this index as the outcome variable, I collected data 
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on various social environment variables, such as percentage of Southern Baptist 
membership, percentage voting Democrat, unemployment rates, poverty rates, infant 
mortality rates, temperature index, sodomy laws, anti-discrimination laws, population 
size of metropolitan areas, and heterosexual cohabitation rate. 
To answer my fourth research question, dealing with how gay men and lesbians 
fill out the census forms, I conducted interviews and Internet surveys and collected 
newspaper accounts. Using snowball sampling techniques, I interviewed thirty self-
identified gay and lesbian couples living in Texas. I gave each respondent a modified 
2000 Census Schedule form and I asked the respondents to answer questions from the 
census, such as the category of relationship to “Person 1” or head of the household. I 
followed with questions about their selection and whether they found the question 
confusing.   The second source of data was an Internet survey which was a shortened 
version of the interview questions. This survey was emailed to self-identified gay men 
and lesbians or their allies nationally.   
1.6. Outline of Dissertation 
  I now turn to an outline of the dissertation. In Chapter II, I give an overview of 
the history of the census and family and the literature. The Census Schedule’s definition 
of family has changed with the historical emphasis over time. For instance, in the 19th 
century, the Census Schedule usually listed the householder, usually male, first, followed 
by his wife, sons, daughters, and slaves if the family owned any. The definition of 
householder changed to mean “a common table,” that is, providing for the entire family. 
Jumping to the present, there are no family types which dominate the US family 
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landscape. Thus, how has the Census been used to define family? Are gay men and 
lesbians confused when filling out the census? 
Chapter III describes the methodology to consider questions of dual structure and 
boundary work. I use a mixed-methodology. I first create five indices to determine the 
prevalence of gay male and lesbian populations and then apply one index to the state, 
metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and tracts. Furthermore, I estimate ordinary least 
square regressions to analyze the prevalence of same-sex couples. Secondly, I conducted 
interviews with self-identified gay men and lesbians, using snow-balling techniques. I 
asked whether there might be a distinction in gay male and lesbian headed households in 
the way they fill out the Census? Did gay men and lesbians use networks and social 
resources to fill out the census? Are Census data unreliable for counting gay and lesbian 
individuals? 
Chapter IV reports the findings of the analyses of the five indices. I extended the 
work of Black and his colleagues (2000, 2002), Walther and Poston (2004), and Gates 
and Ost (2004) regarding the validity of census-based statistics on the homosexual 
populations of the U.S. metropolitan areas I argue that one gay and lesbian index is the 
best measure of gay men and lesbian unmarried partners prevalence. I conclude the 
chapter estimating regressions which extends Walther and Poston’s (2004) work. I find 
that the more agreeable the physical temperature of the area, the higher the concentration 
of gay partners. Further, the higher the poverty rate in the metropolitan area, and the 
higher the percentage voting Republican, the lower the concentration of partnered gays. 
And the larger the area’s population, and the higher the level of heterosexual 
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cohabitation, the higher the concentration of gays. None of the four independent 
variables dealing with sodomy laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual 
orientation are shown to be significantly associated in the hypothesized negative 
direction with the level of gay concentration. The main differences in the two sets of the 
gay men and lesbian results are that the infant mortality rate is significant in the lesbian 
equation. The presence of laws prohibiting discrimination in the public and private 
sectors on the basis of sexual orientation is significant in the lesbian equation, but the log 
of population size is not.  
Chapter V reports the findings of the interviews. Using constant comparison 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967), I create themes coming from the interviews. In Chapter V, I 
examined how gay and lesbian couples answered the Census Schedule. The highest 
percentage of individuals marked single on the Census Schedule. This is significant 
because more research is demonstrating that gay men and lesbians are being 
underenumerated by the Census Bureau. I also found that the second most marked 
category was “unmarried partner” on the Census Schedule rather than “husband/wife” or 
“housemate/roommate.” Many of the respondents based their marking on the Census 
Schedule based on how they viewed their relationship and how society viewed their 
relationship. For the couples who marked the category, husband/wife, had lived together 
for a longer time period, owned property together, and had not moved as often. They 
viewed themselves as a married couple – who deserved similar legal rights as 
heterosexual married couples. 
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 Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas 
influence ‘individuals’ enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical 
consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people’s lay understandings of the law, 
while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases 
the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources is then 
variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct 
purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, 
despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. The 
respondents described the Census Schedule as a legal document which they knew how to 
fill out properly. However, when I asked about other legal forms such as life insurance, 
interviewees have placed their partners on these forms. These forms are less secure than 
the Census Schedule. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal 
point of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees and 
newspaper accounts. Some of the respondents discussed wanting to be counted on the 
Census Schedule because power is represented in enumeration. If one’s household is 
counted, the group is powerful.  
Chapter VI concludes the dissertation. My work contributes to the literature 
about the quality and validity of Census data. The Chapter IV demonstrates that cultural 
schemas and resources do not play a significant importance in settlement patters of 
same-sex households. Furthermore, my interviews provide rich data about a legal 
consciousness of injustice in everyday life and how couples negotiate their identity in 
gay marriage movements. I find that couples view the Census Schedule as a legal 
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document which should be filled in “properly.” Furthermore, the couples discuss how 
they participate in the gay marriage movements in their everyday lives.   
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The state seeks to bring order, if not out of chaos in the case of the household, 
then from the messier diversity of the persons and institutions under its 
jurisdiction (Smith 1992: 424). 
 Definitions of census categories have often been at the center of conflict.  The 
Census is used as a blunt instrument and as a toolkit. Swidler (1986: 273) defines a 
cultural toolkit as, “symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in 
varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems.” The Census seeks to reduce 
complexity into discrete measurable categories. In the United States, very few 
classifications and categories of the Census schedule have remained the same over an 
extended period of time (Anderson 1988: 4; Anderson 2000; Smith 1992). Indeed, many 
categories change from Census to Census.  Definitions of racial, ethnic and family 
categories have been recreated in the context of the society, politics, and history of the 
United States. In recent decades, the diversity of family definitions has resulted in 
different enumerations of family structures and formations which in turn reflect organic 
changes in interpersonal relationships.  They also reflect more purposeful political shifts 
in collective group boundaries and the power to express those shifts.   
 I am interested in whether and to what extent official statistics collected by the 
state reflect and affect the social structure, as it pertains to race, class, gender, and 
sexualities, and the intersections across these social groupings. Although other research 
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has examined the intersection of race (Marx 1998; Nobels 2000, 2002), ethnicity 
(Goldscheider 2001), symbolic power (Loveman 2005), citizenship and identity (Kertzer 
and Arel 2001) and the state as it applies to the Census, I critically examine households 
and family formations that are missing from the literature. Towards this end, I focus on 
the Census as an instrument of the state, so to be able to capture the process of inclusion 
and exclusion as it relates specifically to the intersection of sexualities and family 
formation. As such, I begin with a history of the family as it applies to the Census 
Schedule in which I demonstrate the changing definitions of family and family 
formation as they play out on the Census Schedule. I then turn to an examination of how 
the Census has been used in identity construction and nation-building in terms of 
sexuality. Because legal aspects are involved in determining the status of same-sex 
households as they are counted by the state, I examine predominant laws pertaining to 
family and sexualities. Finally, I conclude the chapter reviewing Sewell’s (1992) concept 
of dual structures and Marshall’s (2005) concept of legal consciousness of injustice. 
Extending these two key theoretical perspectives, I posit the concept of statistical 
consciousness which I define as the awareness and use of statistics by people in 
everyday life. The production and consumption of statistics will be shown to serve as a 
pivotal point of contestation of power and resistance. 
2.2. The Intersecting History of the Census Schedule and the Family 
For much of U.S. history, census-taking has been a haphazard process, lacking 
the descriptive categories as we know them today. In fact, except for the mean size of 
the household, it was not until the 1940s that the Census Bureau even published any of 
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the statistics it had gathered on family and household composition (Ruggles and Brower 
2003: 73; Shammas 2002; Smith 1992). For instance, prior to the American Revolution, 
the census merely served as a means for counting the number of English persons 
inhabiting the colonies.  Although not specified to do so, enumerators frequently listed 
names and other information about household members. But if more complete 
information about the dwelling and the members of the dwelling was offered, it was 
completely rejected (Smith 1992). Despite a lack of direction in the enumeration process, 
in almost all cases enumerators followed a similar pattern, listing the oldest free male of 
the dwelling first, followed by his wife, then sons and finally daughters (Cott 2000; 
Smith 1992).  
Although the Census Bureau required a numerical representation of each given 
household prior to 1850, enumerators did not necessarily need to visit each household 
residence to gain this record. The Census statute stated that an enumerator could inquire 
“at each dwelling house or to the head of every family” to enumerate the household 
(Smith 1992: 429, italics added). Thus, enumerations of households often depended 
largely on the claims made by the head of the household. In 1850, however, the Census 
Bureau made two important changes to this policy. First enumerators were supposed to 
actually visit each household residence.  Second, enumerators were asked to list the 
names and characteristics of every free person in each household (Shamas 2002; Smith 
1992). These changes pretty much formed the basis for current policies and categories 
by the Census. 
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The constitution of the household, and head of household, in particular, has 
likewise undergone dramatic changes in the history of the Census. The authority of the 
“head” first defined and demarcated the extent of the household. Specifically, between 
the years 1790 and 1840, the definition of the family on the Census Schedule was “a 
group of slaves or all those who by nature or law are placed under the authority of a 
single person” (Herlihy 1991: 3; Smith 1992: 430).4  Then by 1850, the notion of the 
primary (male) provider was the basis for determining the head of household. Thus, his 
family was redefined as “one or more persons who lived separately from others in a 
house or part of a house with a common means of support” (Smith 1992: 437). However, 
by 1870, the central defining focus for the head of household shifted from economic 
provider to provider of a “common table” (Smith 1992: 437). In fact, this facilitated 
enumeration within boarding houses and tenement residents using a household definition 
of a “tie of a common roof and table” (Smith 1992: 437).  
As noted earlier, in 1850, Census enumerators for the first time were asked to list 
the name and characteristics for every free person in each household. In 1880, the 
Census Schedule began clarifying the relationship of household members and the head 
of household. This change differentiated households from a generalized group of people 
to individuals, each with a specific relationship to the head. This enabled the Census to 
begin tracking the nature of those relationships and different family formations.  
Although diverse family formations have existed throughout U.S. history, the 
Census and its enumerators have historically de-emphasized such households. For 
                                                 
4 The Latin term “familia” originally meant a group of slaves. In the Middle Ages, familia could refer both 
to people and to property. Classical Latin carried several different meanings of familia (Herlihy 1991). 
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instance, prior to industrialization, families were economically structured to produce 
almost all domestically used products. As such, families came to be described as the 
“little commonwealth” (Cott 2000; Gillis 1996; Mintz and Kellogg 1988; Smith 1992). 
However, due to widespread poverty, many families- between two-thirds and three-
fourths of all families- could not afford to rear their own children (Gillis 1996: 7). 
Adolescents were often sent to other households to learn a trade, known as “living out” 
(Gillis 1996: 32-33).5 In the Census, adolescents were counted as part of the household 
in which they resided at a given time, and not the household into which they were born. 
As a result, the social practice of living out enabled the establishment of household 
formations that did not reflect the structure of blood ties, although this was not explicitly 
acknowledged on the Census Schedule (Smith 1992).  
Rather, as I noted previously, enumerators morphed diverse family formations 
into patriarchal structures following the cultural beliefs and practices of the time. Even 
when women formed the head of the household, enumerators frequently listed instead 
the oldest male as “head.” They also reorganized Native American families who 
generally lived in multigenerational, multifamily, and kinship households into male-
headed nuclear households (Cott 2000: 26; Strong and Winkle 1996). Patronymic family 
surnames were likewise assigned to keep identification and property succession clear 
(Cott 2000: 122). 
                                                 
5 Shamas (2002: 150) asserts that household size increased from the founding of the nation until the Civil 
War and then decreased significantly afterwards. In the thirty years between 1850 and 1880 the proportion 
of the population falling into the “household headed” category jumped at a faster rate, going from 15.4 to 
20.3 percent of the population. 
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While the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in dramatic changes in the 
construction of family, as defined by the Census, these categories remained constant for 
the majority of the twentieth century. In 1940, the Census finally began publishing 
household data beyond its mean size, but it would not be until after the cultural 
revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s that the Census would again reevaluate the concept 
of the head of household. 
In the 1970s, American families perceived a significant shift in family 
formation.6 The nation experienced an increase in both rates of divorce and remarriage 
(Bramlett and Mosher 2001; Kreider and Fields 2002; Schoen and Standish 2001), 
falling birth rates7, increases in heterosexual and homosexual unmarried domestic 
partnerships8 (Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991; D’Emilio 1998; Lichter and Qian 
2005; Sweet and Bumpass 1987), increases in single parent households (McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994) and people living alone (Lichter and Qian 2005; Sweet and Bumpass 
1987; Waite and Gallagher 2000). For instance, the proportion of households with one 
person living alone increased from 17 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 2005 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2005). In 1970, there were 1.1 million multiperson households in the 
United States who were neither married nor related by blood or adoption. In 2000, this 
                                                 
6 As discussed earlier in the chapter, families were rarely nuclear and living in neo-local residences 
(Coontz 1998, 2000). However, society has lived under a myth that in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s 
families were predominately nuclear and authoritarian with fathers as head of households.   
7 Such countries as Sweden, Germany, France and Australia offer parents cash incentives to increase 
fertility (Stacey 1996: 44), while other countries such as China and South Korea are encouraging parents 
to have daughters because of the current sex ratios. 
8 Many countries include homosexual unmarried domestic partnerships and/or same-sex marriage. For 
instance, France has PACS, Pacte civil de solidarité, Belgium, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Israel, Andorra, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom (Andersson et al. 2006). 
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increased to 5.5 million (Simon and O’Conner 2003). The U.S. Census Bureau estimated 
that the number of opposite-sex cohabiting couples grew from 440,000 in 1960 to 3.8 
million in 2000 (Litcher and Qian 2005). Furthermore, in the 1990s, women between the 
ages of 15 to 29 were less likely to marry the father of their child compared to the 1970s 
(only about one in every 10 pregnant women in the 1990s and four in every 10 pregnant 
women in the 1970s) (Raley 2001). The number of children who would live in a 
household with just one parent due to divorce rather than death of a parent throughout 
their childhood also increased (Bianchi and Spain 1995; Bumpass and Sweet 1987; 
Coontz 2000; Graefe and Lichter 1999). Given these cultural changes, Bernardes (1988) 
estimate that there are as many as two hundred different arrangements that Europeans 
and Americans now regard as legitimate “family.” As such, no single type of family 
formation statistically dominates in the United States (Gillis 1996), and the “traditional 
family,” of a working husband, his stay-at-home wife, and their children represent only 
about 10 percent of all households today (Lichter and Qian 2005). 
In 1970 the Census Bureau responded to these cultural shifts by simply defining 
“head of household” as “the person who is regarded as the head by the members of the 
household” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973: ix). However, feminists still challenged 
this definition, noting the category was not as open as the informal definition implied 
(Presser 1998). Wives and children under the age of 16 could not be the head of 
household. Although Arthur Norton, Chief of the Marriage and Family Statistics Branch, 
argued that the term “head” was a purely statistical indicator and therefore a good 
measure, feminists contended that this category of head of household and the editing 
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practices of the Census Bureau implied an authoritarian structure for households and 
families that were dutifully measured.9 Thus, unless women were not married, they 
could not be the householder head. Moreover, welfare had been denied to women in 
some states based on not being defined as heads of their household (Presser 1998).  
  In response to increased political and cultural changes occurring at the times, in 
July 1976, President Ford ordered the Justice Department to review all federal laws and 
make any recommendations to eliminate sex bias. Arthur Fleming, Chair of the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, wrote the following to Robert Hagan, Acting Director of 
the Census: 
The Bureau’s current policy also seems contrary to the proper mandate of the 
Census Bureau, which ought to be to describe accurately the social, economic, 
and demographic characteristics of the people, rather than to prescribe 
appropriate and inappropriate relationships within households (as cited by 
Presser 1998).10    
                                                 
9 Female demographers in 1976 met with Paul Glick, a senior demographer at the Census Bureau. The 
Census Bureau had conducted a special survey to determine how people were defining head of household. 
Among 1,880 individuals, 49 percent named a male as the head of household; about one-third of the 
individuals responded that there were joint heads of household. Glick argued that the 1980 Census 
Schedule should remain as pretested while members of the Social Scientists in Population Research (all 
women) argued that to the contrary. They questioned if the respondents understood what household head 
meant providing various interpretations such as “the person in charge of household affairs, in charge of the 
children, in charge of all family members, including the wife?” (Presser 1998: 148). According to Presser, 
Glick responded that head of household meant “who is top dog.” 
10 While the Census Bureau changed the category to “Person 1,” many reports and agencies continued to 
report “head of household” such as the General Social Survey. The documentation of the General Social 
Survey (GSS) states that “For many households the designation of head is an arbitrary assignment.” It also 
states that “Head does convey useful information in determining household type among non-spousal 
relatives. For example, it indicates whether an adult child is living in the parental home or a parent is 
living with his/her adult child” (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss/report/m-report/meth73.htm). 
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  As a result of these governmental initiatives and lobbying efforts by the group 
Social Scientists in Population Research and other women’s organizations, the Census 
Bureau again reconceptualized the head of household category to “Person 1.” Person 1 
was considered to be the person under whose name a residence was owned or rented. 
Person 2, 3, 4, etc. were deemed coresidents of the household. The relationships between 
these household members and Person 1 were to be clearly delineated on the Census 
Schedule.  
  To better enumerate and depict ongoing changes within U.S. families, the Census 
reorganized and added different categories. For example, in 1980, the categories of 
nonrelated persons included roomer, boarder; partners, roommate; paid employee; and 
other nonrelative (to be written in). In 1990 the category was changed to “roomer, 
boarder or foster child.”11    The 1990 questionnaire also separated the 1980’s “partner, 
roommate” category into “housemate, roommate” and “unmarried partner.”  Thus the 
1990 questionnaire attempts to specify who is living together as opposed to simply 
rooming together (Barrett 1994, 17).  Based on the purported increase of 
intergenerational and blended families, the 1990 census also added the categories 
grandchildren and stepchildren and thus distinguished stepchildren from natural-born or 
adopted children (U.S. Department of Commerce 1995: 1-15).  
 As suggested above, in recent decades, the Census has also sought to determine 
those living and cohabiting together (Bumpass and Sweet 1989). In 1980, the Census 
created the category POSSLQ (person of the opposite sex sharing living quarters), which 
                                                 
11 In 1980, it was often not clear whether foster children should be listed as relatives or as unrelated 
persons; this category specifies their status. 
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served as a de facto category for couples who were not married and of the different 
(opposite) sex (Bunting 1987; Casper and Cohen 2000; Osgood 1981). This enabled the 
Census Bureau and other demographers to better track changes in heterosexual 
cohabitation. In the mid-1980s, Donald Hernandez, the Chief of the Marriage and 
Statistics Branch of the Population Division of the Census Bureau, and Arthur J. Norton, 
his supervisor, made the decision to add the response category of “unmarried partner” to 
the Census Schedule (Hernandez 2006). Therefore, in 1990, the Census reconstructed 
POSSLQ as “unmarried partner,” defined as a close personal relationship and having a 
“marriage-like” relationship with Person #1 (Barrett 1994). However, unlike POSSLQ, 
sex was denoted through the unmarried partner category, enabling the enumeration of 
same-sex households for the first time.12 
 Table A.1 in the Appendix is a timeline of significant shifts by the Census 
Bureaus in regards to household definitions and policies. Figure A.1 in the Appendix 
presents part of the 2000 Census Short Form Schedule.  
2.3. How the State Creates Identity Based on Race and Ethnicity 
 While family categories changed little during most of the twentieth century, race 
and ethnic categories underwent frequent evolutions, often adding changing or deleting 
categories on nearly each Census Schedule. For instance, in the 1890 Census, Croatians 
in North Carolina were counted as White, but were counted as Indian in the 1900 Census 
(Rodríguez 2000: 80). Then, in the 1930 census, four new racial categories were 
introduced:  “Mexican, Filipino, Hindu, and Korean” (Lee 1993: 79).  This was the first 
                                                 
12 Hernandez (2006) notes that the Census Bureau was aware that same-sex households would mark their 
relationship on the Census Schedule. 
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and only time that Mexican has appeared as a race on the census schedule (Anderson and 
Fienberg 1999: 182-183), and by the 1940 Census, Mexicans were counted as Whites 
(Rodríguez 2000: 82-83).  Thus, within a ten year period, Mexicans had been shifted 
from their own "Mexican" category to being included in the "white" category, unless 
"they appeared to census interviewers to be 'definitely Indian or of other Nonwhite 
races" (Rodríguez 2000: 84).  Then the 1960 Census included eleven racial 
classifications including Hawaiians, part Hawaiians, Aleuts, and Eskimos (Lee 1993: 
79), but part Hawaiian, Aleut, and Eskimo were omitted in the following decade. In 
1980, fifteen racial categories appeared on the Census, along with a Spanish/Hispanic 
origin question (Lee 1993: 79; Anderson 1988: 227).  In 1990, however, the Census was 
significantly scaled back by grouping nine categories under a new category “Asian and 
Pacific Islander” (Lee 1993: 80; Anderson and Fienberg 1999: 167-168).    
 Categories involving African Americans and Native Americans were especially 
problematic, as the Census tended to focus on degrees of racial ancestry (Hirschman et al 
2000: 382; Anderson 1988; Malcomson 2000; Nobles 2000; 2002; Rodríguez 2000: 74-
75; Zuberi 2001). By the 1890 Census Schedule, racial biological precision “had led to 
census categories based on degrees of African ancestry (mulatto, quadroon, and 
octoroon)” (Hirschman, et al. 2000: 382), and enumerators were instructed to be careful 
in choosing which category Blacks belonged based on perceived blood quantities (Lee 
1993: 77; Nobles 2002; US Bureau of the Census 1989: 36). Although in 1900, the 
categories Mulatto, Quadroon, and Octoroon were dropped from the Census, the Mulatto 
category reappeared on the 1910 and 1920 Censuses, making sure that biracial 
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individuals were enumerated as non-White persons (Lee 1993; Nobles 2002). For Native 
Americans, the Census required the proportion of “white blood” (none, ½, ¼, 1/8) for 
each enumerated Native American (Anderson 1988; Hirschman et al 2000: 382; Lee 
1993; Rodríguez 2000: 80).   
 In the latter part of the twentieth century, the Census Bureau acknowledged for 
the first time that race was to be socially constructed, rather than biologically innate. 
Specifically, in 1950 the Bureau admitted that the concept of race lacked scientific 
reason and was based on public opinion alone (Rodríguez 2000). As a result, in 1970, it 
allowed individuals to check or write-in their own race, and thus be able to self-identify 
their racial classification.  
 The ability to self-identify racially on the Census Schedule has prompted other 
conflicts around racial and ethnic categories. For instance, some Latinos marked the 
“Other” race category on the 1990 census, self-identifying racially as Latino/a or 
Chicano/a, rather than as an ethnicity. A similar dispute is currently underway regarding 
classifications for Arab/Arab Americans. On the 2000 Census, Arab and Arab 
Americans predominately self-identified as White (El-Badry 2004), but there has been 
an increasing push since September 11, 2001 to racially constitute Arab/Arab Americans 
as non-White.13  
                                                 
13 According to Directive 15: Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative 
Reporting in May 1977, Census racial categories were defined as American Indian or Alaska Native; 
Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and White. Therefore, there 
is not a clear racial category for Arab and Arab Americans. All people from Arab countries were racially 
defined as White by the Census. As such, Arabs and Arab Americans who chose another racial category 
were often flagged and moved to the White racial category.  However, Samhan (1999) argues that the 
Census Bureau views the Arab and Arab American population as “not quite white,” while many Arab and 
Arab Americans live a life as a person of color. Moreover, the Census Bureau released a census brief, The 
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 Just as the Census has reconceptualized the category “head of household” in 
numerous iterations, it has constructed and reconstructed racial and ethnic categories in 
line with ongoing cultural shifts and conflicts. Historically, it has added, deleted, 
changed categories often with each Census. In the early 1900s, it attempted to evaluate 
racial ancestry of Native Americans and African Americans with finite precision. At 
different times, it racially constituted Latinos/as as Mexican, White, or ethnically as 
Hispanic.14 Despite acknowledging in the 1950s that race was a social construction, the 
Census Bureau has retained racial categories on the Census Schedule largely for 
historical continuity. 15  
                                                                                                                                                
Arab Population: 2000 along with a more detailed special report, We the People of Arab Ancestry in the 
United States in 2003 and 2005 respectively. In these reports the Census demographic characteristics of 
the Arab and Arab American population based on ancestry questions. The Census Bureau defined Arab as 
“most people with ancestries originating from Arabic-speaking countries or areas of the world are 
categorized as Arab” (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005: 1). The reports leave out any multiple Arab 
ancestries people. It is unclear as to why the Census Bureau released these reports when previously the 
Census Bureau had paid little attention to the Arab and Arab American population. Furthermore, the 
Census Bureau provided information of metropolitan statistical areas that had 1,000 Arab population to the 
Department of Homeland Security. As a result, many Arab and Arab American leaders from the Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Arab American Institute (AAI), and the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, a civil liberties group, argued that this action promoted collective suspicion and 
backlash against Arabs and Arab Americans. On the 2010 Census Schedule, there will no longer be an 
ancestry question, suggesting that the demographic characteristics of the Arab and Arab American 
population will be even harder to enumerate in the future.  
14 Hispanic is a term created by the Census Bureau to measure a panethnic Latino/a identity (Bean and 
Tienda 1987).  
15 There has been confusion between race and ethnicity categories on Censuses (Kertzer and Arel 2004). 
European census practice rejected race in favor of ethnicity and nationality. The first exception of counting 
by race and ethnicity occurred in the 1939 Nazi German Census when the Census asked people if they had 
one Jewish grandparent (Aly and Roth 2004; Kertzer and Arel 2004). In 1991, a grass-roots campaign, 
started by the Toronto Star, “urged Canadians of all backgrounds to identify their origins as “Canadian” 
(“Call Me Canadian!”), a category which had never been allowed by census-makers. In the 1991 census, 
3.3 percent entered “Canadian” in the category “Other-specify” of the question on origins, making it the 
fifth largest “ethnic” group” (Kertzer and Arel 2004: 16). When an ethnic group is listed on the census, the 
number of respondents increase with a particular group. For example, in Canada, the number of 
Americans of Slovak, Croat, and French Canadian ancestry more than doubled between the 1980 and 1990 
censuses, while the number of Cajuns increased sixty-fold – all four categories which were not listed in 
1980, but were in 1990 (Kertzer and Arel 2004; Passel 1997). 
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 As noted in the last two sections, the Census, as a state regulated institution, has 
been strongly influenced by cultural frameworks around gender and race. Missing from 
this rich discussion has been the impact of heterosexuality on family and household 
definitions. Up until the 1990s, the Census has presumed and assumed to be heterosexual 
households. Then in 1990, the Census added “unmarried partner” at which time same-
sex households could first specify their relationship on the Census. 
2.4. Heteronormativity 
Cultural norms around sexuality have historically assumed and privileged 
heterosexuality over nonheterosexuality, such that heterosexuality has been constituted 
as “compulsory” (Rich 1986). Rich first demonstrated that this privileging of 
heterosexuality had infiltrated all institutions and “need[ed] to be recognized and studied 
as a political institution (Rich 1986: 35). Ingraham (1997) elaborated this argument 
positing the existence of a “heterosexual imaginary.” She argued that research and 
institutions  
conceal the operation of heterosexuality in structuring gender and closes off any 
critical analysis of heterosexuality as an organizing institution. The effect of this 
depiction of reality is that heterosexuality circulates as taken for granted, 
naturally occurring, and unquestioned, while gender is understood as socially 
constructed and central to the organization of everyday life (Ingraham 1997: 
275). 
The lack of a critical examination of heterosexuality as a structuring force in society has 
resulted in “heteronormativity – the view that institutionalized heterosexuality 
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constitutes the standard for legitimate and prescriptive sociosexual arrangements” 
(Ingraham 1997: 275)  Take the example of two professors who are applying for a higher 
position; one is a white heterosexual male and the other a white lesbian (Ingraham 1997: 
284). The male professor decides to marry, inviting all his colleagues to his wedding. 
The male professor receives the job. Ingraham (1997) argues that this heterosexual 
practice is not questioned as influencing the decision making of the voting colleagues, 
but it likely does. Thus, the white male professor received material advantage by virtue 
of his wedding.  
Involuntary sterilization is another example of how the body is controlled 
through the regulation of sexuality by the state. As part of the eugenic movement (Paul 
1995; 1998) compulsory sterilization initially targeted mentally ill people who were 
primarily living in state institutions. Other state laws targeted the deaf, the blind, the 
epileptic and those who were physically deformed (Reilly 1991). On many reservations, 
Native American women were sterilized without their knowledge (Lawrence 2000). The 
first state to introduce compulsory sterilization legislation was in Michigan in 1897, but 
Indiana was the first state to actually enact sterilization legislation in 1907 followed by 
Washington and California in 1909. The Supreme Court case, Buck v. Bell legitimized 
sterilization of patients in a mentally ill Virginia institution. The number of sterilizations 
increased until 1942 when the Supreme Court ruled in Skinner v. Oklahoma that 
sterilization violated criminals’ equal protection clause of the constitution. Sterilization 
continued to occur until late the 1970s, including in commonwealth provinces such as 
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Puerto Rico (Briggs 2002). Between the 1900s and the 1970s, the United States 
government sterilized over 64,000 people (Kevles 1985). 
 Another example of how the state controls and regulates sexualities is via 
abortion. Before the scientific discovery of human development of conception, the 
English common law allowed abortions to be performed before “quickening,” that is, 
when the women feels the fetus move for the first time. The Lord Ellenborough’s Act of 
1803 made abortion illegal after quickening had occurred. Prior to 1973, the Comstock 
law, for example, made it illegal to send lewd material via postal mail (Beisel 1997). As 
Beisel notes, the Comstock law demarcated a class distinction between the newly minted 
middle class and the lower class. Abortionists were depicted as lower class and 
degenerate. Abortion was illegal until 1973 when the court case Roe v. Wade ruled that 
abortion was legal. Even though abortion became legal, the state continues to place 
stipulations on people who can have an abortion. For instance, in some states, women 
must be over the age of 18 to have an abortion, while other states make the women wait 
for 24 to 48 hours before having an abortion.  
 A third example of how the state controls and regulates sexualities is interracial 
laws. Although interracial relationships were not uncommon in the United States, many 
colonies and later states used legal measures to punish interracial affairs. In 1622, the 
colony of Virginia declared interracial relationships as punishable by whipping and 
dishonorable to God (Korgen 1999; Williamson 1980). By 1725, Virginia, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware, and Pennsylvania all had 
anti-miscegenation laws (Bennett 1993: 301). The punishment for interracial 
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relationships included extension of time in which a white16 servant was kept in 
servitude; free Blacks were sold into slavery, or sold out of the colony. Ministers and 
other person who performed such marriages were also fined. Many of these 
miscegenation laws remained until 1967 (Bennett 1987: 303; Takaki 1989), when the 
Supreme Court ruled on the court case, Loving v. Virginia. However, two states, 
Alabama and South Carolina, still have anti-miscegenation laws in their state 
constitutions. Although interracial relationships were discouraged, it was only in cases in
which legal wives were publicly disrespe
 
cted (Berry 1999; Cotts 2000).  
                                                
 Anti-miscegenation laws of the 1920s continued to increase the hardship to 
immigrants and household formation. The Racial Integrity Act of 1924 was passed to 
retain the integrity of the white race. It prohibited “any white person…to marry any save 
a[nother] white person” (Racial Integrity Act of 1924). This law was passed in the heat 
of nationalism in which immigration laws considerably cut the number of immigrants 
who could enter the United States (Anderson 1988; Berry 1999; Pedraza 1996; Takaki 
1989). The Johnson Act was based on a quota system of 2 percent of the 1890 census 
(Anderson 1988; Ngai 1999). This was to ensure that non-whites and Southern 
Europeans could not immigrant to the United States (Jacobson 1998).  
 In the 1930s, new laws prohibited interracial marriage. For instance, Salvador 
Roldan in 1933, wanted to marry his White fiancée. Almost immediately, the California 
legislature amended their law to include “Malay race” as a restricted category (Takaki 
 
16 The definition of a white person changes over historical periods. Jewish, Irish and German Americans 
for example were not necessarily viewed as white (Brodkin 1999; Jacobson 1998; Kazal 2004). 
     
                                  
   
34
1989). Twelve other states also prohibited marriage between Whites and Filipinos, 
mostly on the West coast (Takaki 1989). 
 Although various laws prohibited interracial marriage, the judges in the court 
case, Prince versus Massachusetts, ruled that marriage was a private affair. The US 
Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution protected a “private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter (Prince v. Massachusetts 1944).  
 In December of 1945, Congress passed Public Law 271, which became known as 
the War Brides Act (Spickard 1989). Soldiers who were in the European warfront could 
bring women they had married overseas to the United States. Many German and Italian 
wives entered the United States with few problems, but Japanese wives were excluded. 
Congress later passed an amendment to the War Brides Act, which allowed G.I’s to 
bring Japanese wives to the United States for only one year, 1947 to 1948. 
 By the 1950’s, thirty-one states had banned interracial marriages between Whites 
and non-Whites (Berry 1999). In 1958 Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving were married 
in Washington D.C., where interracial marriage was legal. Upon marriage, they moved 
and lived together as husband and wife in Caroline County, Virginia. Because of the 
Virginia statute, the Lovings were charged with Breaking Virginia’s code 20-54. 
Virginia’s statue stated, 
 It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry and save 
 a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and 
 American Indian. For the purpose of this act, the term “white person” shall apply 
 only to the person who has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than 
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 Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the 
 American Indian and have no other non-Caucasian blood shall be deemed to be 
 white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the 
 intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by 
 this chapter (Virginia Code 20-54). 
On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail 
(Coolidge 1998). The judge, however, agreed to suspend their sentence if they agreed to 
leave Virginia for 25 years. The code further stated that interracial marriages conducted 
in other states would not be recognized in Virginia. The Lovings contested the code not 
on the basis of the definition of race, which was clearly defined in the statue, but on the 
basis of the fourteenth amendment. 
 By 1963, fourteen states had already repealed laws outlawing interracial 
marriages (Coolidge 1998).17 In 1948, the Supreme Court of California (Prez v. Sharp) 
ruled that the state’s ban on interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and 
Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment (Takaki 1989).   In 1967, the Supreme Court 
ruled on Loving v. Virginia that interracial couples could legally marry. 
 From the above examples, it is clear that the state decides who is socially 
controlled based on the social and political environment. The state decides who can and 
cannot be sterilized, who can or cannot have an abortion or who could marry. The state 
decides that mentally ill women should be sterilized to ensure that their children would 
not be born. Surgeons on reservations act as agents of the state and thus sterilize Native 
                                                 
17 Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming 
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American women. While upper class women usually were able to ensure an abortion if 
they wanted, the state imposed legal regulations primarily against lower class women. 
Furthermore, the state determined who could and could not be married.  
One effect of the dominant structuring power of heteronormativity relates to 
family formation in the ideology of the Standard North American Family (SNAF). 
SNAF is the legal conception of a married couple who may or may not have children. 
The adult male is in the paid labor force and the woman’s primary responsibility is 
caring for her husband and children (Smith 1993: 52). Although this family type 
comprises only approximately ten percent of the current U.S. population (Lichter and 
Qian 2005), its ideological force infuses a wide range of discourses and institutions.  
This same ideology of the “traditional” nuclear family compelled missionary 
groups and the U.S. Congress to reestablish matriarchal, non-nuclear Native American 
families into patriarchal households, in which the man/husband labored and the 
woman/wife served, cleaned, and cared for children. SNAF has also prompted more 
recent legislation seeking to confront the “culture of poverty.” In 1965, Moynihan 
argued that widespread households headed by Black single mothers had resulted in the 
emasculation of Black American males, producing behavioral deficiencies that reinforce 
conditions of poverty. He recommended policies that would encourage marriage and the 
promotion of nuclear families.  
Numerous other policies have continued to emphasize marriage as a means to 
decrease poverty and other social ills. In the early 1970s, when teenage pregnancy 
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reached “epidemic” proportions,18 policies were initiated to encourage teenage mothers 
to marry the father of their children. Even in current welfare programs, increased 
benefits are being granted as incentives to encourage marriage as a stabilizing force and 
as a means out of welfare itself. 
Perceived assaults on the primacy of heterosexual marriage and SNAF, via same-
sex marriages and civil unions, have even prompted national legislation in the form of 
the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA 1996). 19 Section 3 specifically defines 
marriage and spouse, stating:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman, a husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers to only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife (Federal Code 2419). 
Contrary though to usual federalist precedents that uphold legal declarations in other 
states, including marriage certificates, wills, and adoptions, Section 2 of this same act 
nullified this provision, again stating: 
no state…shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial 
proceeding in any other state…respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other state,…or a 
right or claim arising from such relationship  (Federal Code 2419).  
                                                 
18 Luker (1996) shows that numerically teenagers had more births during the 1950s than in the 1970s. 
19 The U.S. Senate voted 85-14 for DOMA and the House had passed it by a vote of 342-67 (Chauncey 
2004: 125). 
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To further strengthen this enactment, more than thirty states (at the time of this writing 
in Spring of 2007) have passed similar state constitutional Defense of Marriage Acts.20 
President George W. Bush and others have even called for a national constitutional 
amendment to verify marriage as “one man and one woman.”21 
 Specifically in regards to the Census, this SNAF ideology has led to the 
misenumeration of numerous households in the U.S., especially some created in unique 
social contexts (de la Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 1998). In fact, the 
1990 Post Enumeration Survey of the 1990 U.S. Census reported a 1.8 percent of within 
household census coverage errors of the total population due to household mistakes 
(Hogan 1992). In one case, in the town of Woodland, Oregon, Montoya (1992) observed 
the establishment of “ad hoc” households, created in response to poverty and a lack of 
affordable housing. The relationships to each other in these households were maintained 
based on the allocation of money. In some cases, people living within the ad hoc 
households did not know the identities of others. Those who were enumerated were 
those who coincided with the enumerator’s visit. In another situation, in Florida, a high 
                                                 
20 As early as 1977, states were writing into their constitutions the definition of marriage as “one man and 
one woman.” The following states have passed state DOMA’s Alabama (1998); Alaska (1996); Arizona 
(1996); Arkansas (1997); California (2000); Colorado (2000); Delaware (1996); Florida (1997); Georgia 
(1996); Idaho (1996); Illinois (1996); Indiana (1997); Iowa (1998); Kansas (1996); Kentucky (1998); 
Louisiana (1996); Maine (1997); Michigan (1996); Minnesota (1997); Mississippi (1997); Missouri 
(1997); Montana (1997); Nebraska (2000); North Carolina (1995); North Dakota (1997); Oklahoma 
(1996); Pennsylvania (1996); South Carolina (1996); South Dakota (1996); Tennessee (1996); Texas 
(2000); Utah (1995); Virginia (1997); Washington (1998); and West Virginia (2000) (Eskridge 2002: 28; 
www.hrc.org). 
21 The Census Bureau has had to edit all same-sex couples into the unmarried partner category. This 
disregards the research that has demonstrated the distinctions in the gay and lesbian communities between 
those who mark ‘husband/wife’ and those who mark ‘unmarried partner’ (Fields and Clark 1998). If the 
Census Bureau believes that the sex question has been miscoded, they do what they define as a 
consistency edit. Black and his colleagues (2002) note a false positive problem can occur if a different-sex 
partner is enumerated as a same-sex couple. This could be as large as a third of the sample and thus bias 
the same-sex couple sample. 
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degree of fluctuation and mobility influenced Haitian households, such that some 
household members were described by others as “just passing through.” Residence by 
any one household member ranged anywhere from two weeks to four years (Wingerd 
1992). As such, in both instances, those who were enumerated were those whose 
residence coincided with the enumerator’s visit. 
 In a third study, Romero (1993) noted overlapping considerations of SNAF and 
fears of INS deportation in relation to the (mis)enumeration of El Salvadoran households 
in San Francisco, California. While multiple families often lived within the same 
household, only one family/home was listed on the mailbox and residential documents, 
e.g. utility bills and apartment leases. This one family would be counted in the Census, 
while missing all the others. In all of these cases, specific contextual factors such as 
poverty, temporality, and deportation fears led to the creation of unique households in 
different U.S. locations. While these specific factors likely also impacted the 
enumeration, misenumeration has been tied most directly to enumerators’ assumptions 
about household makeup and SNAF. 
 According to SNAF, households tend to be constituted as single dwelling 
residences of nuclear families. In an ethnographic study, Gerber (1990, 1994) 
demonstrated an alternate criterion employed by members of multiple family households 
to define a household member and who lives there. The more complex the household 
relationship, the more criteria they used to determine if the person should be considered 
part of the household. The criteria included peoples’ intentions and agreements, the 
location of belongings, and where mail is received; these determined for the respondents 
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whether they were as living in the household. Because of the Census definitions, this 
may lead respondents to leave off “marginal” people who should be enumerated in the 
census or are included in error.  
  In previous sections, I have discussed how the state, via the Census Bureau, has 
constituted household, race, and ethnic categories – and how these categories have 
shifted overtime. Underlying these constructions, however, has been the presumption of 
heteronormativity, largely unheeded until recently prompted by increasing debate around 
civil unions and same-sex marriages. As such, state and national legislation has been 
instigated to ensure and enforce single monogamous heterosexual marriage. In the way, 
the state has enacted powerful structuring forces around sexuality itself. In this next 
section, I explore this concept of sexuality as structure in greater depth.    
2.5. Sexualities as Structural 
 One of the primary concerns in sociology is with the structuring of social life, be 
it social class structuring politics, gender that structures employment opportunities, or 
sexuality structuring the state. Giddens (1984: 377) defines structure as “Structure. Rules 
and Resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure 
exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as 
instantiated in action.”  In other words, Giddens underscores the interaction of forces, in 
which structures shape people’s actions, but people’s practices in turn also reproduce 
and/or constitute structures. 
 In an elaboration on Giddens’ notion of structure, Sewell (1992) posits the 
existence of dual structures at work in social arenas. He reiterates these structures are 
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comprised of two key components – a) rules or cultural schema, and b) resources. 
Sewell, however, emphasizes that these components are culturally mediated, such that 
structures such as the state are consciously established, maintained, fought over, and 
disputed, rather than taken for granted as if they were unchangeable features of the world 
(Sewell 1992: 24). Sewell (1992: 8) defines cultural schema as the “generalizable 
procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life.” 
 Two distinct applications of Sewell’s (1992) work are Lewis’ (2004) analysis of 
race relations in education and Hull’s (2006) examination of gay marriage. Lewis noted, 
in regards to race, that  
Sewell’s formulation gives us a way of understanding race as both symbolic and 
structural, as comprised of both cultural schemas (e.g. rules of sexual interaction 
and folk understandings of the meaning and differences between sexual groups) 
and resources (e.g. cultural capital, wealth) (Lewis 2004: 630).  
Lewis applied Sewell’s concept to whiteness and argues that Whites enact cultural 
schemas of racial dominance and thus gain material advantages from non-Whites. In 
regards to sexuality, Hull (2006) examined the cultural schema around marriage 
ceremonies, particularly related to gay marriage. Despite the lack of legal recognition of 
the ceremonies, many same-sex couples enacted weddings and commitment ceremonies. 
Many of the respondents discussed the cultural aspects of “getting married” and how it 
changed the status of their relationship among their friends, family, and themselves. 
 One common cultural schema that pervasive across institutions, practices, and 
discourses, challenges men who work in predominately female jobs, such as nursing or 
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teaching. Williams (1992) finds that the public holds negative cultural attitudes about 
male nurses, questioning their sexuality and assuming they are gay (Connell 1995). 
Likewise, many male teachers of young children are accused of being gay and or 
pedophiles (King 2004). Despite evidence to the contrary from national professional 
organizations (AMA, APA, ASA among a few), others continue to argue that gay male 
teachers will “recruit” young children into a homosexual lifestyle or that “homosexual 
promotion” provides an avenue to recruit young children into homosexuality (Squirrel 
1998; Whatney 1991). These assertions then tend to reinforce and conflate cultural 
schemas around gender and sexuality, predisposing public opinion to negatively perceive 
men working in typically female-gendered occupations. 
 Furthermore, cultural schema regarding gay men and lesbians are threaded 
throughout U.S. law. "Contemporary condemnation of gay and lesbian people is not 
simply a matter of individual attitude or idiosyncrasy, but rather is deeply embedded in 
the structures of our culture and law" (Law 1988: 187). This includes local ordinances, 
civil and criminal suits, and state and national legislation. For example, in Buffalo, New 
York, a city ordinance from the 1920s banned two same-gender people from dancing or 
openly associating with each other unless in a bar (Kennedy and Davis 1993). In New 
York City, a local decree from the same time period prohibited two non-relatives from 
sharing an apartment together, thus denying gay or lesbian couples the opportunity of 
living together. Even in current civil and criminal suits, a gay or lesbian identity can be a 
detriment. Child custody has been denied to biological parents based on a 
nonheterosexual orientation (Patterson 1992). In hate crime trials, defense lawyers often 
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appeal to a “gay panic” or Non-violent Homosexual Advance Defense to gain their 
client’s acquittal (Smyth 2006). This defense argues the inherent right to retribution of 
heterosexuals against purported advances by homosexual men. In 1996, a proposed bill 
called Employment Non-Discrimination Act would have ended workplace 
discrimination against gays and lesbians, but it was narrowly defeated (Berg and Lien 
2002). In the same year, however, President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) into law, which has since prompted more than thirty states to pass similar 
legislation. A recent appeal in Michigan has even denied domestic partner benefits, 
based on the judicial interpretation of a domestic partnership as “marriage-like” 
denounced in Michigan’s DOMA amendment (Michigan Court of Appeals 2007). 
While laws represent critical enactments of cultural schemas, they also manifest 
the second aspect of dual structures – resources. Sewell (1992: 9) defines resources as 
“anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions.” He argues that they 
are of two types: nonhuman and human. Nonhuman resources are material aspects which 
are valued and can be used to enhance or maintain power. Examples include “factories 
owned by capitalists, stocks of weapons controlled by kings or generals, or land rented 
by peasants” (Sewell 1992: 10). Human resources, though, describe personal and social 
attributes which encourage particular forms of action. These include “children’s sense of 
obligation toward their mothers, or the fear and reverence that subjects feel for their 
king” (Sewell 1992: 10). Cultural schemas embody a particular ordering of the social 
world, and human resources characterize actions compelled by those schema.  
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Gay men and lesbians historically and currently are denied resources based on 
heteronormative privileges and sanctions. Historically, examples of resources denied 
include housing (Chauncey 1994), failure to enforce laws and police harassment 
(Comstock 1991; Deitcher 1995; D’Emilio 1983), criminal prosecution of LGBT 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) activist (Adam 1987; Stockdill 2003) and 
association in bars (Kennedy and Davis 1993). Other resources that may be denied to 
gay men and lesbians are marriage, adoption, and inheritance rights (Bennett and Gates 
2004; Cahill 2004; Cott 2000; Defense of Marriage Act of 1996; Eskridge 2001; Graff 
1999; Moats 2004; Mello 2004; Rauch 2004; Wolfson 2004).   
Many examples of resources being denied to gay men and lesbians involve the 
workplace. Researchers (Humphrey 1999; Schneider 1986) have also found that many 
homosexuals are fired when their sexual orientation is discovered. In terms of the hiring 
process, homosexuality, at least initially, may not play as large a factor as actual on the 
job training or work (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995; Levitt and Klassen 1974). Bernstein 
and Kostelac (2002: 316), who studied police officers, found that one-fourth of their 
sample “felt that recruiting homosexual officers undermines department morale.”  
Furthermore, studies suggest that although many lesbians and gay men anticipate 
discrimination, a smaller percentage actually experiences discrimination in their 
workplace (Bell and Weinberg 1978; Humphrey 1999; Levine and Leonard 1984; Saghir 
and Robins 1973; Schneider 1986; Taylor and Raeborn 1995). In Embrick, Walther, and 
Wickens’ (2007) study, heterosexual men denied gays and lesbians the resources of a 
good job by ensuring that no gay men or lesbians entered into the place of employment. 
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Other research suggested that in some cases gay men and lesbians must pass as 
heterosexuals in order to gain access to the job market (Badgett, Donnelly, and Kibbe 
1992).  
 In the previous sections, I have discussed how the state, via the Census, has 
variously shaped and defined households, family, race, and ethnic categories. I have also 
noted the dual aspects that structures sexuality – the cultural schemas, tied to 
heteronormativity, that typically negatively define homosexuality and resources, the 
material consequences denied to gay men and lesbians, e.g. housing, child custody, and 
employment of these schemas. While I have focused on the structuring forces centered 
on sexuality, I recognize structures are not unilaterally enacted (Giddens 1984). 
Sexualities rather, just as structures shape people’s behaviors, individual practices 
impact those same structures. Much of the evolution of Census categories has in fact 
been in response to lobbying efforts by particular groups. Pressures by women’s groups 
led to the change of the head of household category to Person 1. Multiple groups,22 
people,23 and legislators24 have tried to influence the categories on the Census Schedule, 
                                                 
22 Groups who weighed in on the debate over the addition of multiracial categories include: A Place For 
US Ministry, Honor Our Ethnic Youth or HONEY, IMAGE, Interracial Network, Interracial/Intercultural 
Pride or I-Pride, Multiracial Americans of Southern California or MASC, Biracial Family Network, 
Parents of Interracial Children, Interracial Connection, Interracial Family Alliance, Interracial Club, 
Interracial Family Circle, Interracial Families, Inc. National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People. Groups who weighed in on the debate over the addition of the category, Hispanic, included: 
Mecha, Crusade for Justice, Brown Berets, Black Berets, and Young Lords to name just a few. Other 
groups who lobbied for a change in the definition of head of household included Social Scientists for 
Population Research, National Organization for Women, the Women’s Equity Action League, and the 
National Abortion Rights Action League.  
23 People who supported or disagreed with adding the multiracial category included: Pat Barner, Kevin 
Barber, Charles Byrd, Reginald Daniel, Ramona Douglass, Carolos Alejandro Fernández, Susan Graham, 
Sarah Ross, Ruth and Steve White, among a few.  
24 Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI),  Representative Thomas Sawyer (D-OH), Representative Robert Matsui 
(D-CA), Representative Thomas Petri (R-WI), Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, among a few. In the case 
of the head of household category, included Representative Patricia Schroeder who was also the Chair of 
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the Census Schedule still revolves around a nuclear heterosexual family formation (de la 
Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 1998). 
 In regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas influence 
‘individuals’ enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical consciousness. 
Legal consciousness refers to people’s lay understandings of the law, while statistical 
consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases the production of 
legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources, is then variously understood, 
consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct purposes. This 
understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, despite being 
socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. 
2.6. Legal Consciousness 
 A common understanding of “law” suggests a fixed and immutable set of 
guidelines that differentiates right from wrong, and the institution of penalties upon 
“breaking the law.” However, much like concepts of race (Omi and Winant 1994) and 
sexualities (Chauncey 1993), law is both durable and malleable. It is a social 
construction and fluid in its boundaries (Schauer 2006). Berger and Luckman (1966) 
argue that all of social order and social life is a social construction. In regards to law, 
Berger and Luckman give an example of the death penalty. They write that the, 
“institution of the law posits that heads shall be chopped off in specific ways under 
specific circumstances and that specific types of individuals shall do the chopping 
(executioners, say, or members of an impure caste, or virgins under a certain age, or 
                                                                                                                                                
the U.S. House Subcommittee on Population and the Census at the time and Arthur Fleming who was 
Chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 
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those who have been designated by an oracle).” Law shapes how people make meaning 
in their lives at both the structural and individual levels, intersecting with institutions 
such as the state, religion, and family, among a few (Engel and Munger 2003; Ewick and 
Silbey 1998; Merry 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Nielsen 2000). In these intersections, 
people fight to recreate or to affirm the law in their everyday life. For instance polygamy 
has been outlawed in the United States since 1862 with the Morrill Anti-Polygamy Act; 
however, polygamy is practiced in the some states such as Utah, Arizona, and Texas 
(Dobson 2006).25  
Although law is malleable and durable, Max Weber (1947) writes about “the 
subjective meaning-complex of action” which can be applied to the intersection of social 
agency and legal consciousness. Unlike Marx, Weber suggests that culture can influence 
agency while agency can influence culture. Weber describes the subjective interpretation 
of action as an effect to understand human behavior in terms of “the concepts of 
collective entities” (Weber 1947: 102). This suggests that for Weber a dual character of 
action/consciousness in which thoughts or concepts “have a meaning in the minds of 
individual persons, partly as of something actually existing, partly as something with 
normative authority” (Weber 1947: 101-102). 
Because Weber suggests a dual character of action and consciousness in which 
concepts have meanings in people’s everyday life, Merry extends by suggesting the 
concept of legal consciousness. Merry (1995: 5) defines legal consciousness as “the 
ways people understand and use law” and as “the way people conceive of the ‘natural’ 
                                                 
25 In 2001, the state of Utah convicted Thomas Green of criminal non-support and four counts of bigamy 
for having 5 serially monogamous marriages, while living with previous legally divorced wives.  
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and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and action and their 
commonsense understanding of the world.” For instance, a person is in a car accident. It 
is the other persons fault, but the insurance company will not issue a loaner car. The 
person in the accident responds by saying that if the insurance company does not provide 
a loaner car then she will lose her job and have to sue the person who caused the 
accident. In this example, the person invokes legal consciousness in suggesting that she 
will have to sue the person who caused the accident. Legal consciousness is in the 
practical knowledge in which people do things (Bourdieu 1977). Scholarship about legal 
consciousness has demonstrated how law shapes the everyday lives of people (Ewick 
and Silbey 1992, 1998; Hartog 1995; Nielsen 2000; Sarat 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1995; 
White 1990).  Many empirical studies of legal consciousness exist about the white 
working class and middle class people (Greenhouse 1986; Merry 1990; Engel 1983; 
Engel 1984; Merry and Silbey 1984; Yngvesson 1988), while other studies have 
uncovered legal consciousness by focusing more on people of color rather than 
socioeconomic status (Bumiller 1988; Sarat 1990; Friedman 1985; Tyler 1990; White 
1990).   
Extending Merry’s definition, Ewick and  Silbey (1998) argue that legal 
consciousness develops through individual experience and changes with contradictory 
experiences. People will shift what they are doing if it is not working or contradicts what 
happens to them. Swidler (1986) calls this “strategies of action.” “Strategies of action” 
are the normative rules and values and the familiar, repeated ways of practices. Swidler 
(1986: 273) suggests that culture can be understood as “a ‘tool-kit’ of symbols, stories, 
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rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve 
different kinds of problems.” Individuals develop particular “strategies of action” which 
are based on repeated practices that are linked together over time. Culture consists of 
repertoires of skills, styles, habits, and techniques which explain patterns of action. 
Individuals consistently learn new repertoires and competencies, especially when the 
existing ones prove to be inadequate or inconsistent or when new ways of examining 
culture become available. When one experiences contradictions in one’s life, Swidler 
suggests that individuals and groups will tend to abandon familiar repertoires for new 
ones.  
In Ewick and Silbey’s book, The Common Place of Law (1998), they found that 
people often abandon familiar repertoires for new ones. Most people would not have 
considered the legal system as an avenue toward a solution to their problems. However, 
many in their study began using the legal system as a solution to their problems. Ewick 
and Silbey find three orientations to law: before the law; with the law; and against the 
law. Those respondents who were “before the law” saw the legal system as a trap, 
something standing in the way of their everyday life. Those respondents who were seen 
as “with the law” engaged the legal system, using it to work for them. Those respondents 
who were “against the law” were people who viewed the legal system as a trap and 
supporting systems of oppression, or they resisted the legal system. Many (Merry 1995; 
McCann 1994; Thompson 1975) argue that those who use the legal system as a tool of 
resistance have legal consciousness.  
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Another study about legal consciousness examines public speech. Nielsen (2000) 
finds variations in how legal consciousness is applied to public speech by gender, class, 
and race. She finds four paradigms to the law: the freedom of speech paradigm, the 
“autonomy” paradigm, the “impracticality” paradigm, and the distrust of 
authority/cynicism about law paradigm. Those respondents who argued the freedom of 
speech paradigm used a “slippery slope” argument, that is, if one form of speech is 
restricted then what is to stop other forms of speech from being restricted (Nielsen 2000: 
1074). In the “autonomy” paradigm, respondents downplayed public harassment and did 
not want to be perceived as victims. Respondents who were in the “impracticality” 
paradigm suggested that it was impractical to catch, try, and punish individuals who 
violated public harassment laws, if the laws existed. Finally, respondents who were 
categorized as having a distrust of authority or cynicism about the law argued that the 
laws would not be enforced because of a lack of authority.  African American 
respondents specifically were more likely to argue that public speech could not be 
legally enforced because of their lack of belief in authority. One African American 
respondent even compared the idea to affirmative action saying “They’re never going to 
enforce laws like that anyway. Look at affirmative action – it’s all going away anyhow” 
(Nielsen 2000: 1084-1085). Nielsen’s findings indicate that social groups experience and 
define legal consciousness differently based predominately on social hierarchies. 
In another study, Anna-Maria Marshall (2005: 2) extends the concept of legal 
consciousness in everyday life and asserts the concept of “legal consciousness of 
injustice.” She defines legal consciousness of injustice as “represent[ing] an effort to 
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understand the relationship between law and social change from the bottom up, where 
changing social, political, and cultural values create conflict in everyday life” (Marshall 
2005: 2). She argues that people do not necessarily need to understand the exact 
interpretation of the law. In her study of sexual harassment, many of the women applied 
more stringent rules to define an event as sexual harassment than what is stated in the 
written policy, but were aware of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace. Many 
of the respondents were aware of the sexual harassment; however, they did not seek 
legal assistance because they felt that it was pointless, that is, the law would not be 
enforced. I turn now to a discussion of Sewell’s argument and the concept of statistical 
consciousness. 
2.7. Statistical Consciousness 
People often see statistics operating in their everyday lives when they pick up a 
newspaper or watch television. Social scientists and critics produce statistics for public 
consumption. Journalists report on social problems which have been constructed (Best 
1995, 2001; Loeseke 1999; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Reporters have a much easier 
time reporting news stories if the statistics are exaggerated (Hewitt 1996). These 
exaggerations can occur within powerful organizations and institutions such as 
governmental offices (Crossen 1994).  
Joel Best (2001) argues that society is innumerate – “mathematical[ly] illiterate” 
(Paulos 1988). People do not critically examine the statistics that permeate their lives. 
When Kinsey and his colleagues first published their book, Sexual Behavior in the 
Human Male, one statistic regarding homosexuality emerged from this study that has 
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since become ubiquitous in the everyday understanding of American society, the “10 
percent” statistic. Kinsey and his colleagues reported that “10 per cent of the males are 
more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rate 5 or 6) for at least three years between the 
ages of 16 and 55. This is one male in ten in the white male population.” They continue 
that they found 8 percent of males are exclusively homosexual and that “4 per cent of the 
white males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, after the onset of 
adolescence.”26 Kinsey and his colleagues clearly reported differences of homosexuality 
based on age, race, and practices of male sexual activities. Best (2001: 62) describes the 
10 percent statistic as a mutant statistic – “distorted versions of the original figures.” 
However, the 10 percent statistic has remained.27    
Gay and lesbian activists continue to assert that in the United States, 10 percent 
of the population is homosexual. Activists use the slogan, “10 percent,” to show the 
power and numbers of the gay and lesbian population. The 10 percent statistic has taken 
on a mythical realm in queer communities. For instance, the 10 percent statistic has 
appeared in scholarly work (Jennings 1994; Smith 1998), work about religion 
(Thompson 2005) and youth (Owens 1998). Peter Sprigg from Family Research Center, 
accounts for 124,000 google hits of the 10 percent statistic. The 10 percent statistic has 
become pervasive throughout society.28  
                                                 
26 Many researchers have critiqued Kinsey’s methods of data collection, reports, and interpretation of their 
data (Brickman 2004; Cochran 1954; Himelhoch and Fava 1955; Laumann et al. 1994) 
27 Please see Chapter III for a discussion of the percentage of the population who are lesbian or gay. 
28 One of the reasons that the 10 percent statistic remains pervasive in our society is because of what 
Biderman and Riess (1967) call the “dark figure” in criminology. The dark figure is the “occurrences that 
by some criteria are called crime yet that are not registered in the statistics of whatever agency was the 
source of the data being used” (Biderman and Riess 1967: 1). Many people have non-heterosexual sexual 
activity, but do not self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or queer (Humphreys 1975; Laumann et al. 1994; 
     
                                  
   
53
Once a statistic has taken on a life of its own, Best (2001) describes this as 
number laundering. Best (2001: 35) writes that, “Its origins as someone’s best guess are 
now forgotten and, through repetition, it comes to be treated as a straightforward fact – 
accurate and authoritative.” The 10 percent statistic is not only a mutant statistic but has 
become pervasive throughout society.  
Another example of mutant statistics derives from the 2000 Decennial Census. 
When the data from the 2000 Decennial Census became available 92 news articles were 
published about the increase in the number of reported same-sex households between the 
1990 Census to the 2000 Census. For instance, the Indianapolis Star reported: 
According to U.S. Census Bureau data released Wednesday, the number of same-
sex households in the state grew by more than fourfold – about 428 percent, from 
1,935 in 1990 to 10,219 in 2000 – during the 1990s even though their relative 
numbers remain tiny (Callahan 2001). 
Furthermore, the Chicago Sun-Times reported, “Same-sex partner households in 
Illinois jumped 267 percent statewide between 1990 and 2000…” (Guerrero and 
Sweeney 2001) and Toosi (2001) describes the dramatic increase for the state of 
Wyoming as “only 30 such couples were reported in 1990. In 2000, it was 807, a 2,590 
percent increase.” These accounts report enormous percentage increases in the numbers 
of same-sex households in various states, but these newspaper accounts do not provide 
the entire story.  
                                                                                                                                                
Russell and Poston 2007; Walther, Terrell, and Poston 2007). Because of non-heterosexual sexual activity, 
there is always a dark figure of how many lesbian and gay men are there? 
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Very few researchers have critically examined the Census data; but the 2000 
Census data were reported throughout the media and continues to be referred to in news 
articles without the caveats of the problems with the census data. In a news article about 
the gay marriage vote in Kansas, Bellafante (2006), a journalist, wrote,   
[Gary Gates] found a 68 percent jump in Kansas households headed by same-sex 
partners between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, 11 out of every 1,000 couples living 
together in Kansas reported themselves as same-sex, according to Mr. Gates's 
review of the Census Bureau's annual American Community Survey data, a 
figure closer than one might expect to those recorded in New Jersey and New 
York, where 12 and 14 out of every 1,000 couples, respectively, are same-sex. 
With the census data, researchers and activists have produced statistics for public 
consumption.  
Because of these examples of statistics used for public consumption and civil 
understanding, I assert the concept of statistical consciousness. Following Marshall’s 
(2005) work on legal consciousness of injustice, I define statistical consciousness as 
representing an effort to understand the relationship between statistics and social change, 
where changing social, political, and cultural values create conflict in everyday life.    
In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology I used to address my research 
questions. I used a multiple method design including secondary analysis, survey 
collection, and qualitative interviews with gay and lesbian couples. 
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
 Sociologists have used multiple methods to analyze communities and answer 
overarching macro level questions about a variety of issues. For instance, Du Bois 
(1899/1996) collected ethnographic and survey data about Philadelphia Blacks. He 
included “six schedules” covering nine thousand Blacks: a family schedule, an 
individual schedule, a home schedule; a street schedule; an institution schedule for 
organizations and institutions; and finally a slight variation of the individual schedule 
was used for house-servants living at their places of employment. Secondly, Drake and 
Clayton (1945) collected data (population; distribution of poverty; distribution of 
foreign-born, etc.) and compared African American communities in the Black 
Metropolis and the Deep South on these demographic characteristics. Luker (1997) 
analyzed teenage pregnancy using both historical demographic data and interviews with 
teenage parents. In studying Mexican migration, Douglas Massey (1987a, 1987b, 1994) 
created the ethnosurvey which combines ethnographic and survey methodologies 
(Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey et al. 1998; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). 
Furthermore, using the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a survey, 
Rumbaut (2005) constructed interview questions to contextualize ethnic identities, which 
led to a better understanding of multiple generational identities and education.  
 While many sociologists and anthropologists have used both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to collect data about populations, demographers only began 
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noticing qualitative research in the 1970s (Kertzer and Arel 2001).29 Two research 
projects began exploring anthropological and qualitative methodology. In the 1970s, 
Ansley Coale and many of his students undertook the Princeton European Fertility 
Project. Using demographic transition theory with three stages, pre-transitional, 
transitional, and post-transitional to explain declining fertility in European countries, 
Coale and his students found onsets of fertility decline for different economic conditions 
that were not predicted by the demographic transition theory (Coale and Watkins 1986; 
Knodel and van de Walle 1979). For instance, Coale and Watkins (1986) found fertility 
declines in France due to “cultural changes” such as linguistic, religious, or geographic 
variations.   
 In a second case, dissatisfied with the World Fertility Survey (Caldwell 1982, 
1985), John Caldwell began doing field studies in Nigeria and Bangladesh (Caldwell 
1977). Using focus groups and key informants, Caldwell defined “microdemography,” 
later as anthropological demography for smaller demographic projects (Caldwell, Hill 
and Hull 1988).  
 This was a significant shift for demography. Caldwell (1982: 4) wrote,  
Most demographers work on large data sets, often with little contact with the 
people whom the statistics describe. Fortunately, in early 1962 it became clear 
that the 1960 Ghana Census was not going to yield material quickly enough to 
absorb my time. We thereupon used our limited funds for cheap and relatively 
small scale investigations which meant borrowing methodology from the 
                                                 
29 In the 1970s and 1980s, other disciplines such as education began combining ethnographic and survey 
methods in one single study design (Louis 1982; Miles and Humberman 1984; Smith and Robbins 1982). 
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anthropologists (and reading them) and becoming intimately acquainted with 
village and family in turn. For a demographer with traditional training, the 
experience was illuminating – so illuminating that we have attempted to use 
similar methods ever since.  
Because of his “illuminating experiences,” Caldwell began actively promoting culture 
and truncated qualitative studies in demographic theory. Caldwell argued for a Wealth 
Flows Theory (Caldwell 1982), which was based on his analysis of data using the 
microdemographic methodology.  
  Since Caldwell’s Wealth Flows Theory, demographers have primarily focused 
mixed-methodology upon fertility (Coale and Watkins 1986; Knodel, Chamratrithiron, 
and Debavalya 1987). Recently, various anthropologists (Fricke 2005; Scheper-Hughes 
1997) and demographers (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Fricke and Teachman 1993; Kertzer 
and Friske 1997; Riley 1997) have suggested new and various methodological 
combinations such as focus groups (Morgan 1996), critical interpretive anthropology 
(Scheper-Hughes 1993, 1997), ethnosurvey (Massey 1987a), combining ethnography 
and GIS technology to study poverty and disability (Skinner, Matthews, and Burton 
2005), and the neighborhood history calendar (Axinn, Barber, and Ghimire 1997).   
3.2. Why Use Mixed-Methods? 
 Many (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) argue that mixed-methodology is 
epistemologically opposed. There are at least two groups in this debate: the purists and 
the pragmatists. The purists argue that the two methodologies are incompatible because 
of different assumptions about the manner in which to conduct research (Guba 1978). 
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Firestone (1987: 16) writes for purists that “there is a logical relationship between the 
principles inherent in the paradigm and the methods chosen; methods are derived from 
first principles.” Firestone (1987) stresses four assumptions that are debated among 
purists and pragmatists: 1). Assumptions about the world; 2). Purpose; 3). Approach; and 
4). Researcher’s role. 
1). Assumptions about the world. Qualitative researchers stress the social construction of 
reality or the multiple “truths” of a context (Smith and Heshusius 1986). Reality is a 
social construction rooted in the individual and/or a collective definition of the social 
situation (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). Purists argue that reality can never be captured, 
only approximated (Firestone 1987; Guba 1990: 22; Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 21). 
Qualitative studies capture and represent in depth context(s) which are deemed socially 
significant. In the purists’ views, quantitative researchers argue that there is only one 
truth that is based on positivist philosophy (Firestone 1987). Qualitative research is seen 
as “value-laden” and subjective while quantitative researcher is seen as “value-free” and 
objective (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 10; Firestone 1987; Powdermaker 1966).30 
2). Purpose. Qualitative studies tend to be more concerned about understanding the 
social context. Qualitative researchers will try to understand the social actors in their 
contexts. They will provide rich descriptions of the social world which is not found in 
quantitative studies. For example, in Gamson’s (1998) book, Freaks Talk Back, he 
participated as a member of the audience at talk shows, interviewed people who 
participated in the shows, interviewed people who worked at the shows, and analyzed 
                                                 
30 Critiques of quantitative research being “value-free” may be found in Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 
(2001); Gusfield (1976); House (1979); Zuberi (2001).  
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multiple shows using content analysis to come to an understanding about what talk 
shows meant to the participants, the audience, and to those who produced the shows.  
 Quantitative studies are less concerned with rich descriptions because of the 
nature of their methods and being able to generalize to a larger population (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005: 12; Firestone 1987). Quantitative analysis is typically based on large data 
sets to explain the determinants of social facts through objective measuring and the 
quantification of variables (Greenhalgh 1997). Within demographic analysis (Coale and 
Watkins 1986; Forbes and Frisbie 1991; Hammel 1990; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; 
Watkins 1986, 1987, 1990), culture becomes a leftover variable. That is, outcomes that 
were not expected occurred and some researchers suggest that culture was the influence 
to these outcomes.31 This produces a causal effect rather than an understanding 
(vertschen) of the social actors.  
3). Approach. Quantitative researchers typically use methods such as logistic regression, 
path analysis or log-linear analyses that are seen as objective or “true” (Cronbach 1975; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 11). Qualitative researchers will use ethnographic or 
participation observations to study a social context. These methods vary in basic 
assumptions of “truth.” Qualitative researchers reflect upon multiple “truths,” arguing 
that there is not just one “truth” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).  
4). Researcher’s role. Qualitative researchers usually account for the position of the 
researcher by clarifying their social class, gender, race, and sexual identity. Social status 
                                                 
31 For instance, Forbes and Frisbie (1991) in one the first studies of Hispanic and Anglo infant mortality 
conclude that cultural aspects play a factor in the decreased level of Latino infant mortality. However, they 
do not underscore what they mean by culture or what aspects of Hispanic culture have an influence on 
decreasing infant mortality. 
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makes a difference in how people respond to the interview. While Johnson-Bailey 
(1999) found in her interviews of returning older African American women to higher 
education that Black female respondents understood each other on race and gender 
issues, schisms of social class and color impeded the process of understanding these 
Black women.  Quantitative researchers rarely account for their positionality (with an 
exception of Riley 1997). Quantitative researchers are more likely to describe that they 
have no position. 
 Mixed-methods for purists remove qualitative methods from their natural home 
within a critical, interpretive framework (Howe 2004; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). 
Moreover, they allow the inquiry to be dichotomous: exploration (qualitative methods) 
versus confirmation (quantitative methods) (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003).   
 Pragmatists, however, make a distinction between methods and methodology. To 
purists, methodology should always be derived from theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), 
but for pragmatists methods are a collection of techniques to justify the outcome. 
Pragmatists argue that there is a false dichotomy that exists between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches (Onwuegbuzie 2002). They assert that qualitative and quantitative 
methods can be combined to answer most research question (Axinn and Pearce 2006; 
Onwuegbuzie 2002; Massey 1987a, 1987b 1994; Reichardt and Cook 1979).  
 Many researchers have overlooked the epistemological differences and combined 
qualitative and quantitative methods, suggesting that by combining methods there will 
be more strengths than weaknesses for the research (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Creswell 
1995; Creswell et al. 2003; Greene, Caraceli, and Graham 1989; Massey 1987a, 1987b, 
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1994; Onwuegbuzie 2002; Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie 1998, 2003; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 1998). For instance, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 5) define mixed methods 
research as 
a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. 
As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction 
of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a method; it 
focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative 
data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone.  
While Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) do not separate the philosophical assumptions 
and the methods, they do point to combining both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to better understand research problems.  
 Moreover, Sieber (1973) outlines numerous reasons that quantitative and 
qualitative research can be used together. First, at the research design stage, quantitative 
data can assist the qualitative phrase by identifying representative sample members. At 
the data collection stage, quantitative data can provide baseline information and help to 
avoid interviewing only high-status individuals. During the data analysis stage, 
quantitative data can facilitate the assessment of the generalizablity of qualitative data 
and shed new light on qualitative findings. Furthermore, qualitative analysis can assist 
the quantitative component of study with conceptual and instrument development. 
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Qualitative data can help with interpreting, clarifying, describing, and validating 
quantitative results (Massey 1987a, 1987b, 1994; Onwuegbuzie 2002). 
 Morse (1991) suggests two types of mixed-methods: simultaneous or sequential. 
The first is simultaneous use of qualitative and quantitative methods with little 
interaction between the two sources of data during the data collection stage, but the 
findings complement one another at the data interpretation stage. The sequential method 
is used to plan the next step in the research project (Axinn and Pearce 2006; 
Onwuegbuzie 2002). Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) note three ways in which mixed-
methods can occur: merging or converging the two datasets; connecting the two datasets 
by having one build on the other; or embedding one dataset within the other so that one 
dataset supports the role of the other dataset. In my dissertation I used mixed-methods 
because neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone could answer my research 
questions. Furthermore, my method was sequential. I first analyzed the Census data and 
then did interviews when new research questions came about.  
3.3. What Are My Data? 
 I have used mixed-methods of interviews, surveys, and secondary data. I first 
examined the 2000 U.S. Census data. Using a sequential method and after examining the 
census data, I interviewed thirty self-identified gay men and lesbians. From the 
interviews, I constructed a preliminary Internet survey. My first data source are 
secondary data from the 2000 Census data. I used them to I propose five different 
indices to measure and index gay male and lesbian concentration.  
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3.3.1. Census Data 
Until the conduct of the 1990 U.S. census, it was not possible to examine a 
national representation of same-sex couples. In the 1990 and 2000 censuses an 
“unmarried partner” response was added to the other responses (husband, wife, son, 
grandfather, etc.) to the census question pertaining to the standard “relationship to the 
householder,” i.e., the person in the household designated as person #1. Person #1 is 
typically "the member of the household in whose name the home is owned, being bought 
or rented" (Barrett 1994: 16). Every person in the household, except for person #1, thus 
responds to a question about his/her relationship to person #1. The “unmarried partner” 
response enables the identification of persons in the household who are unrelated to 
person #1, but who have a “marriage-like” relationship with person #1. Census 
procedures allow respondents to check the “unmarried partner” response irrespective of 
whether the person’s sex is the same as that of person #1.  
One of the data tables available on Summary File 2 of the 2000 census, Table 
PCT 22, gives the number of households in which person #1 is a male, and another male 
in the household identifies himself as the unmarried partner of person #1; these are 
known as male-male households. A similar tabulation is provided for households in 
which person #1 is a female and in which another female identifies herself as the 
unmarried partner of person #1; these are known as female-female households. Because 
the “unmarried partner” response is meant to reflect a “marriage-like” relationship 
between the two persons, researchers make the assumption that these data on same-sex 
households (male-male or female-female) represent households inhabited by partnered 
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gays, or by partnered lesbians (Black et al. 2000; 2002; Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons 
and O’Connell 2003; Walther and Poston 2004).  
There are at least two issues to be addressed in an appraisal of the same-sex 
partnering census data. The first asks about the accuracy of the 2000 census data in 
portraying the true numbers of partnered gay men and lesbians? Specifically, how well 
have the 2000 census data on same-sex partners enumerated the actual numbers of 
partnered gays and lesbians living in the U.S. in 2000?  A second issue concerns the 
extent to which there is error in the same-sex partnering census data, perhaps due to sex 
miscoding.    
3.3.1.1. How Well Have the 2000 Census Data on Same-Sex Partners 
Enumerated the Actual Numbers of Partnered Gay Men and Lesbians Living in 
the U.S. in 2000? 
Census 2000 counted 1,188,782 same sex unmarried persons living in the U.S. in 
2000. Of these, 605,052 are same-sex male unmarried partners, and 586,730 are same-
sex female unmarried partners. To begin to evaluate the validity of these data, one would 
need to first know the true number of gay men and lesbians (of age 18 and over) living 
in the United States in 2000. There is no such number available, but it may be estimated 
with data from national surveys.  
 The U.S. population of males and females aged 18 and over, counted in the 2000 
census, is comprised of 100,994,367 males, and 108,133,727 females. How many of 
these males are gay men, and how many of these females are lesbians?  
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 One of the statistically best and nationally representative surveys of sexuality in 
the U.S. is the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) conducted in 1992 by 
Laumann and his associates (Laumann et al. 1994). The male and female respondents (of 
age 18 and over) in the NHSLS were asked a number of questions about same-sex 
behavior and identification (Laumann et al. 1994: 292-297). One can determine the 
percentages of gay men and lesbians in the NHSLS by tabulating the responses to both 
types of questions.  
 Regarding self-identification, one can use weighted data from the NHSLS and 
ascertain that 2.6 percent of the males and 1.1 percent of the females “report identifying 
with a label denoting same-gender sexuality” (Laumann et al. 1994: 297). Regarding 
behavior, the NHSLS weighted data indicate that 2.1 percent of the males and 0.9 
percent of the females report having exclusively same-sex sex partners in the past twelve 
months. One can combine the two answers and develop an estimate of the percentages of 
gays and lesbians in the U.S. who self-identified as homosexual and/or engaged in 
exclusively homosexual behavior in the past year. The data show that 2.99 percent of the 
males may be classified as gay, and 1.48 percent of the females may be classified as 
lesbian. I note that these percentages of lesbians and gays based on weighted data from 
the NHSLS are lower than similar estimates of The Urban Institute that five percent of 
the U.S. population of age 18 and over is gay and lesbian (Gates 2001: 2). 
 Earlier I reported counts from the 2000 census of persons age 18 and over living 
in the U.S. Using the gay and lesbian percentages from the NHSLS discussed above, one 
can estimate that the gay population in the U.S. aged 18 and over in 2000 numbered 
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3,019,732 (that is, 100,994,367 x’s 2.99%); and the lesbian population numbered 
1,600,379 (that is, 108,133,727 x’s 1.48%). Now one needs to determine how many of 
these gay men and lesbians are living in marriage-type relationships in the same 
households. 
 In The Gay and Lesbian Atlas, Gates and Ost (2004) review several studies to 
arrive at estimates suggesting “that 23.5 percent of gay men and 42.7 percent of lesbians 
are coupled” (2004: 13). Using these figures, one can estimate that in the U.S. in 2000, 
there were 709,637 gay men in committed relationships living in the same households 
(that is, 3,019,732 x’s 23.5%). As noted above, Census 2000 enumerated 602,052 same-
sex male partners in the U.S. This suggests that Census 2000 undercounted 107,585 
committed gay men living in the U.S., for an undercount of 17.9 percent (Poston 2007). 
 With respect to committed lesbians, one can estimate that in the U.S. in 2000 
there were 683,362 committed lesbians living in the same households in the U.S. (or 
1,600,379 x’s 42.7%). Census 2000 counted 586,730 same-sex female partners in the 
U.S., indicating an undercount of committed lesbians of 96,632, or 16.7 percent.32 
 Of course, there are many problems with these estimates. For one thing, the 
census questionnaire does not ask about the actual sexual orientation of the respondents. 
One is assuming that the census numbers of same-sex male and female partners reflect 
the actual numbers of committed gays and lesbians in the population. One is also 
assuming that the NHSLS-based estimates of the prevalence of gays and lesbians in the 
                                                 
32 Badgett and Rogers (2003) used a survey of activists who attended the Washington Millennium March 
and a second source of an Internet survey conducted by Harris Interactive/Witeck-Coombs. They find an 
undercount between 16% and 28%. 
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NHSLS sample are true. Indeed it is not unlikely that the gays and lesbians were 
undercounted in the NHSLS (Gates 2001; Gates and Ost 2004).  
 The second issue to be addressed deals with the degree to which there could be 
error in the same-sex partnering data, perhaps due to sex miscoding errors. In the 1990 
census, if a same-sex couple (a householder and an unmarried partner) checked 
themselves as being married, post-collection census editing treated this as an 
inconsistency, and “usually changed the sex as a consistency edit. This means that in 
data for 1990 released by the Bureau the couple was coded as a heterosexual married 
couple” (Gates and Ost 2004: 12). The Bureau changed this post-collection editing 
decision in the 2000 Census to treat it “as an inconsistency in the relationship to 
householder rather than in the spouse’s sex. That is, the ‘husband-wife’ relationship 
designation was changed as a consistency edit to an ‘unmarried partner’ relationship. 
Since the sex variables were not changed as they were in 1990, the couple was counted 
as a same-sex unmarried partner couple” (Gates and Ost 2004: 12; U.S. Census Bureau 
2002).  
 It is known that a very small fraction of census respondents makes an error on the 
“sex” question and enters the incorrect sex. It is estimated that the degree of sex 
miscoding error among heterosexual couples in the 2000 census is no greater than 0.2 
percent. Recall that if this occurred in the 1990 census and one person in a married 
couple checked the wrong sex, the sex would be changed in the editing process and the 
couple counted as a married (heterosexual) couple. But in the 2000 census, the marital 
status code was changed and the couple was counted as an unmarried same-sex couple. 
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Census Bureau analysts, however, have determined that this sex miscoding measurement 
error is very small (as just noted) and “does not have any significant effect on 
geographical distribution patterns” (Gates and Ost 2004: 14).33  
3.3.1.2. Problems with the Census Data 
Currently, the data from the census about the unmarried partner category may 
contain numerous problems.  First, some scholars have suggested, given a variety of 
definitions for cohabitation on several large scale surveys, that various respondents may 
have misunderstood the term “unmarried partner,” inappropriately marking that 
category. For instance, the Current Population Survey defines cohabitation as being a 
household member. The National Survey of Family Growth – Cycle 1 defines 
cohabitation as “lover/partner,” while the National Survey of Family Growth – Cycle 5 
defines cohabitation as a “male partner” on the household roster and those “who live and 
sleep here most of the time” (Knab 2005: 6). Manning and Smock (2003) found using 
qualitative interviews that young couples “slide” into living together. In other words they 
did not discuss sharing the same household. For instance, during the college years, many 
couples begin dating while living in different apartments. Over time, however, they 
begin spending more time at one apartment and in a sense begin living together. 
However, the couples lacked common language such as partner or unmarried partner to 
identify their relationship and did not identify their relationship as “cohabiting.”  
Secondly, as Chevan (1996) has noted, a stigma may be associated with marking 
“unmarried partner” on the census form, which might discourage individuals from 
                                                 
33 I have compared 1990 and 2000 Census data of indices of metropolitan statistical areas. The 1990 and 
2000 Census data of indices are highly correlated.  
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marking that category. Chevan (1996) found that elderly heterosexual couples were less 
likely to mark unmarried partner due to increased pressure from adult children 
frequently worried about potential disputes over inheritance. Moreover, given the stigma 
associated with same-sex relationships (Goffman 1963), gay men and lesbians may be 
even less likely to mark their relationship on the census form. 
Thirdly, it cannot be assumed that same-gender unmarried partners necessarily 
self-identify as gay men and lesbians.  Phua and Kaufman (1999: 376-377) argue that 
same-gender unmarried partners may not necessarily self-identify as gay or lesbian.  
While Black and colleagues (2000) acknowledge that self-identification is an important 
aspect for gays and lesbians, they argue for census validity. They compare the number of 
self-reported gays and lesbians recorded in the General Social Survey and in the 
National Health SLS samples with 1990 U.S. Census data, they found that “about 35% 
of men living as partnered same-sex couples are recorded in the Census; for women the 
corresponding fraction is 29%,” which is lower than the GSS or NHSLS estimated rates 
(Black et al. 2000: 18).  Given concerns about self-identification, those who did mark 
“unmarried partner” or even “husband/wife” are likely to be more “out”34 than those 
who did not (Black et al 2000: 8; Smith and Gates 2001). Therefore, the number of gay 
and lesbian unmarried partners may well be an underestimate of the total population of 
gays and lesbians. 
 In addition, another problem arises with regard to the editing practices of the 
Census Bureau. Following the stipulations of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, the 
                                                 
34 To state openly and publicly that one is homosexual. 
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U.S. Congress defines marriage as a relationship involving opposite sex people. If a 
person marks his/her relationship to the householder, who also is of the same gender, as 
husband/wife, the Census Bureau is required to edit this respondent into the unmarried 
partner category. Fields and Clark (1999) examined the editing process of the Census 
2000 Dress Rehearsal conducted in April, 1998 in Sacramento, California and in South 
Carolina. They found that same-sex couples who marked spouse were older, had 
children, owned property, and were less likely to have moved in the last five years. They 
wrote: “[I]t is clear from the examination of these unedited data that households which 
are identified as ‘married couple’ same gender households are a distinct group from 
households which are identified as unmarried partner same gender households” (1999: 
10). Given these numerous problems, I now turn to the interviews I conducted. 
3.3.2. Interviews 
 I first became interested in the Census Schedule after attending a party. At the 
party, a woman began a discussion about receiving an email from the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC) about how to properly fill out the Census Schedule. Following this 
discussion, many women began discussing how to fill out the Census Schedule and 
“how to make their families count.” One couple lived apart while one attended graduate 
school and another worked at an engineering firm. From these discussions, I began to 
investigate Census data and how they could be used.  
 McCorkel and Myers (2003: 200) show that “data” and analysis that researchers 
produce are “shaped by our relationship with the subjects of our research” and by the 
positions we occupy relative to them and within wider society. I am an out White lesbian 
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parent who has lived in this community for over five years. I participate in LGBT 
communities in which some of the interviews were conducted not only as a member of 
different communities, but also as a member of the university. Furthermore, I attend gay 
and lesbian events in the community. I petitioned some of the self-identified gay men 
and lesbians from the church that I participate in. Some of the interviewees are 
considered close personal friends who have visited my home, had dinner with me, and 
helped me with family medical issues. Finally, the community in which I conducted 
some of these interviews has extensive gay and lesbian networks. Many of the 
respondents to this study have sold houses to each other, watched their children together, 
and send their children to the same schools.    
 Using snowballing sampling techniques, I interviewed thirty self-identified gay 
and lesbians, some as couples, some as individuals. I gave each respondent a modified 
2000 Census Schedule form, and I asked the respondents to answer questions from the 
census, such as the category of relationship to “Person 1” or head of the household. I 
followed with questions about their selection and did they find the question confusing.        
 Semi-structured interviews allow for certain major questions to generally be 
asked in the same manner for each interview (Fontana and Frey, 2005). At each 
interview I had a general questionnaire to which I would refer (Mishler 1986). While the 
order of the questions may be different for each respondent, all major questions were 
asked of each interviewee. I used active listening, probing the respondents if they were 
not forthcoming with information, or if I did not understand what they were discussing 
(Converse and Schuman 1974). I had numerous interactions throughout the interview 
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regarding to the topics discussed or about what the respondent stated. For example one 
respondent in a couple spent approximately thirty minutes discussing her previous work 
situation and the discrimination that she had felt at the workplace. If the respondents had 
a child, we would often deviate from the interview questions to discuss day care and/or 
schools. I was able to adapt the semi-structured interviews to the level of comprehension 
and the specific context of each interview situation.  
 The interviews became “a methodology of friendship” (Kong et al 2002). I tried 
to establish rapport and trust with my interviewees (Cicourel 1974). Douglas (1985) 
advocated revealing personal feelings and private situations to the interviewee as a quid 
pro quo of good faith. For instance, with many of the respondents I would discuss my 
own same-sex relationship and how we picked a day care for our children and if we had 
had any problems with the day care. I also discussed how the interview could be stopped 
at any time if they felt uncomfortable.  
 The interviews lasted from one hour to two and half hours. The interviews were 
transcribed after the interview. The respondents picked the locations of the interviews.  
Four interviews occurred in their homes. Eleven interviews occurred in their workplace 
or in my office. Four interviews occurred over email. I sent the interview questions to 
one person, and the respondent mailed back the interviews in which they had written 
their responses. The rest of the interviews occurred in various restaurants or coffee 
shops. Three times people declined to be interview. One potential interviewee refused 
because I would not pay for an interview. One woman refused because she had 
previously been interviewed by a colleague for a different study and did not feel 
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comfortable being interviewed again. And the last potential interviewee continually 
missed meetings stating that she had to much work to do.  
In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of and effectively 
analyze the interviews, I first began by transcribing all my interviews and read the text 
of the interviews. As I reread the text from the interviews, I employed the constant 
comparative method to discern central and recurring themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
While Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) work is generally used for grounded theory, the 
constant comparative method is “compatible with the inductive, concept-building 
orientation of all qualitative research” (Merriam 1998: 159). With adhesive “post-its,” I 
“unitized” (Lincoln and Guba 1985) the data by identifying with adhesive “post-its” 
points in the text that related specifically to my research questions, e.g. how do 
individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the census categories and how do they 
socially construct their relationships? Although Lincoln and Guba (1985: 345) define a 
“unit” as the “smallest piece of information about something that can stand by itself,” 
constituted as a sentence or as much as a paragraph, narrative dialogue may require 
multiple paragraphs to convey a particular idea, and so I unitized the data onto index 
cards.  
 For clarity of organization, I labeled each card first with the interviewee’s name 
and date of interview in the bottom left hand corner. In the bottom right hand corner, I 
numbered the data index cards as well. Next, I employed what Creswell (1998) describes 
as “axial coding.” I placed these data cards into piles that could then be more easily 
manipulated. After placing each data card into a pile I then labeled key concepts or ideas 
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illustrated in the text and I reflected on the particular units. Depending on the text, I 
might reflect on themes and place ideas about themes on the top right hand corner of the 
card. Finally, I grouped these ideas about themes together to discern and form broadly 
encompassing categories and metacategories. These encompassing categories and 
metacategories lead to the themes I discuss in Chapter V.   
3.3.2.1. Description of Sample 
According to 2000 Census data, 5.5 million couples were unmarried couples 
which was an increase from 3.2 million in 1990 (Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 1). The 
majority of unmarried partners are different sex couples (4.9 million) and about 1 in 9 
(594,000) are same-sex partners. Of the same-sex partners, 301,000 had male partners 
and 293,000 had female partners (Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 1). Of coupled 
households, unmarried couples make up about 9 percent of the total households. Of the 9 
percent, only between one and two percent of the unmarried households are same-sex 
households (Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 3). 
In 2000, same-sex unmarried couples are mainly from urban locales. Eighty-four 
percent of female same-sex households and eighty-six percent of male same-sex 
households lived in an urban location (Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 3). Same-sex 
households are more likely to be located in the West (Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons and 
O’Connell 2003; Smith and Gates 2001; Walther and Poston 2004). California has the 
largest number of unmarried-partner households with 684,000 same-sex couples or 12 
percent of the 5.5 million total (Simmons and O’Connell 2003:7). However, this account 
does not distinguish between different (opposite) male and female same-sex couples. 
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The Great Plain states and west Texas and northwards have below-average proportions 
of unmarried partner households (Gates and Ost 2004; Simmons and O’Connell 2003; 
Walther and Poston 2004). 
My interviewees are highly skewed in gender, income, education, and race 
(Table 3.1). There are seven male respondents (23% of the total sample) and twenty-
three female respondents (77% of the total sample). The average age is 39 years. The 
average income is almost $75,000, with a maximum of $400,000 and a minimum of 
$20,000. My sample has a median income of $60,000. The average income of gay male 
respondents is $74,285 with a maximum of $100,000 and a minimum of $35,000. The 
gay male respondents have a median income of $81,250. The average income of the 
lesbian interviewees is a little over $74,000 with a maximum of $400,000 and a 
minimum of $20,000. The lesbian respondents have a median income of $42,000. Dang 
and Frazer (2004: 16) find the median income for White female same-sex couples to be 
$60,000 and $69,000 for White male same-sex couples, with Black and Latinos/as 
households having significantly less median income (Cianciotto 2005; Dang and Frazer 
2004). My male respondents have a slightly higher median income, while the female 
respondents have a lower median income than the male respondents. Seventy percent of 
the respondents self-identify their race or ethnicity as White. The interviewees are highly 
educated with all respondents having at least some college (one respondent has an 
associate degree), and 23% of the interviewees have a PhD or professional degree.  
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According to the 2000 Census, sixty-seven percent of White same-sex partners 
have some education beyond high school (Dang and Frazer 2004: 28). Twenty-three 
percent of the respondents have previously been married, and three respondents had 
three children as a result of their marriage. 
Gay/lesbian couples with children comprise almost 30% of same-sex households 
according to the 2000 Census (Bennett and Gates 2004). One in three female same-sex 
couples and one in five male same-sex couples have children under the age of 18 in 
residence (34.3 percent of female partners and 22.3 percent of male partners are raising 
children) (Bennett and Gates 2004). While all families (heterosexual or homosexual) on 
average make less money then families without children, gay and lesbian families with 
children tend to be in a higher income bracket. However, due to issues of federal and 
state benefits, same-sex couples decrease their income and class standing (Bennett and 
Gates 2004).  
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Table 3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Name Age Education Household 
Income 
Race/ 
Ethnicity 
Heterosexual  
Marriage 
Children’
s  
Ages 
Occupations 
Tristan 43 Bachelor 62500 White no  Librarian 
Matthew 42 Bachelor 62500 White no  Computer 
specialist 
Madelin
e 
52 Bachelor 90000 Texan no 12 Computer tech 
Heather 45 Master 120000 White no 8, 6, 3 Nurse/professor 
Leigh 40 Bachelor 75000 White no 8 Hospital 
account 
manager 
Ryan 44 Bachelor 44000 Hispanic no  System analyst 
Natalie 39 MD 400000 White yes 6, 14 
months 
Doctor 
Jenny 42 Bachelor 47000 White no  Vet tech 
Ava 37 PhD 47000 White no  Professor 
Candace 35 Masters 40000 Caucasia
n 
no  Pastor 
Brianna 34 Bachelor Middle 
class 
Caucasia
n 
yes  Administrator 
Jasmine 53 Masters Middle/ 
upper class 
Caucasia
n 
yes adult Psychologists 
Chloe 35 Masters 40000 Caucasia
n 
yes  Graduate 
student 
Aimee 40 PhD Upper class Caucasia
n 
no  Psychologist 
Larry 36 Masters 100000 White no trying to 
adopt 
Administrator 
David 31 Bachelors 100000 Hispanic no trying to 
adopt 
Computer 
engineer 
Abigail 28 Masters 21600 Black no  Student 
Barbara 41 Masters 95000 African- 
American 
no 15 Administrator 
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Table 3.1. (cont.) 
Name Age Education Household 
Income 
Race/ 
Ethnicity 
Heterosexual 
Marriage 
Children’s  
Ages 
Occupations 
Christina 38 Masters 95000 Chicana yes 15 Lecturer/editor 
Sam 57 Associates  25000 German no  Disability 
Toby 34 Masters 35000 Asian no  Professor 
Randi 29 Bachelor 20000 Chinese  
American 
no  Graduate 
Student 
Becky 29 PhD 40000 White yes  Researcher 
Emma 45 Bachelor 30000 White no  Production 
Jessica 30 Bachelor 30000 Asian and  
Hispanic 
no  General 
manager 
Michelle 24 Bachelor declined Caucasian no  System 
analysts 
Lori 27 Bachelor declined Caucasian no  Librarian 
Archivist 
Xavier 41 PhD 60000 Hispanic yes  Professor 
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The respondents with a child are eight lesbians and two gay men who are trying to adopt 
or have a child by surrogacy. Generally, speaking, parents are older, have higher 
incomes, and slightly more education than the non-parent respondents. The average age 
is 43 years of age. The average income is a little over $125,000 with a maximum of 
$400,000 and a minimum of $40,000. Of the respondents who have children, they have a 
median income of $97,500. The interviewees are highly educated with all respondents 
having at least a Bachelors degree and 30% of the interviewees have a PhD or 
professional degree. 
3.3.2.2. Problems with the Interview Data 
 This sample is very limited and has three major problems: (1) the lack of 
diversity within the sample and the number of interviews; (2) the issue of the social 
position/status of the research and the respondents; and (3) all respondents must self-
identify as gay or lesbian. First, a snowball technique was used by me; I am a White 
lesbian parent. The sample is skewed towards respondents who are middle class, who are 
highly educated, and who are predominately White. I sent emails, flyers, and letters to 
friends, to various “open and affirming” churches within the Metropolitan Community 
Church, United Church of Christ and Unitarian Universalist, to professional and student 
gay oriented organizations, to softball and rugby teams, and to GLBT parent 
organizations. I visited large metropolitan churches, participated in a softball team, and 
joined a parent organization. Many gay men and lesbians were asked to participate in the 
research and declined with two reasons cited most often, namely, not enough time or 
subjects were not being paid for an interview.  
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 Secondly, social position and status of the researcher and the respondents was a 
problem with some of the interviews (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Seidman 1991). 
McCorkel and Myers (2003) show that “data” and analysis that researchers produce are 
“shaped by our relationship with the subjects of our research” and, by the positions, we 
occupy relative to them and within wider society. I participate in the community in 
which some of the interviews were conducted (Crapanzano 1980). For example, I 
petitioned some of the self-identified gay men and lesbians from the church that I 
participate in. Some of the interviewees are considered close personal friends who I have 
visited their homes, had dinner with me, and helped me with family medical issues.   
 The interviews were not gender matched (Gluck and Patai 1991). Denzin (1989: 
116) writes, “gender filters knowledge” and influences the interviewer and the 
interviewee. The respondents may embellish a response, give what is described as a 
“socially desirable” response, or omit certain relevant information (Bradburn 1983: 291). 
The respondent may also err due to faulty memory (Schwarz 1999). Two male couples 
openly discussed how they would offer more information to a gay man than they were 
offering to a lesbian. One man throughout the interview would make a statement and 
then state, “but you are not a gay man so you may not understand.”  
 According to my selection scheme, all respondents must self-identify as gay men 
or lesbians. Because the interviewees have to self-identify as gay men or lesbian, this 
suggests a more essentialist perspective than a social construction perspective of 
sexualities. However, as many scholars (Humphreys 1970; Foucault 1990; Katz 1996; 
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2001; Laumann et al 1994) suggest, many people will have homosexual behavior but not 
self-identify as homosexual.    
3.3.3. Internet Surveys 
 The third source of data was an Internet survey which was a shortened version of 
the interview schedule. This survey was emailed to self-identified gay men and lesbians 
or their allies, gay and lesbian groups, and churches nationally.  
 The Internet is being used more and more to collect survey data (Singapore, Teo, 
Lim, and Lai 1997) and to do ethnographies (Gatson and Zweerink 2004; Hine 2000). 
The Web has been used to collect medical records (Subramanian, McAfee, and 
Getzinger 1997), study drug dealers (Coomber 1997a, 1997b), and conduct laboratory 
experiments in behavioral and social sciences and psychology (Piper 1998; Smith and 
Leigh 1997). It is unclear under what conditions Internet surveys can be effective and 
whether an Internet survey can influence the data’s validity or reliability. With postal 
responses significantly decreasing (Fowler 1993; Fox, Crask, and Kim 1988; Oppenheim 
1992) Internet surveys may be the wave of the future. Numerous researchers (Roselle 
and Neufeld 1998; Shaw and Davis 1996) have used postal mail and email and found 
that email can be just as effective as postal mail.  
 I created a survey containing 61 questions. These questions were drawn from the 
interview questions. The survey was in the field for one month. I created a database 
which contained individual emails and mailing lists such as Gay and Lesbian Parent 
groups and Open and Affirming Churches. Once an individual or group received the 
email, then the person could go to the survey. The survey was located on a public Web 
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page with a database stored behind it. This survey did not require any email usernames 
and did not store the sender’s address so to maintain anonymity. Furthermore, the survey 
does not ask for their location of the respondents (Coomber 1997b). If a respondent 
responded to the survey from a public host computer such as universities, cyber-café, 
and public libraries, it would be virtually impossible for me to trace their responses. 
Researchers (Coomber 1997b) suggest that using Internet surveys to contact minority 
(risk) populations may allow for those who would not be interviewed,35 to fill out an 
Internet survey with relative anonymity. 
3.3.3.1. Sample Description 
Some of the demographic characteristics of the respondents from the Internet 
survey were similar to the Census data, such as age and income [N=54]. The average age 
is almost 35 years of age. The categories of income are the following: 30.5% of the 
respondents have a household income of $20,000 or less; 36.4% of the respondents have 
a household income between $30,000 and $60,000; 34.6% of the respondents make 
$70,000 or more in household income. Of the male respondents, 33.3% of the male 
respondents had a household income of $20,000 or less, 44.4% of the male respondents 
had a household income between $30,000 and $60,000, and 22.3% of the male 
respondents have a household income of greater than $70,000. Of the female 
respondents, 21.4% of the female respondents had a household income of $20,000 or 
less, 32.1% of the female respondents had a household income between $30,000 and 
                                                 
35 Many potential respondents did not return requests, emails, or phone calls. 
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$60,000, and 46.5% of the female respondents have a household income of greater than 
$70,000 which is much higher than the male respondents. Sixteen percent of respondents 
marked ‘unmarried partner’ on the Internet survey. 
The respondents to the Internet surveys are highly skewed in gender, education, 
and race. There are seventeen male respondents (31.5 % of the total sample) and thirty-
two female respondents (59.3% of the total sample). According to the 2000 Census, of 
the same-sex partners, 301,000 had male partners and 293,000 had female partners 
(Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 1). Almost eighty percent of the respondents self-
identify their race or ethnicity as White, 3.7% of the respondents self-identify as African 
American; 7.4% of the respondents self-identify as Asian, and 5.8% self-identify as 
biracial. Dang and Frazer (2004) report that of the same-sex unmarried population, 
twelve percent self-identify as African American, while Cianciotto (2005) notes that 
fourteen percent of the same-sex unmarried population self-identified as Latinos/as. The 
respondents of the Internet survey are highly educated with all respondents having at 
least some college (one respondent has an associate degree) and 57.4% of the 
interviewees have a PhD or professional degree. According to the 2000 Census, sixty-
seven percent of White same-sex partners have some education beyond high school 
(Dang and Frazer 2004: 28). Twenty-three percent of the respondents have previously 
been married and three respondents had three children as a result of their marriage. Only 
9.3% of the respondents reported having a child; this is much lower than the Census data 
report. Three of the female respondents had a child and two of the male respondents had 
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a child. The sample of the Internet survey is not a representative sample of gay men and 
lesbians. 
3.3.3.2. Problems with the Internet Survey 
Internet surveys have various problems. First, surveys on the internet may 
produce a biased sample and biased returns. Respondents are those who are most likely 
to have access and feel comfortable using internet technology (Berge and Collins 1996; 
Kiesler and Sproull 1986; Parker 1992; Sproull 1986). Therefore, Internet-based samples 
may not be generalizable to the entire population. Studies of Internet demographics 
suggest that certain social groups are underrepresented in the usage of the Internet and 
Internet surveys. For example, women, people of low social class, racial and ethnic 
minorities, people with lower education and older age groups are less likely to use the 
Internet or have problems using email (CommerceNet and Nielsen 1995, 1996, 1997a, 
1997b; GVU 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b; Marszalek and 
Goree 1995; Zhang 1999). In an email about my survey, Ruth (over 60 years old, 
Christian pastor) wrote,  
Well, I logged on but apparently didn’t bother to sign the consent form and now I 
can do nothing. So do whatever you have to do to let me participate. DANG! 
Take me out completely, and I’ll start all over again.  
Zhang (1999) found that respondents who used the Internet to respond to a survey felt a 
higher overall ability to use the Internet than those who used postal mail to respond to a 
survey.  
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Technologically, not everyone in the sample may have all the specific software 
applications needed to complete a survey (Zhang 1999). For instance, if the survey has 
special plug-ins, or uses Adobe, a respondent may not have access to those softwares. 
 Moreover, respondents may self-select in filling out an Internet survey (Dolenko 
1998; Marszalek and Goree 1995). Most Internet surveys are sent to mailing lists, 
newsgroups, or public Web sites. In my survey, the sample is not generalizable to the 
general population. I used a snowballing technique requesting respondents from various 
gay and lesbian organizations or their allies, “Open and Affirming” UCC churches, 
Unitarian Universalistic churches, and individuals.  
 When survey research is conducted as an impersonalized communication, the 
response rate is typically low (Berge and Collins 1996; Ciolek 1998; Kovacs et al., 1995; 
Spink et al 1998). Because of a lack of personal communication with the researcher, 
many respondents tend to “drop out” before they actually complete the surveys (Dolenko 
1998). Among a few of the organizations, administrators acted as gatekeepers. For 
example, one parent group never sent my request for respondents to the general 
membership (I am a member of the group and am currently on the listserve). Secondly, 
one organization refused to send the survey request to the general membership because 
they felt it did not keep with the general mission of their organization. They wrote in an 
email to me,  
 Carol, 
 
[Organizations’] leadership is centered in a Steering Committee that works by 
consensus. I forwarded your request to them and the questions below have 
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emerged. Please send your answer to [email address]. That way the entire 
committee will get it and we won’t have to waste time sending it around as we 
did to get here.  
 
[Person], who is a Professor of Sociology, and I both feel we would like to know 
a number of things before we would approve this.  What does this study have to 
do with old Lesbians?  Does this benefit Old Lesbians in any way?  We would 
like to have a more in depth description of what this study is about.  Are non-
Lesbians also being interviewed and are younger Lesbians or non-Lesbians being 
interviewed?     
Furthermore, many respondents emailed me saying that the request for participation was 
found in their ‘junk mail.’ For instance, Joyce wrote, “Carol, this went into my bulk 
email so didn’t see it until now.  Good luck!!!” If the respondents did not receive the 
request in their inbox it would be very unlikely that they would respond to the survey.36  
 Fifthly, Internet surveys may reach unintended individuals. Individuals can 
forward the request to others and other unintended groups (Goree and Marszalek 1995). 
Also public surveys can be reached by anyone who has a Web browser with an Internet 
connection. There has been no effective way to screen unintended participants. In my 
survey, unintended people may have responded to the survey. Although I wrote on the 
                                                 
36 In group studies, the target population and its number of participants are usually unknown (Berge and 
Collins 1996; Cronin et al. 1994). What is at issue is if the non-group participants are statistically different 
from the participating group. Anderson and Gransneder (1995: 41) found that “respondents were more 
likely to use the system more often and for more time than were non-respondents.” There has been little 
conclusive research suggesting whether the respondent and non-respondent groups are statistically 
different. 
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survey that the survey was intended for gay men, lesbian, and bisexual women and men, 
there is not a specific question asking individuals their sexual identity. This can lead to 
self-identified heterosexual people filling in the survey. Noah (self-identified 
heterosexual man) commented that he was half way through the survey before he 
realized it was for gay men, lesbian, and bisexual women and men. Robert wrote in an 
email, “Is this for me to forward or do you want some of us ’breeders’ to fill it out as 
well?” (“Breeders” usually refers to heterosexual individuals.) 
 Finally, the Internet survey did not skip questions as it should have and has 
ambiguous and awkward wording which will decrease the validity and reliability of the 
survey. For instance, if a respondent answered question 12 as having no children, then 
the survey was to skip to question 13. However, when it was in the field, I did not skip. 
Furthermore, one respondent wrote, “yes your wording in this survey is terrible on some 
questions.” Another respondent stated, “What relationship question?  This survey is very 
unclear.” For all of these problems, I will be reworking the survey and trying to correct 
the majority of these problems. 
In the next chapter, I examine the 2000 census data. I first present five indices to 
measure the level of same-sex couples. I argue that the first index is the best measure. 
Using the first index, I examine the differences in states, metropolitan statistical areas, 
counties, and certain selected tracts. I conclude the chapter with a regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 INDICES AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS OF SAME-SEX HOUSEHOLDS 
4.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I first discuss some of the relevant literature related to gauging 
patterns in the concentrations of gay and lesbian residence. Furthermore, I demonstrate 
how each index is formed and calculated, providing the pros and cons of each index. 
Then, I describe the five sets of lesbian and gay indices first among the states, 331 
metropolitan areas, counties with 50 or more same-sex households within the county, 
and finally selected tracts using 2000 Census data. 
While it is true that results from the 2000 U.S. Census indicate that partnered 
gays and lesbians live virtually everywhere in the U.S., 85 percent live in metropolitan 
areas (Simmons and O’Connell 2003: 2). Also, there is considerable variation among 
states, metropolitan areas, counties, and tracts in the presence of gays and lesbians 
(Gates and Ost 2004: 24-31). The different distributions of gays and lesbians are of 
interest if only for the fact that they seem to be associated with the political and social 
visibility of gays and lesbians. Areas where gays and lesbians have settled have become 
according to O’Reilly and Webster (1998), “gay spaces” with political force and 
activism. Metropolitan areas with the largest representations of gays and lesbians, for 
instance, San Francisco, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, among other areas, are 
often the “gay spaces” that receive the most national attention. But as just noted, there 
are concentrations of gays and lesbians in virtually all the metropolitan areas of the 
country. However, with but a few exceptions (Black et al. 2000, 2002; Gates and Ost 
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2004; Rosenfeld 2007; Walther and Poston 2004), there has been little effort among 
social scientists at indexing these concentrations among the metropolitan areas of the 
U.S. and examining the extent to which the indexes are associated with the social and 
political characteristics of the areas. 
In this chapter, I extend the work of Black and his colleagues (2000, 2002), 
Walther and Poston (2004), Gates and Ost (2004) and Rosenfeld (2007) regarding the 
validity of census-based statistics on the homosexual populations of the U.S. 
metropolitan areas.  Black and his associates (2003) have developed gay and lesbian 
partnering indexes for 20 metropolitan areas with the largest gay-lesbian populations. 
They first used the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the 1990 census to 
obtain data on gays and lesbians who were in what they termed “marriage-like” 
relationships. They next examined the geographic distributions of these gays and 
lesbians in their sample. They found that almost 60 percent of their gay sample resided 
in 20 metropolitan areas, and that over 45 percent of their lesbian sample resided in 20 
metropolitan areas (sixteen of which were among the 20 inhabited by gay men).   
Their data indicated that Los Angeles contained 9.8 percent of all the gay 
partners in their sample, New York 8.4 percent, and San Francisco 7.9 percent. The same 
three cities also contained the most lesbian partners of all the cities in the U.S.: New 
York with 6 percent, Los Angeles with 5.4 percent, and San Francisco with 3.4 percent. 
Their data are interesting in their own right and provide further evidence that the census 
data on gays and lesbians do not consist “predominantly of mis-recorded opposite sex 
couples” (Black et al. 2000: 148). However, their percentage indexes are highly 
 
                                  
   
90
associated with the size of the cities. The largest cities have the greatest numbers of gay 
and lesbian partners.  
Gates and Ost (2004) used 2000 census data on same-sex partners and 
constructed gay and lesbian concentration indexes for the states, metropolitan areas, and 
counties of the U.S. in their The Gay and Lesbian Atlas. Their index is a “ratio of the 
proportion of same-sex couples living in an [area] to the proportion of households that 
are located in an [area]…This ratio…measures the over- or underrepresentation of same-
sex couples in a geographic area relative to the population” (Gates and Ost 2004: 24). 
They found, for instance, that gay couples are more than four times as likely as a 
randomly selected household to live in the San Francisco metropolitan area, the area 
with the highest concentration index, and twice as likely to live in the Fort Lauderdale 
area. The Santa Rosa, Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, New York, and New Jersey metropolitan 
areas have the next highest index scores. Gates and Ost (2004) show that lesbian 
households were more than 2.5 times as likely than an average household to live in the 
Santa Rosa metropolitan area, and almost 2.5 times as likely to live in Santa Cruz-
Watsonville. Santa Fe, San Francisco, Oakland, and Burlington are the metropolitan 
areas with the next highest lesbian concentration index scores. The rates that have been 
developed in this dissertation build on and extend the work of Gates and Ost (2004) 
(Black et al. 2000, 2002). In fact, one of the rates developed, namely the number of 
gay/lesbian households per 1,000 households, is mathematically equivalent to the index 
discussed by Gates and Ost (2004).  
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Rosenfeld (2007) uses the 2000 Census data to show the leading metropolitan 
areas for same-sex couples. He ranks the top 10 metropolitan areas and finds that New 
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are the top three metropolitan areas. He also finds 
that thirty percent of all same-sex households live in the top ten metropolitan areas. 
However, Rosenfeld (2007) only provides a strict count of the 2000 5% PUMS data on 
same-sex households and does not account for other aspects such as population size. The 
rates that have been developed in this dissertation build on and extend the work of Gates 
and Ost (2004) (Black et al. 2000, 2002; Rosenfeld 2007). In fact, one of the rates 
developed, namely the number of gay/lesbian households per 1,000 households, is 
mathematically equivalent to the index discussed by Gates and Ost (2004).  
4.2. How Should One Index the Presence of Gay and Lesbian Partners? 
Despite the work by Gates and Ost (2004), the question remains:  how should 
one index the presence of gay and lesbian partners? One way would be to produce 
incidence rates, by determining the number of gays or lesbians per persons who 
comprise the demographic and statistical population from which gays and lesbians are 
drawn. In demography a rate is typically defined as the number of persons experiencing 
an event at a given time (the numerator) divided by the population at the risk of the event 
(the denominator). Thus a rate of first marriage for an area is the number of persons in 
the area in a given year marrying for the first time, divided by the total number of 
unmarried persons in the population of the area above a certain age, usually age 18. An 
out-migration rate for an area in a given period of time is the number of persons moving 
from the area in a given period, divided by the number of persons living in the area at the 
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start of the period (see Hinde, 1998: 80-81; 193). It is important when calculating 
incidence/prevalence rates that the persons in the numerator correspond with those in the 
denominator; that is, the denominator must include the persons in the numerator; this is 
known as the principle of correspondence (Hinde 1998: 4). 
The rates are developed from the data from Summary File 2, Table PCT22 
(“Unmarried Partner Households and Sex of Partners) of the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 2003). For the gay rates, I used household data on “male 
householder and male partner,” and for the lesbian rates I used household data on 
“female householder and female partner.”  
One way to develop a rate of gay (or lesbian) partnering for an area at a 
particular time would be to divide the number of gay (lesbian) partners by the number of 
unmarried males (females) in the population of age 18 or higher. The denominator 
would be restricted to unmarried persons because according to the statistical and 
demographic definitions used here, as well as Census Bureau coding procedures, married 
persons are by definition heterosexual, and would thus not be “at risk” (in a statistical 
sense) of being a gay or lesbian partner. 
 Thus my first index of gay (lesbian) partnering, Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1, is a 
straightforward rate with the statistically most appropriate denominator and is defined as 
000,1*
18)(#
)(#
1)(
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
=
ageofFemalesMalesUnmarriedof
PartnersLesbianGayof
RateLesbianGay
   
The second index is related to Rate 1.  Rate 2 measures the number of lesbian 
(gay) partners by the number of never married women (men) over the age of 18.   
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 A third gay (lesbian) partnering rate for an area at a particular time would 
employ the same numerator as the first two  indexes, but with a less restrictive 
denominator, namely all males (females) of age 18 or over, not just those who are 
unmarried. Unlike the Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1, this third index would not exclude married 
people from the denominator. This third index of gay (lesbian) partnering, Gay (Lesbian) 
Rate 3, is also a rate but with a less restrictive denominator and is defined as: 
000,100*
18)(#
)(#
3)(
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
=
ageofFemalesMalesofTotal
PartnersLesbianGayof
RateLesbianGay
 
Since the denominator of Gay (Lesbian) Rate 3 is so much larger than the denominators 
of Gay (Lesbian) Rate 1 and 2 (because it includes married persons), I have multiplied 
this third set of indexes by a constant of 100,000, instead of 1,000 as I did in the first two 
sets.   
The fourth and fifth indexes measure the prevalence among households. Rate 4 is 
the number of lesbian (gay) households divided by the total number of unmarried 
households.   
000,1*
#
)(#
4)(
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
oldsriedHousehTotalUnmarof
HouseholdsLesbianGayof
RateLesbianGay
 
Rate 5 calculates the total number of lesbian (gay households) divided by the 
total number of households.  
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I have described the five lesbian and gay rates. I will now turn to a descriptive 
analysis of the rates across various kinds of geographical areas, such as states, 
metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and tracts. 
4.2.1. States 
Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 50 states of 14.07 
(Table 4.1). This means that across the states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average 
of 14 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. Florida has the 
highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of almost 20.4; for every 1,000 unmarried men in 
Florida in 2000, 20 of them (or more than 2 percent) were in a gay partnering 
relationship. South Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 1 value, less than 1 per 1,000. This 
first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the states of just over 12 per 
1,000. Vermont has the highest value of all the states with a score of 23.1; just over 2.3 
percent of all unmarried females in Vermont of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering 
relationships. North Dakota has the lowest score on Lesbian Rate 1. 
Among gay men, the second rate, Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the 
states of 21.0 (Table 4.1). For every 1,000 never married males of age 18 and over, there 
is an average of almost 21 gays in partnering relationships. Florida has the highest score 
of all the states, 32.8 gay partners per 1,000 never married males in the population. 
South Dakota has the lowest score on this rate of all the states. For lesbians, the mean 
value on this second rate, Lesbian Rate 2, is 27.8. Across the 50 states, there is an 
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average of almost 28 lesbian partners per 1,000 never married females of age 18 and 
over. Vermont has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 2 of 49.7, and North Dakota has 
the lowest value (15.1). 
Rate 3 for gay men (Gay Rate 3) has a mean value among the 50 states of 529.3 
(Table 4.1).  This means that across the states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average 
of a little over 529 gay cohabiters for every 100,000 men of age 18 or over.  California 
has the highest value of Gay Rate 3, a score of 819.5; for every 100,000 men in 
California in 2000, almost 0.8 of them were in a gay partnering relationship.  South 
Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 3 value, 287.7 men per 100,000 men over the age of 18. 
Rate 3 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 3) has a mean value among the 50 states of 528.3, 
slightly lower than Gay Rate 3 (Table 4.1).  This means that across the states in 2000, 
there was an average of 528 female same gender cohabiters for every 100,000 women of 
age 18 or over.  Vermont has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 3, a score of 981.5. For 
every 100,000 women in Vermont in 2000, almost 0.9 of them were in a lesbian 
partnering relationship.  North Dakota has the lowest Lesbian Rate 3 value, 281.7 per 
100,000 women over the age of 18. 
Rate 4 for gay men (Gay Rate 4) has a mean value among the 50 states of 48.3 
(Table 4.1).  This means that among the 50 states of the U.S. in 2000, there was an 
average of almost 48 male same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried households.  
California has the highest value of Gay Rate 4. California has a score of 72.5.  South 
Dakota has the lowest Gay Rate 4. Rate 4 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 4) has a mean value 
among the 50 states of 50.9, slightly higher than Gay Rate 4 (Table 4.1).  This means 
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that across the 50 states in 2000, there was an average of almost 51 female same-sex 
households for every 1,000 unmarried households.  Utah has the highest value of 
Lesbian Rate 4 with a score of 70.7.  Of all the rates for states, Utah seems to be the 
most unusual state to have the highest Lesbian Rate 4. Utah has the most heterosexual 
marriages in the United States (Gates and Ost 2004). North Dakota has the lowest 
Lesbian Rate 4 value. 
 Gay Rate 5 has a mean value among the 50 states of 2.5.  This means that across 
the 50 states in 2000, there was an average of 2.5 male same-sex households for every 
1,000 total households.  California has the highest value of Gay Rate 5, a score of 4.3 for 
every 1,000 households in 2000.  South Dakota has the lowest value of Gay Rate 5. Rate 
5 for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 5) has a mean value among the 50 states of 2.6, slightly 
higher than Gay Rate 5 (Table 4.1).  This means that across the 50 states in 2000, there 
was an average of almost 2.7 female same-sex households for every 1,000 households.  
Vermont has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5 with a score of 4.8.  North Dakota has 
the lowest Lesbian Rate 5 value. Tables A.2 and A.3 contain the values for all fifty states 
and the five rates. 
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Table 4.1. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices For 
States, 2000 U.S. Census 
Rate Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Minimum 
Values 
State 
Maximum Values 
State 
Gay Rate 1 14.0
(3.0)
7.8
South Dakota
20.4
Florida
Gay Rate 2 21.0
(4.5)
11.0
North Dakota
32.8
Florida
Gay Rate 3 529.3
(126.6)
287.7
South Dakota
819.5
California
Gay Rate 4 48.3
(11.1)
28.0
South Dakota
72.5
California
Gay Rate 5 2.5
(0.6)
1.3
South Dakota
4.3
California
Lesbian Rate 
1 
12.6
(3.1)
7.0
North Dakota
23.1
Vermont
Lesbian Rate 
2 
27.8
(7.0)
15.1
North Dakota
49.7
Vermont
Lesbian Rate 
3 
528.3
(126.6)
281.7
North Dakota
981.5
Vermont
Lesbian Rate 
4 
50.9
(10.0)
30.1
North Dakota
70.7
Utah
Lesbian Rate 
5 
2.6
(0.6)
1.3
North Dakota
4.8
Vermont
Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4 
 
 
How are the rates related at the state level? Table 4.2 presents a matrix of zero-
order correlations showing the relationships between the various rates. The five gay rates 
are highly correlated with one another. Of the five zero-order correlations involving the 
relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is .614 between Gay Rate 2 and 
Gay Rate 4. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each 
other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates. The 
correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .420 (Lesbian Rate 2 
with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .988 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 5). Between 
 
                                  
   
98
the gay rates and the lesbian rates, the highest correlation is between Gay Rate 3 and 
Lesbian Rate 5 (0.806). However, Gay Rate 4 is not significantly related with Lesbian 
Rates 1, 2, or 3. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are a matrix of scatterplots showing the five gay and lesbian 
rates. Figures 4.3 through 4.6 show the relationship between each rate. Figure 4.3 
compares Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. As shown in the figure, there are 40 states that 
have a higher value on Gay Rate 1 than Lesbian Rate 1. This suggests that there are 
more states with partnered gay men per 1,000 unmarried men over the age of 18 than 
partnered lesbians per 1,000 unmarried women over the age of 18. Figure 4.4 compares 
Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are 2 states, Delaware and New York, which have 
more male same-sex partners than female same-sex partners. Figure 4.5 compares Gay 
Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. Three states, Iowa, Louisiana, and North Carolina have more 
partnered gays per 100,000 males over the age of 18 than partnered lesbians per 100,000 
females over the age of 18. Figure 4.6 compares Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. 
Thirteen states (Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming) have relatively 
more male same-sex unmarried households than female same-sex unmarried households. 
Figure 4.7 compares Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. Fifteen states (Arizona, California, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have relatively more lesbian total households 
than gay total households. Tennessee has exactly the same value for Gay Rate 5 and 
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Lesbian Rate 5. Thirty-four states have relatively more gay total households than lesbian 
total households.  
Table 4.2 Zero-Order Correlation Matrix of Gay and Lesbian Indices, 50 States, 2000 
U.S. Census  
 Gay  
Rate 
1 
Gay  
Rate 
2 
Gay  
Rate 
3 
Gay  
Rate 
4 
Gay 
Rate 
5 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian  
Rate 2 
Lesbian  
Rate 3 
Lesbian
Rate 4 
Gay Rate 2 0.94    
Gay Rate 3 0.97 0.89   
Gay Rate 4 0.71 0.61 0.67   
Gay Rate 5 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.70   
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
0.66 0.65 0.66 0.20  0.65    
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
0.58 0.70 0.54 0.10  0.50  0.91   
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
0.73 0.68 0.76 0.26  0.73  0.97 0.85  
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
0.64 0.55 0.59 0.79 0.58 0.54 0.42 0.59 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
0.77 0.69 0.80 0.36 0.78 0.94 0.78 0.98 0.64
Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4
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Figure 4.1. Scatterplots of Five Rates of Gay Partnering for 50 States, 2000 U.S. Census. 
 
                                  
   
101
 
 
Figure 4.2. Scatterplots of Five Rates of Lesbian Partnering for 50 States, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.3. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 1 for 50 States, 
2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.4. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.5. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 50 States, 2000 U.S. 
Census.  
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Figure 4.6. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 4 for 50 States, 
2000 U.S. Census. 
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4.2.2. Metropolitan Areas 
Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas 
of 13.3 (Table 4.3).  This means that across metropolitan areas of the U.S. in 2000, there 
was an average of 13 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over.  
San Francisco, California has the highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of 47.9; for every 
1,000 unmarried men in San Francisco, California in 2000, almost 48 of them were in a 
gay partnering relationship.  Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest Gay Rate 1 value, almost 5 
per 1,000. 
 The first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the metropolitan 
areas of 12.1 per 1,000.  Santa Rosa, California has the highest value of all the 
metropolitan areas, a score of 30.9; just over 3.0 percent of all unmarried females in San 
Francisco of age 18 or more are in lesbian partnering relationships.  Dubuque, Iowa has 
the lowest score on Lesbian Rate 1, just slightly less than its lowest score on Gay Rate 1. 
 Among gay men, the second rate, Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the 
331 metropolitan areas of 20.0 (Table 4.3).  For every 1,000 never married males of age 
18 and over, there is an average of 2.0 percent of gay men in partnering relationships.  
San Francisco has the highest score of all metropolitan areas. For every 1,000 never 
married males, 6.0 percent of gay men are in partnering relationships.  Dubuque, Iowa 
has the lowest score on this rate of all the areas. 
 For lesbians, the mean value on the second rate, Lesbian Rate 2, is 26.8.  Across 
the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 26.8 lesbian partners per 1,000 never 
 
                                  
   
107
married females of age 18 and over.  Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on 
Lesbian Rate 2 of 72.2, and Provo-Orem, Utah has the lowest value. 
 Gay Rate 3 has a mean value across the 331 metropolitan areas of 501.6 (Table 
4.3).  For every 100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 501 gay 
men in partnering relationships.  San Francisco, California has the highest score of all 
metropolitan areas, 2,315.4 gay partners per 100,000 males in the population.  Dubuque, 
Iowa has the lowest score on this rate of all the areas. 
 This third rate for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 3, has a mean value of 513.5.  Across 
the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 513.5 lesbian partners per 100,000 
females of age 18 and over.  Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on Lesbian 
Rate 3 of 1384.1, and Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value. 
 Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 331 metropolitan areas of 46.4. Across 
the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 46.4 male same-sex unmarried 
households for every 1,000 households of unmarried cohabiters. San Francisco, 
California has the highest value on Gay Rate 4 of 183.2, while Dubuque, Iowa has the 
lowest value. 
 Rate 4 for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 4, has a mean value among the 331 
metropolitan areas of 51.1. Across the 331 metropolitan areas, there is an average of 
51.1 female same-sex unmarried households for every 1,000 households of unmarried 
cohabiters. McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 4 
of 116.0, while Rapid City, South Dakota has the lowest value. 
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 The last rate for gay men, Gay Rate 5, has a mean value of 2.4. Across the 331 
metropolitan areas, there is an average of 2.4 male same-sex unmarried households for 
every 1,000 total households. San Francisco, California has the highest value on Gay 
Rate 5 of 11.8, while Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value. 
 Rate 5 for lesbians, Lesbian Rate 5, has a mean value among the 331 
metropolitan areas of 2.6, slightly higher than Gay Rate 5. Across the 331 metropolitan 
areas, there is an average of 2.6 female same-sex  unmarried households for every 1,000 
total households. Santa Rosa, California has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 5 of 7.2, 
while Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest value. Tables A.3 and A.4 present the 331 
metropolitan statistical areas with gay and lesbian rates. 
Table 4.4 presents zero-order correlations showing the relationship between the various 
rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of the five zero-order 
correlations involving the relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is 
0.711 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. The highest correlation among the gay rates 
is 0.984 between Gay Rate 3 and Gay Rate 5. The five lesbian rates are also positively 
and highly correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those 
for the five gay rates. The lowest correlations involve the relationship between each pair 
of lesbian rates. The lowest is 0.477 between Lesbian Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 4. The 
highest correlations of lesbian rates are between Lesbian Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 3 of 
0.950. Between the gay and lesbian rates, the highest correlation is 0.668 between Gay 
Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. The lowest correlations is 0.358 between Gay Rate 2 and 
Lesbian Rate 4. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 present the correlations of all the rates. 
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Table 4.3. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices for 
331 Metropolitan Areas, 2000 U.S. Census 
Rate Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Minimum 
Values 
MSA 
Maximum Values 
MSA 
Gay Rate 1 13.3 
(4.4)
4.3
Dubuque, IA
47.9
San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 2 20.0 
(6.9)
6.3
Dubuque, IA
60.7
San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 3 501.6 
(187.9)
151.5
Dubuque, IA
2,315.4
San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 4 46.4 
(16.8)
17.2
Dubuque, IA
183.2
San Francisco, CA
Gay Rate 5 2.4 
(0.9)
0.7
Dubuque, IA
11.8
San Francisco, CA
Lesbian Rate 
1 
12.1 
(3.7)
5.0
Dubuque, IA
31.0
Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 
2 
26.8 
(8.6)
9.0
Provo-Orem, 
UT
72.2
Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 
3 
515.2 
(168.3)
201.7
Dubuque, IA
1,384.1
Santa Rosa, CA
Lesbian Rate 
4 
51.1 
(14.7)
19.2
Rapid City, SD
116.0
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, 
TX
Lesbian Rate 
5 
2.6 
(0.9)
1.0
Dubuque, IA
7.2
Santa Rosa, CA
Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4 
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Figure 4.9 presents the relationship between Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. 
There are 230 metropolitan statistical areas that have more male same-sex households 
than female and 101 metropolitan statistical areas with more female same-sex 
households than male same-sex households.  
Figure 4.10 represents the relationship between Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. 
There are 21 metropolitan statistical areas which have a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian 
Rate 2  There are 21 metropolitan statistical areas which have a higher Gay Rate 2 than 
Lesbian Rate 2 ( Hattiesburg, MS;  Springfield, IL; New Orleans, LA; Orlando, FL; 
Charleston, WV; Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL; 
Birmingham, AL; Greenville, NC; Atlanta, GA; Athens, GA; Fargo-Moorhead, ND—
MN; Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA; Muncie, IN; Miami, FL; Jersey City, NJ; Stamford-
Norwalk, CT; Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV; New York, NY; Fort Lauderdale, FL; San 
Francisco, CA). The majority of the metropolitan statistical areas (310) fall below the 
line on the graph suggesting a higher Lesbian Rate 2 than Gay Rate 2. 
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Figure 4.11 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. 
There are 153 metropolitan statistical areas with a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 
3. In Figure 4.11, this suggests that there are 153 metropolitan statistical areas above the 
line and 178 metropolitan statistical areas below the line. Again Lesbian Rate 3 is higher 
than Gay Rate 3 in the number of metropolitan statistical areas. 
Figure 4.12 represents the relationship between Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. 
There is one metropolitan statistical area, Benton Harbor, MI, which has the same Gay 
Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 100 metropolitan statistical areas with a higher 
Gay Rate 4 than Lesbian Rate 4. There are 230 metropolitan statistical areas with a 
higher Lesbian Rate 4 than Gay Rate 4. 
Figure 4.13 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. One 
metropolitan statistical area has the same value for Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5, 
Benton Harbor, MI. Ninety-five metropolitan statistical areas have a higher Gay Rate 5 
than Lesbian Rate 5.  
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Table 4.4. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices for 331 Metropolitan 
Areas, 2000 U.S. Census  
 Gay  
Rate 
1 
Gay  
Rate 
2 
Gay  
Rate 
3 
Gay  
Rate 
4 
Gay  
Rate 
5 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian  
Rate 2 
Lesbian  
Rate 3 
Lesbian
Rate 4 
Gay Rate 2 0.94    
Gay Rate 3 0.94 0.83   
Gay Rate 4 0.82 0.71 0.81   
Gay Rate 5 0.92 0.78 0.98 0.82   
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
0.57 0.50 0.59 0.38 0.60   
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
0.57 0.66 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.83   
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
0.55 0.44 0.64 0.38 0.64 0.95 0.69  
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
0.46 0.35 0.47 0.68 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.68 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
0.55 0.42 0.64 0.42 0.65 0.93 0.65 0.98 0.73
Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4. 
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Figure 4.7. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 
2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.8. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 
2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.9. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Partnered Lesbian Rate 1 for 331 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.  
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Figure 4.10. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 331 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census.
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Figure 4.11. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 331 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.12. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for 331 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.13. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for 331 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census. 
  
 
 
                                  
   
120
4.2.3. Counties 
Table A.5 lists all the counties with no male or female same-sex couples.  For 
male same-sex couples, Colorado and Kansas counties each have 10 counties with no 
male same-sex households.  Nebraska contains twelve counties with no female same-sex 
households. There are 22 counties with neither male nor female same-sex households. 
Figure 4.14 is a U.S. map showing Gay Rate 2 for all counties. Figure 4.15 is a U.S. map 
showing Lesbian Rate 2. As one can see from the maps, male and female same-sex 
households are distributed throughout the United States.  
When all counties are included in the analysis, statistical noise occurs. For 
instance, Gay Rate 1 has King County, Texas as the lowest value; however, King 
County, Texas has 2 male same sex partners and only 147 total households. Thus, King 
County, Texas is not representative of the majority of counties. Rosenfeld (2007) found 
that 70 percent of all unmarried partners reside in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, they 
also show that it makes little theoretical or statistical sense to include those counties with 
less than 50 same-sex households contains analysis of all counties. I thus so restricted 
the counties to be analyzed here. 
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Figure 4.14. Map of Counties in the U.S. for Gay Rate 2, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.15. Map of Counties in the U.S. for Lesbian Rate 2, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Rate 1 for gays (Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the counties of 13.5 (Table 
4.5). This means that across counties of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of 13 gay 
cohabiters for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. San Francisco has the 
highest value on Gay Rate 1, a score of 66.2.  Riley County, Kansas has the lowest Gay 
Rate 1 value, almost 3 per 1,000. 
 The first rate for lesbians (Lesbian Rate 1) has an average across the counties of 
12.6 per 1,000.  Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value of all the 
counties with 50 or more same-sex households with a score of 39.5, that is, almost 4.0 
percent of all unmarried females in Hampshire County, Massachusetts of age 18 or more 
are in lesbian partnering relationships.  Dubuque, Iowa has the lowest score on Lesbian 
Rate 1, just slightly more than its lowest score on Gay Rate 1. 
Gay Rate 2, has an average score across the 1,288 counties of 21.6.  This means 
that across counties with 50 or more same gender households in the U.S. in 2000, there 
was an average of 21 gay cohabiters for every 1,000 never married men of age 18 or 
over.  San Francisco has the highest value of Gay Rate 2, a score of 79.4.  Riley County, 
Kansas has the lowest Gay Rate 2 value, 3.5 per 1,000. 
Lesbian Rate 2 has an average across the counties of 31.4 per 1,000 never 
married women.  San Juan County, Washington has the highest value of all the counties. 
San Juan County, Washington has a score of 127.5. This means that just over 12 percent 
of all never married females in San Juan County, Washington of age 18 or more are in 
lesbian partnering relationships.  Riley County, Kansas has the lowest score on Lesbian 
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Rate 2. Riley County, Kansas has just 0.8 percent of all never married females age 18 or 
more are in female same-sex household. 
Gay Rate 3, across the 1,288 counties with more than 50 same-sex households, 
has an average score of 481.5.  For every 100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an 
average of almost 481 gay men in male same-sex households.  San Francisco County, 
California has the highest score. San Francisco County, California has 3889 gay partners 
per 100,000 males in the population.  Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest score on 
this rate of all the counties. 
  Lesbian Rate 3 has a mean value of 502.3.  Across the 1,288 counties with 50 or 
more same-sex households, there is an average of 502.3 female same-sex households per 
100,000 females of age 18 and over.  Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest 
value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 2,164.7, and Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest value on 
Lesbian Rate 3 of 201.7. 
Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 measures the number of same-sex households for every 
1,000 unmarried households. Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 1,288 counties 
with 50 or more same-sex households of 46.4, while the Lesbian Rate 4 has a mean 
value among the 1,288 counties of the U.S. in 2000.  For Gay Rate 4, San Francisco 
County, California has the highest value of 266.6.  Huron County, Ohio has the lowest 
Gay Rate 4. For Lesbian Rate 4, Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value 
of Lesbian Rate 4 (183.6).  Pennington County, South Dakota has the lowest Lesbian 
Rate 4 value. 
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 The mean values for Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 have a mean value among the 1288 
counties with 50 or more same-sex households of 2.5.    San Francisco County, 
California has the highest value of Gay Rate 5 (19.8 for every 1,000 total households). 
Dubuque County, Iowa has the lowest value of Gay Rate 5. For the Lesbian Rate 5, 
again, Hampshire County, Massachusetts has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5 (12.8; 
for every 1,000 total households). Manitowoc County, Wisconsin and Dubuque County, 
Iowa has the lowest Lesbian Rate 5 value of 1.0 (see Table 4.5).  
How are the rates related at the county level? Table 4.6 presents a matrix of zero-
order correlations showing the relationships between the various rates. The five gay rates 
are highly correlated with one another. Of the ten zero-order correlations involving the 
relationships between each pair of gay rates, the lowest is .68 between Gay Rate 2 and 
Gay Rate 4. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly correlated with each 
other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five gay rates. 
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Table 4.5. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values of Indices for 
1288 Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex Households 
Rate Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation)
Minimum Maximum
Gay Rate 1 13.5
(5.0)
3.1 
(Riley County, Kansas)
66.2
(San Francisco County, 
California)
Gay Rate 2 21.6  
(8.6)  
3.5 
(Riley County, Kansas)
79.4
(San Francisco County, 
California)
Gay Rate 3 481.5
(227.1)
151.4 
(Dubuque County, Iowa)
3889.0
(San Francisco County, 
California)
Gay Rate 4 46.4
(19.6)
15.9 
(Huron County, Ohio)
266.6
(San Francisco County, 
California)
Gay Rate 5 2.2
(1.0)
0.7 
(Dubuque County, Iowa)
19.8
(San Francisco County, 
California)
Lesbian Rate 1 12.6
(4.1)
4.9 
(Dubuque County, Iowa)
39.5
(Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 2 31.4
(13.1)
8.4 
(Riley County, Kansas)
127.5
(San Juan County, 
Washington)
Lesbian Rate 3 502.3
(179.1)
201.7 
(Dubuque County, Iowa)
2164.7
(Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 4 51.6
(17.0)
19.2 
(Pennington County, South 
Dakota)
183.6
(Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts)
Lesbian Rate 5 2.5
(0.9)
1.0 
(Manitowoc County, 
Wisconsin and Dubuque 
County, Iowa)
12.8
(Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts)
Source: 2000 US Census Data Summary File 3 and 4
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The correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .46 
(Lesbian Rate 2 with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .98 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 
5). Between the gay rates and the lesbian rates, the highest correlation is between Gay 
Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2 (0.58) and Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4 (0.58). Figure 4.16 
and Figure 4.17 present scatterplots of gay and lesbian rates. As one can see from the 
figures, the rates are correlated.  Figures 4.18 through 4.22 present the relationship for 
each rate. Figure 4.18 demonstrates the relationship between Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian 
Rate 1. There are two counties, Webster Parish, Louisiana and Lee County, Alabama 
that have the same Gay Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1.There are 714 counties that have a 
higher Gay Rate 1 than Lesbian Rate 1. There are 512 counties that have a higher 
Lesbian Rate 1 than Gay Rate 1. Figure 4.19 demonstrates the relationship between Gay 
Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. There are only 60 counties with a higher Gay Rate 2 than 
Lesbian Rate 2 and 1,168 counties that have a higher Lesbian Rate 2 than Gay Rate 2.  
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Figure 4.20 shows the relationship between Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. 
There are 485 counties with a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 3 and 743 counties 
with a higher Lesbian Rate 3 than Gay Rate 3. Figure 4.21 demonstrates the relationship 
between Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 27 counties which have the same Gay 
Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4.37 There are 334 counties that have a higher Gay Rate 4 than 
Lesbian Rate 4. Figure 4.22 shows the relationship for Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. 
There are 18 counties that have the same Gay Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5.38 There are 
333 counties that have a higher Gay Rate 5 than Lesbian Rate 5 and thus fall above the 
line in Figure 4.22. There are 877 counties that have a higher Lesbian Rate 5 and fall 
below the line in Figure 4.22.  Overall, all of the indices are highly correlated with one 
another.
                                                 
37 Lewis County, Washington; Chesterfield County, Virginia; Alcorn County, Mississippi; Covington 
County, Alabama; Columbia County, Wisconsin; Macoupin County, Illinois; Berrien County, Michigan; 
Queen Anne's County, Maryland; Kings County, California; Floyd County, Kentucky; Sawyer County, 
Wisconsin; Fayette County, Ohio; Jackson County, Alabama; Chester County, South Carolina; Geauga 
County, Ohio; St. Joseph County, Michigan; Dallas County, Alabama; Grafton County, New Hampshire; 
Lauderdale County, Alabama; Barnwell County, South Carolina; Whitley County, Indiana; Montgomery 
County, Indiana; Danville city, Virginia; Wood County, Texas; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Wilkes 
County, North Carolina; Columbia County, Pennsylvania 
38 Whitley County, Indiana; Geauga County, Ohio; Wilkes County, North Carolina; Berrien County, 
Michigan; Danville city, Virginia; Kings County, California; Floyd County, Kentucky; Montgomery 
County, Indiana; Gwinnett County, Georgia; Lauderdale County, Alabama; Barnwell County, South 
Carolina; Lewis County, Washington; Jackson County, Alabama; Sawyer County, Wisconsin; Grafton 
County, New Hampshire; Columbia County, Pennsylvania; Covington County, Alabama; Dallas County, 
Alabama; Wood County, Texas; Fayette County, Ohio; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Columbia 
County, Wisconsin; Chester County, South Carolina; Macoupin County, Illinois; Alcorn County, 
Mississippi; St. Covington County, Alabama; Dallas County, Alabama; Wood County, Texas; Fayette 
County, Ohio; Jefferson County, West Virginia; Columbia County, Wisconsin; Chester County, South 
Carolina; Macoupin County, Illinois; Alcorn County, Mississippi; St. Joseph County, Michigan; Queen 
Anne's County, Maryland; Chesterfield County, Virginia  
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Table 4.6. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices, 1288 Counties with 50 or 
more Same Sex Households, 2000 US Census Data 
 Gay  
Rate 
1 
Gay 
Rate 
2 
Gay 
Rate 
3 
Gay  
Rate 
4 
Gay 
Rate 
5 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian  
Rate 2 
Lesbian  
Rate 3 
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
Gay Rate 2 0.92    
Gay Rate 3 0.89 0.72   
Gay Rate 4 0.81 0.68 0.78   
Gay Rate 5 0.87 0.69 0.98 0.78   
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
0.47 0.45 0.39 0.25 0.42   
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
0.43 0.58 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.80   
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
0.46 0.35 0.54 0.30 0.55 0.88 0.57  
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
0.37 0.29 0.31 0.58 0.33 0.62 0.46 0.63 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
0.43 0.30 0.51 0.30 0.53 0.86 0.51 0.98 0.67
Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4. 
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Figure 4.16. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for Counties with 50 or More Same-Sex 
Households, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.17. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for Counties with 50 or More Same-
Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.18. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 1 for Counties with 50 or 
More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.
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Figure 4.19. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for Counties with 50 or 
More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.20. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for Counties with 50 or 
More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.21. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for Counties with 50 or 
More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.22. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for Counties with 50 or 
More Same-Sex Households, 2000 U.S. Census.
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4.2.4. Census Tracts 
 For the census tract analyses, I included twenty-seven counties with a high 
number of male or female same-sex households and selected tracts in which interviews 
were conducted based upon previous research conducted by Gates and Ost (2004) 
(Alameda County, California, Allendale County, South Carolina Charlottesville city, 
Virginia Franklin County, Maine Santa Fe County, New Mexico Tompkins County, 
New York Washington D.C., San Francisco County, California, King County, 
Washington, DeKalb County, Georgia, Suffolk County, Massachusetts; Arlington 
County, Virginia; Monroe County, Florida, Hampshire County, Massachusetts, 
Nantucket County, Massachusetts,  Alexandria city, Virginia, Sonoma County, 
California, Dallas County, Texas, Brazos County, Texas, Travis, Texas, Harris County, 
Texas, New York County, New York, Fulton County, Georgia, Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana, St. Louis city, Missouri, Multnomah County, Oregon, Allendale County, 
South Carolina, Charlottesville city, Virginia).  I excluded all tracts that did not contain 
complete data from Summary File 3 or Summary File 4.  Census Tract 204, San 
Francisco County, California had the highest number of same-sex unmarried households.    
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Table 4.7. Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values for Indices of 
4,079 Tracts in the U.S., 2000 U.S. Census 
Rates Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation)
Minimum Maximum
Gay Rate 1 27.4
(36.5)
0 338.0
(Census Tract 205, San Francisco 
County, California)
Gay Rate 2 35.6
(47.0)
0 416.3
(Census Tract 44, Dallas County, 
Texas)
Gay Rate 3 1470.2
(2235.1)
0 29705.2
(Census Tract 205, San Francisco 
County, California)
Gay Rate 4 114.6
(144.0)
0 1000.0
(Census Tract 205, San Francisco 
County, California)
Gay Rate 5 7.0
(10.7)
0 180.5
(Census Tract 114, San Francisco 
County, California)
Lesbian Rate 1 18.6
(23.5)
0 176.8
(Census Tract 226, San Francisco 
County, California)
Lesbian Rate 2 28.4
(37.5)
0 358.2
(Census Tract 4023, Alameda 
County, California)
Lesbian Rate 3 924.7
(1197.9)
0 10480.3
(Census Tract 4023, Alameda 
County, California)
Lesbian Rate 4 88.1
(115.1)
0 1000.0
(Census Tract 4023, Alameda 
County, California)
Lesbian Rate 5 5.0
(6.4)
0 69.7
(Census Tract 4023, Alameda 
County, California)
Total Same-Sex 
Households 
21.6
(28.5)
0 519.0
(Census Tract 204, San Francisco 
County, California)
     
 
 
                                  
   
139
Overall, the results in most of the tracts are not very surprising. The highest 
prevalence rates of same-sex households are predominately in California. Rate1 for gays 
(Gay Rate 1) has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 27.4 (Table 4.7). This means 
that across the largest tracts of the U.S. in 2000, there was an average of almost 27 male 
same-sex householders for every 1,000 unmarried men of age 18 or over. San Francisco 
Census Tract 205 has the highest value on Gay Rate 1. San Francisco Census Tract 205 
has a score of 338.0 for every 1,000 unmarried men in San Francisco in 2000, that is, 
338 of them (or more than 33 percent) were in a male same-sex household. Lesbian Rate 
1 has an average across the tract areas of 18.6 per 1,000. San Francisco Census Tract 226 
has the highest value of all the tracts with a score of 176.8. This means that just over 
17.6 percent of all unmarried females in that tract of age 18 or more are in female same-
sex households.  
Gay Rate 2 has a mean value among the tracts of 35.6.  This means that across 
the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of almost 36 male same-sex households 
for every 1,000 never married men of age 18 or over.  Census Tract 44, Dallas County, 
Texas has the highest value of Gay Rate 2 with a score of 416.3. Lesbian Rate 2 has a 
mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 28.4.  This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 
2000, there was an average of 28 female same-sex households for every 1,000 never 
married women of age 18 or over.  Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has 
the highest value of Lesbian Rate 2 with a score of 358.2.  
Gay Rate 3 has an average score across the 4,079 tracts of 1,470.2. For every 
100,000 males of age 18 and over, there is an average of almost 1,470 male same-sex 
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households. San Francisco Census Tract 205 has the highest score of all the 4,079 tracts. 
Almost 30 percent of all males of age 18 or older in San Francisco Census Tract 205 in 
2000 were in a male same-sex household. For lesbians, the mean value on Lesbian Rate 
3 is 924.7. Across 4079 tracts, there is an average of 924 female same-sex households 
per 100,000 females of age 18 and over. Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California 
has the highest value on Lesbian Rate 3 of 10,480.3. 
Gay Rate 4 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts of 114.6.  This means that 
of the 4,079 tracts, there was an average of 114 male same-sex households for every 
1,000 unmarried households.  Census Tract 205, San Francisco County, California has 
the highest value of Gay Rate 4. Lesbian Rate 4 has a mean value among the 4,079 tracts 
of 88.1, significantly lower than Gay Rate 4.  This means that across the 4,079 tracts in 
2000, there was an average of 88 female same-sex households for every 1,000 unmarried 
households.  Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California has the highest value of 
Lesbian Rate 4.  
Finally, Gay Rate 5 has a mean value among the tracts of 7.0. This means that of 
the 4,079 tracts chosen in 2000, there was an average of 7.0 male same-sex households 
for every 1,000 total households.  Census Tract 114, San Francisco County, California 
has the highest value of Gay Rate 5, a score of 180.5. Lesbian Rate 5 has a mean value 
among the 4,079 tracts of 5.0, significantly lower than Gay Rate 5.  This means that 
across the 4,079 tracts in 2000, there was an average of 5.0 female same-sex households 
for every 1,000 total household.  Again, Census Tract 4023, Alameda County, California 
has the highest value of Lesbian Rate 5. 
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Table 4.8 presents a matrix of zero-order correlations showing the relationships 
among the various rates. The five gay rates are highly correlated with one another. Of 
the five zero-order correlations involving relationships between each pair of gay rates, 
the lowest is .83 between Gay Rate 2 and Gay Rate 4. This suggests that the variation 
among the male rates is very similar. The five lesbian rates are also positively and highly 
correlated with each other, although the correlations are not as high as those for the five 
gay rates. The correlations for the five pairs of lesbian rates range from a low of .63 
(Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 4) to a high of .95 (Lesbian Rate 3 with Lesbian Rate 
5).  These variations by rate is also similar. However, when comparing the male same-
gender indices and the female same-sex indices, the correlations are much weaker. Some 
of the indices are not statistically significant or have a negative correlation.  For 
instance, of the five gay indices and the five lesbian indices, Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian 
Rate 3 have the highest correlation of 0.29.  Furthermore, Lesbian Rate 4 is negatively 
correlated with Gay Rate 3, Gay Rate 4, and Gay Rate 5.  Thus, this suggests that the 
variation in the rates is different (Kennedy 2001; Black et al 2004).  
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Figures 4.23 and 4.24 contain scatterplots of all five rates. Figures 4.25 through 
4.29 show the relationship for all the rates. Figure 4.25 shows the relationship for Gay 
Rate 1 and Lesbian Rate 1. There are 1,104 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 1 than 
Lesbian Rate 1. Figure 4.26 presents the relationship for Gay Rate 2 and Lesbian Rate 2. 
There are 1,043 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 2 than Lesbian Rate 2. Figure 4.27 
shows the relationship for Gay Rate 3 and Lesbian Rate 3. There are 1,091 tracts that 
have a higher Gay Rate 3 than Lesbian Rate 3. Furthermore, Figure 4.28 demonstrates 
the relationship for Gay Rate 4 and Lesbian Rate 4. There are 1,043 tracts that are above 
the line in the Figure 4.28. This suggests that there are 1,043 tracts that have a higher 
Gay Rate 4 than Lesbian Rate 4. Finally, Figure 4.29 shows the relationship for Gay 
Rate 5 and Lesbian Rate 5. There are 973 tracts that have a higher Gay Rate 5 than 
Lesbian Rate 5.
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Table 4.8. Zero-Order Correlation of Gay and Lesbian Indices for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 
U.S. Census Data 
Rates Gay  
Rate 
1 
Gay  
Rate 
2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay 
Rate 
4 
Gay  
Rate 
5 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian  
Rate 2 
Lesbian  
Rate 3 
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
Gay Rate 
2 
.98         
Gay Rate 
3 
.94 .90        
Gay Rate 
4 
.84 .83 .76       
Gay Rate 
5 
.91 .88 .97 .77      
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
.21 .21 .20 .05 .20     
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
.13 .14 .08 -.01 .07 .92    
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
.26 .25 .29 .08 .28 .94 .87   
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
.00 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .75 .77 .69  
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
.17 .17 .18 .02 .19 .92 .89 .95 .76 
Source: 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 and 4 
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Figure 4.23. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay Rates for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.24. Scatterplot of Partnered Lesbian Rates for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 4.25. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 1 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.26. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 2 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.27. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 3 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.28. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 4 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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Figure 4.29. Scatterplot of Partnered Gay and Lesbian Rate 5 for 4,079 Tracts, 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
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In this chapter, I have calculated five different rates for various areas; states,  
metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and census tracts. From a demographic 
perspective, the second set of rates is more statistically defensible. The population most 
“at risk” of being in a same-sex household are individuals who have never married. 
Therefore, I use the second rates as my dependent variable in the next analysis to 
determine the social and political correlates of concentrations same-sex households. 
4.3. Social and Political Correlates of Gay and Lesbian Partnering 
I now turn to the issue of accounting for variation in the rates of gay and lesbian 
partnering. Why does San Francisco have the highest gay rate and Santa Rosa the 
highest lesbian rate? Why on so many of the sets of rates does Dubuque have the lowest 
gay and lesbian rates? What kinds of social and political considerations might be brought 
to bear? In this section, I propose and test a number of hypotheses in an attempt to 
address this question.   
In Chapter II, I described Sewell’s concept of dual structures. He argues that 
structural determinants have two tenets: resources and rules or cultural schema. I have 
identified four resource independent variables that are not necessarily specific to male or 
female same-sex households: unemployment, poverty rate, infant mortality rate, and 
temperature index. These four independent variables are not specific to gay men and 
lesbians. Most people would like to live in areas of low unemployment, low poverty, low 
infant mortality, and temperate weather (Poston and Mao 1996). I have obtained data on 
rates of civilian unemployment in 1996 for each metropolitan area (U.S. Bureau of the 
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Census 1998). I hypothesize that the greater the levels of unemployment, the less the 
concentrations of gay and lesbian partners. 
Two other factors that may be hypothesized to be related to the metropolitan 
areas are its poverty rate and its infant mortality rate. Both reflect the general quality of 
life of the area. For each metropolitan area I have data on the infant mortality rate in 
1994 and the percentage of persons below the poverty level in 1993 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1998). I hypothesize that the greater the levels of infant mortality and poverty of 
the area, the less the concentrations of gay and lesbian partners.  
Empirical research in the social sciences using climate as an independent variable 
often includes temperature as a key consideration of climate (Karp and Kelly 1971; 
Graves 1980; Poston and Mao 1996; 1998; Poston, Gotcher and Gu 2005). I obtained 
January and July temperature data for each metropolitan area based on average daily 
temperature data for these two months from 1951 to 1970, and calculated a temperature 
index by dividing the average July temperature into the average January temperature. 
Under the assumption that persons prefer to avoid exposure to bitter and cold winters 
and to excessively hot and humid summers, the higher the value of this index, the more 
favorable the climate. This is because the index value is lowered if it is cold in the winter 
or hot in summer (Karp and Kelly 1971: 25). 
There are rules and cultural schema of metropolitan areas and states that may be 
hypothesized to specifically draw gays and lesbians, and not necessarily heterosexual 
people. For instance, Black and colleagues (2003) have noted the importance of the 
metropolitan area’s social attitudes, and political and religious orientation as factors that 
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should be related to the prevalence of gays and lesbians. O’Reilly and Webster (1998) 
have written that the social and political characteristics of communities should be 
associated with levels of gay and lesbian concentration. I have gathered data for each 
metropolitan area on the percentage of votes cast in the 1996 presidential election for the 
Republican candidate, Robert Dole. I have also obtained data for each area on the 
number of Southern Baptist members per 1,000 population.  I hypothesize that the more 
Republican the voting patterns in the area, and the more conservative the religious 
attitudes, as measured by the prevalence of Southern Baptists, the lower the 
concentrations of gay and lesbian partners.  
 Why should the prevalence of Republicans and Southern Baptists be negatively 
associated with the prevalence of gays and lesbians? The Republican Party has long been 
identified, rightly or wrongly, as having an anti-homosexual orientation. Although there 
is a vocal homosexual group in the Republican Party, namely, the Log Cabin 
Republicans, its influence on the party is thought to be minimal (O’Reilly and Webster 
1998: 501; Green et al. 1995; Guth 1995).  
Research on the conflicts over homosexuality in religious Christian 
denominations is extensive (Anderson 1997; Wood and Bloch 1995; Beuttler 1999; 
Ellingson et al. 2001; Koch and Curry 2000; Wellman 1999). Few Christian 
denominations (except Unitarian Universalism) and denominational religious groups 
such as the United Church of Christ, the Integrity group in the Episcopal Church, the 
Dignity group in the Roman Catholic Church, and the Lutherans Concerned group view 
homosexuality in a more tolerant light (Ellison 1993; Mahaffy 1996). Melton (1991) 
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found that 72% of surveyed churches and organizations condemned homosexuals and 
homosexuality as being an abomination in the eyes of God. Members and participants in 
many conservative Christian denominations refer to gays and lesbians as “unnatural”, 
“evil”, “sinners”, and “perverts” (Clark, Brown and Hochstein 1990; Greenberg and 
Bystryn 1982; Keysor 1979; Scanzoni and Mollenkott 1978). The Southern Baptist 
denomination’s conferences regularly pass resolutions that consider homosexuality as an 
“abomination in the eyes of God” (Steinfels 1988: 6).     
There is very little empirical literature about the relationship between the 
presence of sodomy laws and anti-gay/lesbian discrimination laws and the 
concentrations of gays and lesbians. Gates and Ost (2004: 3) note that states with a large 
relative presence of gays and lesbians tend to have more favorable laws pertaining to 
homosexuals. As of 2000, numerous states had sodomy laws that applied only to 
homosexuals, and other states had sodomy laws that applied to both homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. Of the 331 metropolitan areas in 2000, 21 percent were in states with 
sodomy laws against both homosexuals and heterosexuals, and 13 percent in states with 
sodomy laws only against homosexuals. Alternately, in 2000, 23 percent of the 
metropolitan areas were in states that prohibited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in both the public and private sectors, and 40 percent of the metropolitan 
areas were in states that prohibited such discrimination only in the public sector.  
I have constructed one dummy variables to measure the presence of sodomy 
laws: Sodomy-1 is scored 1 if the metropolitan area is in a state that has a sodomy law 
directed against homosexuals and heterosexuals, and 0 if not. I expect that the sodomy 
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variables should be negatively related to the levels of concentration of gay and lesbian 
partners, that is, the levels of gay and lesbian concentration should be lower in 
metropolitan areas in states with sodomy laws.  
I have also constructed two dummy variables measuring the presence in the state 
of laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Anti-disc-1 is scored 1 if 
the metropolitan area is in a state with laws prohibiting discrimination in the private 
sectors, and 0 if not. Anti-disc-2 is scored 1 if the metropolitan area is in a state with 
laws prohibiting discrimination in the public sector, and 0 if not.    
The size of the metropolitan area’s total population should also be associated in a 
positive way with the levels of gay and lesbian concentration. There is good reason to 
expect higher levels of gay and lesbian concentration in metropolitan areas with larger 
populations (Abrahamson 2002; Rosenfeld 2007). These expectations are based in part 
on the notion that the larger the size of the general population, the greater the likelihood 
for some of these people to be gay and lesbian. Because a few metropolitan areas are 
outliers owing to their extremely large populations, I have taken the natural log of the 
metropolitan area’s population size in 2000.  
Finally, I believe there is reason to expect that levels of gay and lesbian 
concentration should be associated with levels of heterosexual cohabitation. If the social 
and political climate of an area is conducive to heterosexual cohabitation, the same 
should be the case for homosexual cohabitation (Black et al 2002). Thus areas with high 
rates of unmarried heterosexuals who are cohabiting should have high rates of 
homosexual cohabitation, and vice versa. I have taken unmarried partner data from 
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Census 2000 and have calculated for each metropolitan area the number of unmarried 
heterosexual cohabiting households per 1,000 total households.    
Table 4.9 presents the results of two ordinary least squares multiple regression 
equations modeling the prevalence of gays and lesbians among the 331 metropolitan 
areas. The dependent variable is the second gay(lesbian) rate, namely, the number of 
partnered gays(lesbians) per 1,000 never married males(females) of age 18 and over; the 
above mentioned twelve variables are the independent variables. I have placed positive 
or negative signs to the right of the variable name indicating the direction of the 
variable’s hypothesized relationship with the gay/lesbian rate. 
I note first that the statistical tolerances of the twelve independent variables are 
all acceptable, ranging from a low of .40 (Southern Baptists per 1,000 population) to a 
high of .76 (infant mortality rate, and the log of population size). The mean tolerance of 
the twelve independent variables is .52. 
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Table 4.9. Metric and Standardized Regression Coefficients from Multiple Regression 
Equations of Gay and Lesbian Partnering Rates (per 1,000 Never Married 
Males/Females age 18+) on Twelve Independent Variables, 331 Metropolitan Areas of 
the U.S., 2000 U.S. Census Data 
Independent Variables Gay Rate 1 Lesbian Rate 1 
 metric standardized metric standardized
Unemployment Rate (-) 0.386* .153 .901* 0.288
Poverty Rate (-) -.415* -.296 -.771* -.444
Infant Mortality Rate (-) -.180 -.060 -.651* -.176
Temperature Index (+) 22.136* .449 28.906* .474
Percent Voting for 
Dole, 1996 (-)                   
-.108* -.142  -.089* -.093
Southern Baptists per 
1,000 Population (-)       
.012*  .187 .027*  .341
Sodomy (Homo and 
Hetero) (-) 
1.475 .087 .879 .042
Sodomy (Homo) (-) 1.123 .054 2.926* .114
Anti-discrimination 
(public & private) (+) 
-.379 -.023 -2.081* -.102
Anti-discrimination 
(public) (+) 
-.423 -.030 .698 .040
Log of Population size 
of Met Area (+) 
1.905* .287 .165 .020  
Heterosexual 
Cohabitation Rate (+) 
.109* .146 .340* .367
Constant -6.953  13.285
R2 (adj.) .417  .395
* p-value > 0.05 
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Of the twelve regression coefficients in the OLS equation predicting levels of 
gay concentration, eight are signed in the hypothesized direction, but of these correctly 
signed coefficients, only five are statistically significant. The more agreeable the 
physical temperature of the area, the higher the concentration of gay partners. And the 
higher the poverty rate in the metropolitan area, and the higher the percentage voting 
Republican, the lower the concentration of partnered gays. And the larger the area’s 
population, and the higher the level of heterosexual cohabitation, the higher the 
concentration of gays. None of the three independent variables dealing with sodomy 
laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation are significantly 
associated in the hypothesized negative direction with the level of gay concentration.  
 The most influential of the independent variables is the temperature index. For 
every one standard deviation increase in the temperature index, there is almost a one-half 
standard deviation increase in the gay concentration rate, holding constant the effects of 
the other independent variables. In order, the next most influential independent variables 
are the poverty rate, the log of population size, the heterosexual cohabitation rate, and 
the percent voting Republican. The independent variables account for over 41 percent of 
the variation in the gay partnering rate. 
The results of the OLS regression equation modeling the prevalence of lesbians 
among the metropolitan areas are similar to those modeling the prevalence of gays. The 
main differences in the two sets of results are as follows: the infant mortality rate is 
significant in the lesbian equation. The presence of laws prohibiting discrimination in the 
public and private sectors on the basis of sexual orientation is significant in the lesbian 
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equation, but the log of population size is not. The most influential independent variable 
in the lesbian equation, as in the gay equation, is the temperature index, and the next 
most important are the poverty rate and the heterosexual cohabitation rate. The 
independent variables account for almost 40 percent of the variation among the 
metropolitan areas in the lesbian prevalence rate, which is an adjusted R2 value only 
slightly less than that in the gay equation.  
In both the partnered gay and partnered lesbian equations, it appears that of the 
significant independent variables, the most important ones are amenity-based effects that 
apply to the population in general, and not only to homosexuals, a conclusion reached by 
Black and his associates (2002) in their study of San Francisco and other areas with large 
relatives numbers of gays. The next most influential independent variables, however, are 
effects that operate primarily for homosexuals. I turn now to a discussion of these 
results.  
4.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this chapter I addressed two issues. The first was the development of five rates 
to measure the levels of concentration of gay and lesbian partnering in the United States, 
metropolitan statistical areas, counties, and 4,079 census tracts. While each rate has 
statistical, descriptive, and demographic merit, I focused on one of the rates, that 
measuring the number of partnered gays, or partnered lesbians, per 1,000 never married 
males, or females, of age 18 and over. Statistically and demographically, I argued, this 
rate has the most defensible denominator, that is, it is based on the statistically “best” 
population from which partnered lesbians and gays are drawn.  
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 I then described the settlement patterns of gay and lesbian partners. Results from 
all five rates indicated that gay partners and lesbian partners settle in states that one 
would expect: California, Vermont, and Florida and do not live in North and South 
Dakota. For gay partners, the five rates indicated that San Francisco has the highest gay 
partner levels of concentration in 2000.  For lesbian partners, four of the five rates 
indicated that the largest concentration of lesbian partners in 2000 is in Santa Rosa. Most 
of the rates showed that Dubuque has the lowest levels of concentrations of gays and 
lesbians. Moreover, I demonstrated that variance of gay and lesbian prevalence occurs 
across the United States. Also, the five gay/lesbian rates are all highly correlated with 
each other, suggesting any of these rates could be used almost interchangeably. Owing to 
the high correlation between the gay rates and the lesbian rates, I also concluded that gay 
and lesbian couples tend to settle in similar metropolitan areas although not at the same 
levels and also not in the same census tracts. Gay men tend to have a few favorite 
metropolitan areas, namely, San Francisco, Atlanta, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami, 
Jersey City, Washington, DC, New York, and Fort Lauderdale, where their prevalence 
rates surpass those of lesbians. Partnered lesbians, on the other hand, tend to have 
concentrations that are greater than those of gays in most of the metropolitan areas, 
tending not to prefer certain areas to the degree they are preferred by gays.   
 Second, I asked about the kinds of structural determinants that influence and are 
related to the geographical locations of gay and lesbian partners. Drawing on limited 
literature dealing with gay and lesbian settlement patterns, I identified characteristics of 
metropolitan areas that have been argued to be related to levels of gay and lesbian 
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concentration. Structural determinants that I predicted to impact gay and lesbian 
settlement patterns seemed to have little influence upon gay and lesbian prevalence. 
In the multivariate context, the variables that were the most influential in 
predicting levels of gay and lesbian concentration were a physical temperature index 
(average January temperature divided by average July temperature), the poverty rate, and 
the heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables that I had constructed to represent cultural 
schema and focusing on characteristics of the metropolitan areas of relevance mainly to 
gays and lesbians such as those dealing with sodomy law and anti-discrimination laws 
pertaining to sexual orientation, as well as presence of political and religious 
conservatism were either not statistically important predictors or exhibited minimal 
influences. For instance, the independent variable, Southern Baptist membership, is 
statistically significant, but in the opposite direction of the prediction. There are three 
main reasons for this possibility. First, religious identity may not be important to gay 
men and lesbians. Singer and Deschamps (1994) found that 62% of gay men and 
lesbians feel that religion is not an important part of their lives. Secondly, gay men and 
lesbians who may not deal with religious institutions that condemn important aspects of 
their sexual identity. Thirdly, Sherkat (1997; 1998) argues that gay men and lesbians 
underconsume religious goods. Gay men and lesbians are rejected by most religious 
organizations that would “very likely diminish many nonheterosexuals’ capacities to 
adapt preferences for religious goods” (Sherkat 2002: 315).  
Other independent variables which were not statistically significant were the 
laws and ordinance variables. Of the laws and ordinances variables only the anti-
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discrimination laws in private variable is statistically significant and in the opposite 
direction of the prediction. This suggests that enforcement of sodomy and anti-
discrimination laws were sporadic at best and remain more of a symbolic threat towards 
gay men and lesbians (Eskridge 2002). 
Quantitative assessments of the patterns of gay and lesbian prevalence in U.S. 
metropolitan areas are particularly relevant today given the active discussions in the 
political, religious, and social arenas with regard to gay marriage, the adoption of 
children by gays and lesbians, and other issues involving sexual orientation. As Gates 
and Ost (2004: 3) have noted, these topics lead to intense discussions, arguments and 
debates, most of which are “marked by an astonishing lack of empirical data.” It has 
been difficult if not impossible for policymakers, community activists, and gay and 
lesbian leaders to appraise the effects that gay marriage laws, domestic partnership 
benefits, adoption rights, and other related issues would have on the homosexual and 
heterosexual communities in the country because of the paucity of information about the 
locations of gays and lesbians. Aside from everyone seeming to know that there are a lot 
of homosexuals in San Francisco, the amount of knowledge about the prevalence of gays 
and lesbians elsewhere in the U.S. is miniscule.     
 In the next chapter, I inquire about how gay men and lesbians filled out the 
census form. Only about thirty-five percent of gay men and lesbian filled in the 
“unmarried partner” category. Most of the respondents discuss the census form as a legal 
document. I argue that my respondents exhibit a legal consciousness of injustice 
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(Marshall 2005). As a result of this analysis, I argue for a new concept which I call 
statistical consciousness.  
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CHAPTER V  
LEGAL AND STATISTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 In the previous chapter, I analyzed Census data to determine how the State 
defines and determines same-sex households. Furthermore, I provided five different 
indices to measure same-sex households. Implementing Sewell’s argument about 
structure as represented in resources and cultural schema, I argued that same-sex 
households would have specific resources and cultural schema that would encourage 
them to settle in certain areas of the United States as opposed to other areas of the United 
States. However, many variables operationalized as resources and cultural schemas 
specific to gay and lesbian households were not statistically significant or lacked 
statistical power when compared to other variables.  
 In this chapter, I turn to how individual gay and lesbian couples respond to the 
Census categories and how they socially construct their relationships.  While the State 
suggests how same-sex households should mark their relationship on the Census 
Schedule, gay and lesbian couples mark various categories on the Census Schedule, that 
is, using their own agency, they marked categories based on three major themes. The 
three major themes are: 1) redefining relationships in the context of the Census 
Schedule; 2) enumeration and misenumeration; and 3) utilization of consciousness. 
5.1. (Re)Defining Relationship in the Context of the Census Schedule 
Significantly more people marked “single” or “unmarried partner,” than 
“housemate/roommate” or “husband/wife” (Table 5.1). Fifty-four percent of the 
interviews and fifty-one percent of the respondents from the Internet survey marked 
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“single” on the Census Schedule. The next most marked category was “unmarried 
partner” with 32% of the interviewees and 30% of respondents from the internet survey 
marking this category. Very few of the respondents marked “husband/wife” category.   
Table 5.1. How Respondents Marked the Census Schedule 
 Unmarried 
Partners 
N 
(Percentage) 
Divorced 
N 
(Percentage)
Married 
N 
(Percentage)
Single 
N 
(Percentage) 
Husband/Wife 
N 
(Percentage) 
Interviews 7 
(32) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(5) 
12 
(54) 
2 
(9) 
Internet 
Survey 
14 
(30) 
3 
(6) 
6 
(13) 
24 
(51) 
0 
(0) 
 
 
The biggest factor in picking a category was the duration of the relationship. If 
the relationship was new, then the couples tended to mark housemate/roommate or 
single. For instance, Margaret and Joanne had recently started a relationship and had just 
moved in together. At the time of the 2000 Census Schedule, they lived in separate 
households. Margaret suggests that because of the newness of their relationship she 
would have picked housemate/roommate. Margaret stated, 
Well, I’m not sure but I would either pick for Joanne or I mean Joanne and I 
would talk about it….. I would either say housemate or roommate or unmarried 
partner depending on how she felt about it and… I imagine we would talk about 
what it would mean to say unmarried partner and if there would be any 
ramifications for that and…if there might be positive reasons to say unmarried 
partner so that we were counted as lesbians and not as assume straight people, 
straight women living together.  Housemates/roommates, …but also we have not 
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been together that long so I wouldn’t necessarily apply the term partner to her in 
other circumstances.  They don’t give the option girlfriend so…either partner or 
roommate I guess would be the closest answer. 
Margaret struggles to define the category that her relationship is in. She varies from 
filling it out herself without a discussion with Joanne to having an in-depth discussion 
with Joanne to choosing “either partner or roommate.”  
This struggle about how to define the couple’s relationship was not unusual. 
Similar to Margaret, others were very confused about the census categories and 
vacillated between which categories they would chose. For instance, Lucy stated, “It was 
either housemate/roommate or wife.” Furthermore, Kate stated, “Depending on how 
advanced the relationship was, it might be roommate or husband/wife.” In neither 
Lucy’s nor Kate’s interview, did they state they would mark ‘unmarried partner’ on the 
Census form.  
In Paula’s situation everyone knows the couple as housemates, but on the Census 
Schedule she defines her relationship as an unmarried partnership. She states: 
Well, I don’t know if we should say married, but probably, well, but everybody 
knows us as housemates, but I don’t know.  I would, in my personal opinion?  
Okay, then I’m an unmarried partner 
In these cases, respondents could not categorize their relationship into set Census 
categories, but waffle on how to label their relationships.  
Others were adamant about their choice and had few problems defining the 
significance of their relationship. For these respondents, the emphasis was placed upon 
 
 
                                  
   
167
the strength of the relationship. For example, Candace a White graduate student 
attending seminary and Andrea had been in a relationship for five years. As Candace 
examined the Census Schedule, she stated: 
Because she is more than householder, roommate, more than roomer or boarder. 
She’s not an other, non-relative. I thought about putting other relative, and 
putting partner, to put exact relationship. But unmarried partner probably comes 
closes. 
Candace provides significance to the category of partner. She examines all of the 
categories and determines the best category for her significant other is partner. Aimee, a 
White counselor who had been with her partner for over twenty years, made similar 
comments. She stated: 
Aimee:  Is there a partner choice? I picked that one. 
Carol:  The unmarried partner. 
Aimee:  Yea yea, that’s what I put. 
Carol:  Okay, so why did you pick that one? 
Aimee:  Because that’s the truth.  You know, ten years ago I would talk about my 
roommate.  She’s not my roommate, she’s not my friend, she’s my partner.   
For Aimee, ten years ago she would have classified her partner as a roommate not a 
partner. However, because she has been with her significant other for ten years, she 
defines her as a partner. Aimee places significance upon the category of partner.  
Others had various problems with filling out the Census form. Two people had 
just recently moved and could not remember receiving a form. A few couples had 
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recently moved into a shared living space but were not in the same household at the time 
of the Census. For example, Xavier had accepted a new job in a different city. He felt 
that his home was with his partner, Don, but he would have received a Census form in 
both locations. Because of this migration, Xavier does not recall receiving the Census 
form or filling it out. He assumes that Don filled it out. Xavier stated,   
I don’t remember receiving it which is pretty bad. I don’t remember we receiving 
maybe Don got it in [another city]?  You think I did it and I don’t, won’t 
remember…See I was moving March or April of 2000.  See we probably got it in 
[another city].  Don probably filled it out. 
In this case, Xavier believes that Don counted him in his household in another city, but 
he was actually living in a different city. Kenneth Pewitt (2003), previous Census 
Bureau Chef, notes that he had a similar problem. His family was living in a different 
location while he was living in Washington D.C. While his home was with his family, he 
also received a short form of the 2000 Census Schedule at his apartment. He was being 
counted in two different locations.  
  Additionally, gay and lesbian couples’ legality as a couple came into question. 
Brianna’s partner was legally married to her separated husband at the time the Census 
Schedule reached their door. Both Brianna and Jasmine had previously been married. 
However, Jasmine was still legally married to her separated husband. When filling out 
the Census form during the interview, Brianna commented that  
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Well, I don’t know cause she is still married.  I don’t know if you have to do this 
legally. Probably.  Everyone knows us as housemates.  I don’t know.  I…would 
lets see.  I’m Person 2.  Then I am unmarried partner.  Yes. 
Although at the time of the interview, she might have chosen the unmarried partner 
category, her partner was legally in a heterosexual marriage. This caused Brianna trouble 
in determining how to mark their relationship on the Census Schedule. 
5.2. Enumeration and Misenumeration: Power in Numbers 
Literature has suggested that same-sex households are underenumerated (Black 
et al. 2000, 2002). In the previous section, many same-sex households did not mark their 
relationship on the Census Schedule because of how they felt about the relationship, but 
also because of mobility, heterosexual marriage, and discrimination felt by the 
respondents. Other researchers postulate that gay and lesbian couples may not 
understand the census questions and categories.  
When I asked if the relationship question was confusing, some of the respondents 
discussed how they were frustrated with Census categories. Larry and David, an 
interethnic couple, found the household question confusing because it does not account 
for gay and lesbian couples. Larry stated, 
Larry:  I would say what is your relationship? 
David:  Yea, what is your relationship to Person 1, and I think they should have, I 
mean they print other exact relationship.  Gay lover?  I mean what are you going 
to put there?  You know, it seems like they could add some other box to check 
that said same-sex spouse, or same-sex domestic partner. 
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Larry:  Right.  I mean there is the option of not related, but it’s unmarried 
partner.  You know there could be another option that said partner. 
David:  Same-sex domestic partner. 
Larry:  Right. 
Ava, furthermore, found the question confusing because she felt it did not differentiate 
between relative and non-relative. To her, her partner is a “blood relative,” even if 
society does not view her partner as such.39 She states, 
Yes.  Because what’s the difference between other relative, other non-relative, 
unmarried partner?  You know, trying to find the best option, it comes down to 
three that I can choose from, or four, some people would consider 
housemate/roommate as an option for gay and lesbian couples but... 
More often, the interviewees did not find the question confusing at all. They  
understood what the question was asking and how it was being answered  in the current 
social and political environment. Ava notes that she completely understands what the 
question means in “the current social and political environment,” that is, she should not 
mark “wife” as a legitimate choice. Ava demonstrates that even though she understands 
how to answer the question, she is refusing to do so and is in opposition to being 
categorized as a non-relative.  
Chloe, who was living in the household by herself at the time of the census and 
did not answer the door when a census-taker came to the door, verbally acknowledged 
                                                 
39 This is not uncommon for gays and lesbians to view non-blood relations as blood relations or as families 
of kin (Weston 1997). 
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each category and concludes that her partner is not a relation. She does not find the 
question confusing. She states, 
How is this person related to person 1?  Husband or wife.  Natural born 
son/daughter.  Adopted.  Father. Child.  Grandchild.  Son.  Mother in law.  Other 
relative print…So if you’re not married then you’re not related, so I would not 
think it would be, yea, it’s cool.  I would not be married.  And even if I did 
exchange rings on a United States constitution, as far as I know it, and also Texas 
law, I don’t think I could define her as relations (a kin).  So, sorry about that, 
ya’ll. 
Chloe’s answer again reveals an awareness that her own personal actions engage with 
socially enforced definitions and boundaries.  She does not find this question confusing, 
and because she is conscious of “Texas law” and “even if I did exchange rings” she 
would not consider her partner a relation (a kin).  She is fine-tuning the differences 
between partnership and legal relatives, acknowledging her lack of power in changing 
those boundaries, and she’s “cool” with it. 
In the interview, I asked the interviewees if gay men and lesbians would want to 
be counted by the Census Bureau. Some of the respondents suggested that they would 
not want the Census Bureau to collect data about gay male and lesbian couples. For 
instance, David asserted that the form was not meant to collect data about gay men and 
lesbians. He stated 
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Because it’s not designed with GLBT [gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender] 
issues in mind.  It’s designed from a heterosexual view and it leaves that bit of 
information out, and it’s not written sensitively wise for GLBT.   
David points out the Census Schedule represents heteronormativity. He specifically 
states, “It’s designed from a heterosexual view.” Others were unsure about being 
counted by the Census Bureau. Sophia, stated, “I don’t know. I don’t see the need.” 
Other respondents would like the Census Bureau to collect data about gay men 
and lesbians to exert power via numbers. Christiania, for example, believes that the ten 
percent figure (Kinsey 1948) that estimates the number of gay men and lesbians living in 
the United States is too low. She states, 
Yes, because I think that 10% is a low number. But that is kind of out there, and I 
really think that there are more, and that data can really affect the laws that are 
being created and those laws can improve the lives of gay people.  Particularly 
the poor, I know a lot of gay people at the poverty level, and there could be laws 
that would improve there lives, like getting tax breaks. And I could bring an 
awareness that everybody isn’t heterosexual. 
Christiania asserts that power and law can be changed by being enumerated by the 
Census Bureau. Gay men and lesbians could gain resources related to being counted by 
the Census Bureau.  
Madeline also believed there is significant value in being counted on the Census 
Schedule. She asserts, 
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Personally, yes. I don’t think there is anything wrong with it. I think that 
anonymity is our biggest downfall. I don’t see any reason why anybody would 
want to count how many blacks, how many Asians, how many queers.  But if 
they wanted to, I don’t have any reason why I wouldn’t stand up and say “Yes I 
am.”  However, most of my friends are professionals, and they don’t want the 
closet door open.  And will not be counted.  
Interestingly, Madeline’s partner is a teacher in a rural district and must walk a line 
between being “out” and too “out.” Furthermore, Madeline compares queers with Blacks 
and Asians, in that, if racial groups are counted then queers should also be counted. For 
Madeline, being counted suggests being out of the closet and having others aware of her 
sexual identity. Madeline judges others as living in the closet and thus would not be 
counted by the Census Bureau. 
Whereas Madeline focused on the similarities to other racial groups being 
counted, Heather focused on the differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. 
Heather agrees that gay men and lesbians should be counted because “We are a unique 
class in ourselves.” Heather suggests that gay men and lesbians are there own group with 
their own interests. 
Leigh argues that gay men and lesbians should be counted by the Census Bureau, 
but does not believe that all gay men and lesbians would be willing to be counted. As we 
saw above Madeline provided a similar analysis. Leigh states, 
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Yes. Because I think we are under-counted.  People don’t think there are very 
many of us. I think the stereotypical 10% of us is very low. But I don’t think that 
everyone would honestly do it. 
I have defined statistical consciousness as using statistics in everyday life,. The 
above quotes suggest that many of my respondents felt that there was power in being 
enumerated. The respondents suggested that if gay men and lesbians were enumerated 
by the Census Bureau, society would find that there are many gay men and lesbians 
living in the United States. Similar to the multiracial movement for the Census Schedule, 
interviewees argue that enumeration by the Census Bureau would decrease anonymity 
and thus create more power for gay men and lesbians. Furthermore, these respondents 
judge that closet gay men and lesbians will not mark their relationship on the Census 
Schedule.   
5.3. Utilization of Legal Consciousness 
Law is a social construction and is fluid in the boundaries that it sets up. Law 
helps shape the meaning that people make of their lives – the way that they understand 
the living conditions created by structural inequality (Engel and Munger 2003; Ewick 
and Silbey 1998; Merry 1990; Sarat and Kearns 1993; Nielsen 2000). People may see in 
law and the legal system a set of traps that support systems of oppression, but they may 
also find in law a set of tools to resist such oppression (Merry 1995; McCann 1994; 
Thompson 1975). But law alone does not determine people’s interpretations of their 
experiences. Rather, it is one of many frames and schemas – both hegemonic and 
subversive – that promote or discourage the everyday conflicts that constitute social 
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change. Law supported oppressive regimes at the same time that it represented the hopes 
and aspirations of liberation, but it was always part of a larger social struggle that 
touched everyday lives (Marshall 2005: 2).  
In my interviews, the continual discussion about gay marriage framed how the 
respondents viewed the Census Schedule. Some respondents made legal distinctions on 
which category they chose. When I asked if respondents would fill out the Census form 
in a different manner, the respondents tended to respond in legalistic terms. Many 
discussed how they were denied the ability to marry. Often the interviewees’ definition 
of household intersected with the current debates about gay marriage. For instance, 
Tristan and Matthew, who met at a university that they attended as undergraduates and 
have been a couple for over twenty years, stated that they marked the ‘unmarried 
category’ but when I asked if they would ever mark ‘husband,’ they responded as to why 
they would not as: 
Matthew: Because they won’t recognize gay marriage 
Tristan: Recently I was doing a survey by Jack in the Box, the ones that you go 
to the web and do the number off the receipt, and I actually wrote them in the 
comments box because they had significant other on there.  And I feel that 
significant other is much more meaningful than unmarried partner.  Or civil 
unions; we don’t have a problem with ‘other’ because from our stand point we 
want marriage for the legal benefits, and that goes back to what you believe; that 
you should be showing your commitment through your actions.  So that other 
people can see that you are committed to each other.  Most people don’t know us 
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as anything other than Matthew and Tristan. Because they always see us 
together. And it is in part that we are always together, as you can tell we talk in 
stereo together.  And so I was very happy with the significant other option on 
there rather than having to check other or none sometimes.  Unmarried partner 
isn’t used a lot.  Usually it is single or married… 
Matthew: single, married or divorced. Since it’s a legal document probably not.  
But we refer to ourselves as husbands. 
Tristan: When we are asked for a beneficiary on an insurance form and they ask 
the relationship, at the point we put husband.  If it is an IRS form, and we know 
what definition they are going by, then we follow the definition because we feel 
that it is important.  
For Matthew and Tristan, they would mark some other category because unmarried 
partner does not represent their relationship. Furthermore, they would mark single on the 
Census Schedule, because of where the document is going to go. Matthew and Tristan 
suggested that they understand the question, but decided to not mark their relationship 
on the Census Schedule. Another couple discussed not marking unmarried partner or 
wife on the Census Schedule, because they were suspicious of the government knowing 
about their relationship. In Matthew and Tristan’s case, they did not mark their 
relationship because they constructed it as a legal document that should not be falsified.   
Furthermore, Madeline, a White working class women who has been in a 
relationship with her partner for over twenty years and raising a daughter, refered to her 
partner as a spouse in their everyday life. On the Census Schedule, she marked 
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‘unmarried partner.’ She defined ‘unmarried partner’ as “[W]e aren’t married because 
the law won’t allow it. So we have to call it a partnership. Because the law sucks.” 
Clearly, Madeline is suggesting a legal consciousness of injustice. She calls her partner 
spouse in their everyday lives, but marks unmarried partner on the Census Schedule. 
Moreover, she is aware of the law and even describes it as “suck[ing]” because she feels 
as if they are married.  
Additionally, Heather, a White university professor who is raising three children, 
filled out the Census form and marked ‘unmarried partner’ for her partner. When I asked 
if she would have considered marking wife as a Census category, she stated 
I have referred to her as my wife, and I suppose now in certain states, then yes a 
person could refer to them as wife.  In 2000 I can’t remember if it was legal in 
certain states.  I affectionately refer to her as my wife, but I know that I am not 
legally married to her, and that I wouldn’t on a census form refer to somebody as 
my wife. 
During the interview Heather divulged that although she and her partner were recently 
separated, they had included each other on insurance forms, and her partner had a 
guardian ad lieu for their three children. In everyday life, they had labeled their 
relationship as spouses, but on the Census form Heather did not mark ‘wife’ because she 
was not “legally married to her partner” Furthermore, she is unsure of her legal status in 
Texas or other states about being married. She falsely (at the time of the interview) 
asserts that in some states she and her partner would have the option to be married.   
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In a similar manner, Chloe refers to her partner, Brooke as unmarried partner. 
She defines their relationship on the Census form as “unmarried partner,” and then states 
when asked if she would ever mark wife,   
Chloe: Not seriously. Because I think the most accurate term is unmarried 
partner.  In legal terms we are unmarried partners, but if anything were to happen 
to one of us, I would call her my wife because that’s how we are emotionally.  
In the above quote, Chloe labels her relationship as spouse; “my wife because that’s how 
we are emotionally,” but on a Census form, she clearly delineates that the relationship is 
‘unmarried partner.’ In all of these examples, respondents understood rightly or wrongly 
the legal climate and their status as legally married. In all the above quotes, people 
understood what the relationship question was asking, but defined the Census Schedule 
as a legal document. In many cases, the were aware of the legal injustices that were 
occurring to them, but still answered the relationship question in the “correct” manner. 
During the time of the interviews, some politicians were proposing a 
Constitutional Amendment to define marriage as one man and one woman. Prior to the 
suggested Constitutional Amendment, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and state 
(DOMAS) defined marriage as occurring between one man and one woman. I asked 
interviewees if they were aware of the Defense of Marriage Act and if so, how they 
defined it. Everyone, except for Toby, was aware of the Defense of Marriage Act. All 
those who knew of it disagreed with the Defense of Marriage Act.  
Abigail chose to redefine what the Defense of Marriage Act meant. She argued 
that “lesbian marriage” was much better than heterosexual marriage. She stated, 
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Well, as far as I know, my opinion of it is it’s really cool.  That defense of 
marriage is good.  We should define our relationship as better than defense of 
marriage.  We should define it as lesbian marriage because it’s much much better 
than heterosexual marriage, so they can keep their heterosexual marriage if they 
give us a different title.   
Other interviews focused on political and civil rights discourse. For instance, Matthew 
and Tristan stated that the Defense of Marriage Act was: 
Matthew: A bunch of crap 
Tristan: OK, the Defense of Marriage Act is DOMA, and not the federal 
marriage…ok, it goes back to; that politicians go to the highest bidder now and 
aren’t truly representative of the people. Therefore they are going for the highest 
paying constituents, and that is the extreme radical right, and they people in 
charge, even in Clinton’s day are trying to placate the right because we scare 
people.  And it all goes back to the fact that most of the surveys that I like 
generally ask the same question “do you believe in gay marriage?” then follow 
that question with “do you know a gay person?” and generally people that know 
a gay person are more likely to be accepting and think differently.  The unknown 
scares them.  For the politicians, it is a divide and conquer strategy… 
Matthew:…absolutely… 
Tristan: all they are trying to do is divide the nation and conquer the other party.  
Not gay people necessary, but we are the scapegoats now. 
Matthew: we are what the communists used to be… 
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Tristan:….right. something that they could money off of. 
Previously, Madeline used a rights discourse to discuss the similarities between gay men 
and lesbians and racial minorities. In the exchange above, Matthew and Tristan view the 
Defense of Marriage Act as extremely political, that is, the politicians are just using the 
Defense of Marriage Act as a “divid[e] and conquer strategy.” Furthermore, Matthew 
and Tristan believed that gay men and lesbians are being used as “scapegoats” and the 
new “communists.” 
 Furthermore, Matthew and Tristan viewed the proposed federal amendment as 
unconstitutional. They argue,  
Matthew: totally wrong from the standpoint of putting bigotry into the 
Constitution.  There has never been a amendment taking away the rights of 
people, except for prohibition. And it shouldn’t start with this.  What the problem 
is, is that it is a very slippery slope that we would be going down if we do it.  
What is going to happen next? Are the going to allow choice decisions? 
Women’s right to choose. They are going back to race relations…possibly 
immigration. All these different things that people love  to be bigoted about.  We 
would only be the start of it.  I find many, many more people that are willing to 
go against in for that reason…       
Tristan: than disagree with gay marriage… 
Matthew: yea definitely disagree with gay marriage. Reading about that really 
annoys me, and I cant imagine that the Supreme Court will allow it because it 
says something to the effect…according to the Constitution entire judiciary is the 
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Supreme Court and other are create as the lamb of Congress, so this tells the 
Congress that they have the authority to tell the lower level courts that they cant 
even hear cases about whether DOMA is constitutional.  And it revokes any 
appellate jurisdiction that the Supreme Court has, which I don’t think they have 
the power to,  and it seems extremely republican to me.  Basically if they 
disagree with something, they don’t even want you to hear the opposition. It’s 
like with Fahrenheit 911. Do they try to tell people to not see it, to tell them its 
awful, NO, they try to get it out of the theatres so you cant have the option to see 
it.  Its like they don’t trust their own voters to vote republican, they redistrict so 
they have to. Its all about taking away choices.  That’s what the republicans are 
all about right now…but its not like I am biased or bitter at this point. 
 Natalie focused on similarities and differences between heterosexual and gay 
marriage. She defined the Defense of Marriage Act as, “Well, were all afraid of 
different, and we don’t want anybody but a man and a woman to be married because of 
the sanctity of marriage.” When I asked her opinions about the Defense of Marriage Act, 
she argued that it was about politics and economics.    
It’s stupid.  It’s political.  It’s about economics.  And she said I don’t need to be 
on my partner’s healthcare benefits.  They don’t really care if I’m married or not.  
I mean most people, the sanctity of marriage, you go to Las Vegas and get 
married on a whim.   
Another respondent declared the Defense of Marriage Act as also being political and 
turning the country away from what politically really matter, the Iraq War. 
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Candace has a similar strong reaction to the Defense of Marriage Act. When I 
asked her how she defined it, she stated,  
Getting on, and getting along straight, so to speak.  That was the one that Clinton 
signed that basically said that if one state allows gay marriage, then the other 
states are not required to view it as a marriage. 
She continues when asked about her opinion of it,   
Clinton appealed to us to get him in office, and then he screwed us once he got 
there.  Both with gays in the military, and the marriage act…To constitutionally 
disallow one of the populations of society full legal rights that another group has 
is unconstitutional.  So, despite my sexuality, or morals, whatever spiritual 
stance, politically I think is unconstitutional.   
Candace discusses not only the political aspect, that is, Clinton signing the Defense of 
Marriage Act into law and that she views it as unconstitutional but also the moral and 
spiritual aspects. Many researchers (Eskridge 2001; Goldberg-Hiller 2004; Mello 2004; 
Rauch 2004) have discussed the civil rights discourse associated with gay marriage, but 
few have discussed the moral or spiritual aspects. For Candace, everything in her life 
centers around her religious aspects. While she discusses political implications, the 
moral and spiritual are much more important. 
5.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Badgett and Rogers (2005: 1) conducted two surveys, one at the Millennium 
March and an online survey. They found that the vast majority of respondents marked 
‘unmarried partner’ and then ‘housemate/roommate’ rather than ‘husband/wife. Only 
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twenty-nine percent of respondents at the Millennium March chose “husband/wife” 
while none of the respondents on the online survey marked “husband/wife” (Badgett and 
Rogers 2005: 7).  In contrast to my data, I had more variety of responses.  People varied 
in how they filled out the Census form and how they marked the Census form, either 
unmarried partner, or housemate or roommate or single. The majority of my 
interviewees picked single.  
 With the majority of respondents both in the interviews and on the internet 
survey marking single on the Census Schedule suggests that gays and lesbians are being 
underenumerated. Black and his colleagues (2000) find that same-sex households are 
underenmerated by as much as 60 percent. I found that only 35% of the respondents in 
my interviews and the internet survey would be enumerated as same-sex households by 
the Census Bureau.  
Using statistics in everyday life, I have defined as statistical consciousness. My 
respondents felt that there was power in being enumerated. The respondents suggested 
that if gay men and lesbians were enumerated by the Census Bureau, society would find 
that there are many gay men and lesbians living in the United States. Similar to the 
multiracial movement for the Census Schedule, interviewees argue that enumeration by 
the Census Bureau would decrease anonymity and thus create more power for gay men 
and lesbians. Furthermore, these respondents judge that closet gay men and lesbians will 
not mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.   
Phua and Kaufman (1999) suggested that gay men and lesbians may not 
understand the Census question. In my interviews, gay men and lesbians definitely 
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understood what the relationship question meant and how they should fill the Census 
Schedule. For many of the interviewees it was not that they did not want to make their 
household on the Census Schedule. It was that they constructed the Census Schedule as a 
legal document; as a “cultural toolkit.” Just as in Marshall’s (2005) work, gay men and 
lesbians were aware of legal injustices that were occurring. Because gay and lesbian 
couples constructed the Census Schedule as a legal document, they had little agency to 
mark differently under the social and political milieu surrounding debates about gay 
marriage.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I have discussed how the state, via the Census, has variously 
shaped and defined households, family, race, and ethnic categories. I have also noted the 
dual aspects that structures sexuality – the cultural schemas, tied to heteronormativity, 
that typically negatively define homosexuality and resources, the material consequences 
denied to gay men and lesbians, e.g. housing, child custody, and employment of these 
schemas.  
 While I have focused on the structuring forces centered on sexuality, I recognize 
structures are not unilaterally enacted. Rather, just as structures shape people’s 
behaviors, individual practices impact those same structures. Much of the evolution of 
Census categories has in fact been in response to lobbying efforts by particular groups. 
Pressures by women’s groups led to the change of the head of household category to 
Person 1. Multiple groups, people, and legislators have tried to influence the categories 
on the Census Schedule, the Census Schedule still revolves around a nuclear 
heterosexual family formation (de la Puente 1993; Martin and Griffin 1994; Presser 
1998).  
In Chapter IV, I developed five statistical rates to measure the levels of 
concentration of gay and lesbian partnering in the United States, 331 metropolitan areas, 
counties, and specific tracts of the U.S. in 2000. While each rate has statistical, 
descriptive, and demographic merit, I focused on one of the rates, that measuring the 
number of partnered gays, or partnered lesbians, per 1,000 never married males, or 
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females, of age 18 and over. Statistically and demographically, I argued, this rate has the 
most defensible denominator, that is, it is based on the statistically “best” population 
from which partnered lesbians and gays are drawn.  
 I then described the settlement patterns of gay and lesbian partners. Results from 
all five rates indicated that gay partners in San Francisco have the highest levels of 
concentration in 2000. For lesbian partners, four of the five rates indicated that the 
largest concentration of lesbian partners in 2000 is in Santa Rosa. Most of the rates 
showed that Dubuque has the lowest levels of concentrations of gays and lesbians. Also, 
the five gay/lesbian rates are all highly correlated with each other, suggesting any of 
these rates could be used almost interchangeably. Owing to the high correlation between 
the gay rates and the lesbian rates, I also concluded that gay and lesbian couples tend to 
settle in similar metropolitan areas, although not at the same levels. Indeed I showed that 
in over 92 percent of the metropolitan areas the levels of lesbian prevalence were greater 
than the levels of gay prevalence. Gays tend to have a few favorite metropolitan areas, 
namely, San Francisco, Atlanta, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Miami, Jersey City, 
Washington, DC, New York, and Fort Lauderdale, where their prevalence rates surpass 
those of lesbians. Partnered lesbians, on the other hand, tend to have concentrations that 
are greater than those of gays in most of the metropolitan areas, tending not to prefer 
certain areas to the degree they are preferred by gay men.      
 Second, I asked about the kinds of characteristics that influence and are related to 
the geographical locations of gay and lesbian partners. Drawing on sociological and a 
more limited literature dealing with gay and lesbian settlement patterns, I identified 
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characteristics of metropolitan areas that have been argued to be related to levels of gay 
and lesbian concentration.  
In the multivariate context, the variables that were most influential in predicting 
levels of gay and lesbian concentration were a physical temperature index (average 
January temperature divided by average July temperature), the poverty rate, and the 
heterosexual cohabitation rate. Variables focusing on characteristics of the metropolitan 
areas of relevance mainly to gay men and lesbians such as those dealing with sodomy 
laws and anti-discrimination laws pertaining to sexual orientation, as well as presence of 
political and religious conservatism were either not statistically important predictors or 
exhibited minimal influences. In regards to religious conservatism, many studies suggest 
why religious conservatism had little statistical influence upon gay and lesbian 
settlement patterns. For instance, Singer and Deschamps (1994) found from a survey of 
self-identified gay men and lesbians that 62% of gay men and lesbians feel that religion 
was not an important part of their lives. Secondly, gay men and lesbians have 
predominately been excluded from religious institutions. This argument postulates that if 
gay men and lesbians who are condemned by religious institutions in turn reject religious 
identities. Furthermore, Sherkat (1997, 1998) argues that gay men and lesbians 
underconsume religious goods and thus do not participate in religious activities. Sherkat 
(2002) finds that gay men have higher rates of religious participation than heterosexual 
men, while lesbians and bisexual women have significantly lower rates of religious 
participation than heterosexual women.  
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Chapter IV has undertaken a quantitative examination of the prevalence of 
partnered gays and lesbians in the metropolitan areas of the U.S. in 2000. It builds on 
and extends the previous and limited literature on the prevalence of gays and lesbians in 
geographical areas of the U.S. reviewed earlier in this paper (Gates and Ost 2004; Black 
et al. 2000, 2002; Walther and Poston 2004). 
Quantitative assessments of the patterns of gay and lesbian prevalence in U.S. 
metropolitan areas are particularly relevant today given the active discussions in the 
political, religious, and social arenas with regard to gay marriage, the adoption of 
children by gays and lesbians, and other issues involving sexual orientation. As Gates 
and Ost (2004: 3) have noted, these topics lead to intense discussions, arguments and 
debates, most of which are “marked by an astonishing lack of empirical data.” It has 
been difficult if not impossible for policymakers, community activists, and gay and 
lesbian leaders to appraise the effects that gay marriage laws, domestic partnership 
benefits, adoption rights, and other related issues would have on the queer and 
heterosexual communities in the country because of the paucity of information about the 
locations of gays and lesbians. Aside from everyone seeming to know that there are a lot 
of homosexuals in San Francisco, the amount of knowledge about the prevalence of gays 
and lesbians elsewhere in the U.S. is miniscule. It is hoped that the quantitative 
presentations in this dissertation will contribute toward addressing this void.     
In Chapter V, I examined how gay and lesbian couples answered the Census 
Schedule. The highest percentage of individuals marked single on the Census Schedule. 
This is significant because more research is demonstrating that gay men and lesbians are 
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being underenumerated by the Census Bureau. I also found that the second most marked 
category was “unmarried partner” on the Census Schedule rather than “husband/wife” or 
“housemate/roommate.” Many of the respondents based their marking on the Census 
Schedule based on how they viewed their relationship and how society viewed their 
relationship. For the couples who marked the category, husband/wife, had lived together 
for a longer time period, owned property together, and had not moved as often. They 
viewed themselves as a married couple – who deserved similar legal rights as 
heterosexual married couples. 
 Furthermore, in regards to the Census and the state, two underlying ideas 
influence ‘individuals’ enactments of agency: legal consciousness and statistical 
consciousness. Legal consciousness refers to people’s lay understandings of the law, 
while statistical consciousness refers to everyday knowledge of statistics. In both cases 
the production of legal interpretation and statistics by authoritative sources is then 
variously understood, consumed, and employed by ordinary citizens for their distinct 
purposes. This understanding takes on forms of generally unquestioned folk knowledge, 
despite being socially constructed in specific historical-cultural contexts. The 
respondents described the Census Schedule as a legal document which they knew how to 
fill out properly. However, when I asked about other legal forms such as life insurance, 
interviewees have placed their partners on these forms. These forms are less secure than 
the Census Schedule. The production and consumption of statistics serve as a pivotal 
point of contestation of power and resistance, especially for these interviewees and 
newspaper accounts. Some of the respondents discussed wanting to be counted on the 
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Census Schedule because power is represented in enumeration. If one’s household is 
counted, the group is powerful.  
6.1. Future Research 
One aspect of future research would include a comparison between how the 
Census Schedule has categorized race and households. As I alluded to in Chapter II, 
there is a strong connection between how the state responds to changes in society. For 
instance, in 1990 Census, very few same-sex households were reported. However, today, 
the American Community Survey has now begun to report data about male and female 
same-sex households. Comparing racial and household definitions provide what the 
transition that the Census Schedule evolves.  
Furthermore, the American Community Survey (ACS) has some of the same 
issues as the 2000 Census Schedule. First, the ACS does not ask for one’s sexual identity 
but enumerates same-sex households based on the gender and relationship question. As I 
have shown in Chapter V, the majority of gay men and lesbians marked “single” on the 
Census Schedule. Thus, the ACS will still have a significant undercount of gay men and 
lesbians. Secondly, the ACS does not do a good job of enumerating small areas. 
Although 70 percent of same-sex households live in metropolitan statistical areas, 30 
percent do not. I have shown that there is variation across the counties in the prevalence 
of same-sex households. This suggests that the ACS will not be able to enumerate same-
sex households living in smaller areas of the United States. Thirdly, the ACS continues 
with ‘unmarried partner’ as not being a family household. My interviewees noted that 
they consider their significant others as family members. For these reasons, I suggest 
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future research using the ACS for same-sex settlement patterns. I would also like to 
extend Chapter IV to include other countries, such as Canada and Australia.  
As well, the concept of statistical consciousness can be linked to social 
movement literature. Gay and lesbian activists continue to assert that in the United 
States, 10 percent of the population is homosexual. Activists use the slogan, “10 
percent,” to show the power and numbers of the gay and lesbian population. The 10 
percent statistic has taken on a mythical realm in queer communities. For instance, the 
10 percent statistic has appeared in scholarly work (Jennings 1994; Smith 1998), work 
about religion (Thompson 2005) and youth (Owens 1998). Peter Sprigg from Family 
Research Center, accounts for 124,000 google hits of the 10 percent statistic. The 10 
percent statistic has become pervasive throughout society. In every gay pride parade, the 
ten percent statistic is used to assert a large number of the population is queer. Tilly 
(1999: 203) argues that for social movements to have strength, the social movement 
must have worthiness X unity X numbers X commitment. The ten percent slogan has 
both symbolic meaning as well as having the ability to demonstrate numbers and power. 
A content-analysis of newspapers as the media reported the release of data about same-
sex households and how those data has been used in media accounts would further 
explicate the concept of statistical analysis.  
Finally, future research would extend the argument of sexualities as a structure. I 
dismiss postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives. Sexualities are not just “play” as 
Butler (1999) suggests. Furthermore, sexualities are not “serious play” (Derrida 1978). I 
noted various cultural schema and resources within the literature that illustrate how 
 
 
                                  
   
192
sexualities as a structure intersect with the state and how individuals responded to these 
constructs. In Chapter V, many of the respondents suggest cultural schema to not 
marking their relationship on the Census Schedule. For instance, one interviewee stated 
she knew how to answer the question based on the current “social and political 
environment.” This suggests that at least laws and the state are intersecting with 
sexualities and how these respondents mark their relationship on the Census Schedule.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A.1. 2000 Census Short Form Schedule (U.S. Census Bureau 2007) 
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Table A.1. Female Same-Sex Rates for States, 2000 U.S. Census 
States Lesbian  
Rate 1 
Lesbian  
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
Alabama                             11.16 27.17 470.77 70.54 2.38
Alaska                              17.43 35.64 662.45 42.07 3.15
Arizona                             15.29 34.06 633.92 51.22 3.18
Arkansas                            11.05 30.80 432.52 55.42 2.15
California                          15.56 30.06 678.07 62.21 3.69
Colorado                            16.62 34.79 674.17 59.25 3.25
Connecticut                         13.09 26.92 567.59 55.57 2.94
Delaware                            12.98 26.53 575.51 48.58 2.97
Florida                             13.05 33.12 562.27 48.86 2.84
Georgia                             13.53 28.38 581.69 62.01 3.00
Hawaii                              11.68 22.60 501.83 49.12 2.86
Idaho                               11.64 28.93 415.77 43.03 2.06
Illinois                            10.27 20.30 450.40 48.88 2.33
Indiana                             10.72 24.84 442.50 41.37 2.21
Iowa                                8.44 19.25 336.50 33.60 1.66
Kansas                              10.53 25.30 410.74 49.29 2.00
Kentucky                            11.96 30.57 480.25 53.38 2.39
Louisiana                           11.79 24.73 540.57 55.38 2.79
Maine                               17.91 43.56 748.08 50.18 3.66
Maryland                            13.05 24.99 577.84 54.50 3.03
Massachusetts                       15.34 28.14 714.02 69.94 3.74
Michigan                            9.70 20.25 424.42 39.93 2.13
Minnesota                           12.87 25.30 522.53 48.40 2.56
Mississippi                         10.20 22.23 461.88 53.98 2.41
Missouri                            10.36 24.23 435.01 42.73 2.16
Montana                             10.03 25.04 389.32 37.01 1.85
Nebraska                            9.48 21.04 376.11 41.30 1.83
Nevada                              14.64 35.76 608.43 41.45 2.97
New Hampshire                    16.24 35.41 647.90 47.51 3.25
New Jersey                          11.69 23.01 502.36 55.16 2.72
New Mexico                         17.56 38.19 765.77 59.60 3.82
New York                            12.43 22.63 581.43 58.26 3.11
North Carolina                      13.18 28.73 529.46 58.11 2.66
North Dakota                        7.09 15.16 281.75 30.14 1.33
Ohio                                10.06 22.32 436.08 42.22 2.17
Oklahoma                            11.27 30.55 446.50 55.38 2.19
Oregon                              18.74 43.47 773.44 60.09 3.81
Pennsylvania                        9.93 20.58 432.61 44.92 2.23
Rhode Island                        13.01 25.65 610.67 56.04 3.18
South Carolina                      12.22 26.24 515.05 57.48 2.63
South Dakota                        7.88 17.57 310.18 31.46 1.50
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Table A.1. (cont.) 
States Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian 
Rate 4 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
Texas                               14.01 30.49 553.37 64.70 2.86
Utah                                12.31 22.76 444.85 70.74 2.43
Vermont                             23.15 49.73 981.51 64.77 4.86
Virginia                            12.00 24.62 488.55 53.41 2.50
Washington                          18.04 39.74 740.33 59.14 3.63
West Virginia                       9.42 25.28 387.49 40.91 1.93
Wisconsin                           10.41 21.30 426.43 37.04 2.09
Wyoming                             11.51 29.02 430.94 38.05 2.04
Source: 2000 US Census Data 100% Summary File 3 and 4 
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Table A.2.  Male Same-Sex Rates for States, 2000 U.S. Census 
States Gay  
Rate 1 
Gay  
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Alabama                             14.22 22.75 506.90 67.99 2.29
Alaska                              10.51 15.55 427.45 29.15 2.18
Arizona                             17.45 26.35 675.81 53.12 3.30
Arkansas                            13.63 23.39 456.03 53.67 2.09
California                          20.18 27.39 819.55 72.59 4.31
Colorado                            15.00 21.84 579.64 50.86 2.80
Connecticut                         15.59 22.27 584.65 51.67 2.73
Delaware                            18.56 27.37 697.56 53.50 3.28
Florida                             20.43 32.83 776.12 62.19 3.63
Georgia                             18.50 26.77 703.68 70.34 3.41
Hawaii                              12.87 17.35 540.17 52.47 3.06
Idaho                               11.75 19.03 393.25 39.98 1.92
Illinois                            14.16 19.78 550.68 55.36 2.65
Indiana                             12.68 19.82 465.11 40.48 2.16
Iowa                                9.51 14.21 337.74 31.48 1.56
Kansas                              11.18 17.22 392.53 44.63 1.82
Kentucky                            12.90 20.97 452.26 46.45 2.08
Louisiana                           13.79 20.49 543.48 50.02 2.52
Maine                               17.55 28.64 641.17 39.41 2.88
Maryland                            14.98 20.82 561.80 47.40 2.64
Massachusetts                      17.08 22.82 694.17 60.67 3.25
Michigan                            10.52 15.49 411.96 36.06 1.93
Minnesota                           12.85 17.98 483.68 42.75 2.26
Mississippi                         11.8 17.82 460.44 48.16 2.15
Missouri                            12.83 20.21 471.22 42.19 2.13
Montana                             9.16 14.68 334.60 30.88 1.54
Nebraska                            10.11 14.81 362.86 37.65 1.67
Nevada                              17.50 28.65 726.36 50.81 3.65
New Hampshire                   14.25 22.01 514.53 35.50 2.44
New Jersey                          14.83 20.02 548.69 54.57 2.69
New Mexico                         15.15 23.26 599.94 43.66 2.80
New York                            17.78 23.38 727.24 64.88 3.47
North Carolina                     15.11 21.92 535.00 54.63 2.51
North Dakota                        7.97 11.01 302.75 31.64 1.40
Ohio                                12.07 18.46 459.55 40.45 2.08
Oklahoma                            12.95 21.56 454.08 52.73 2.09
Oregon                              16.02 25.07 609.53 45.44 2.88
Pennsylvania                        12.71 18.15 473.97 44.15 2.20
Rhode Island                        15.42 21.66 624.44 50.56 2.87
South Carolina                     13.66 20.14 497.68 50.57 2.32
South Dakota                        7.86 11.55 287.78 28.00 1.34
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Table A.2. (cont.) 
States Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay 
Rate 3 
Gay 
Rate 4 
Gay 
Rate 5 
Tennessee                           13.80 22.16 496.50 54.18 2.27
Texas                               16.82 24.73 593.51 66.43 2.94
Utah                                12.91 17.91 444.12 69.08 2.37
Vermont                             17.96 26.96 684.53 42.15 3.17
Virginia                            15.20 21.69 546.78 55.81 2.61
Washington                          18.40 27.72 709.79 54.87 3.37
West Virginia                       12.56 20.83 444.24 42.99 2.03
Wisconsin                           10.63 15.33 396.78 32.74 1.85
Wyoming                             12.57 21.06 451.84 39.69 2.13
Source: 2000 US Census Data 100% Summary File 3 and 4 
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Table A.3. Male Same-Sex Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. 
Census 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas Gay  
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay 
Rate 3 
Gay 
Rate 4 
Gay 
Rate 5 
Abilene, TX                           9.01 14.12 311.64 36.49 1.46
Akron, OH            11.78 17.89 456.97 39.91 2.06
Albany, GA                           11.32 16.26 446.22 39.57 2.03
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY           12.72 17.92 492.88 34.41 2.23
Albuquerque, NM                      16.55 24.77 691.76 46.79 3.18
Alexandria, LA                       12.73 19.23 483.07 49.71 2.21
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA       12.18 18.05 430.97 34.67 2.02
Altoona, PA                          9.35 14.06 336.54 31.16 1.53
Amarillo, TX                         12.29 20.45 394.53 42.17 1.87
Anchorage, AK                        12.32 18.23 502.94 33.62 2.47
Ann Arbor, MI            11.63 15.51 467.62 46.06 2.33
Anniston, AL                         13.72 23.56 477.07 59.44 2.12
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI           9.36 13.51 321.58 27.88 1.54
Asheville, NC                        20.82 32.54 729.39 68.35 3.23
Athens, GA                           13.62 16.85 663.25 66.21 3.30
Atlanta, GA 23.40 32.29 912.26 87.47 4.45
Atlantic--Cape May, NJ         15.53 23.35 606.02 44.03 2.79
Auburn--Opelika, AL                  8.85 11.00 427.40 52.75 2.01
Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC               14.05 21.2 516.80 53.49 2.42
Austin--San Marcos, TX                18.58 24.66 808.21 71.4 4.03
Bakersfield, CA                       14.62 22.97 486.42 42.69 2.68
Baltimore, MD            15.17 21.36 594.18 47.05 2.74
Bangor, ME                            10.31 15.01 446.19 27.7 2.05
Barnstable--Yarmouth, MA              24.80 40.95 804.69 73.96 3.43
Baton Rouge, LA                       12.90 18.05 517.93 50.11 2.40
Beaumont—Port Arthur, TX             11.71 19.73 399.48 49.94 1.96
Bellingham, WA                        11.47 16.15 465.27 37.38 2.23
Benton Harbor, MI                     13.85 21.70 509.48 43.44 2.28
Bergen--Passaic, NJ             13.62 18.20 488.09 58.11 2.43
Billings, MT                          10.00 16.62 366.93 30.43 1.61
Biloxi--Gulfport--Pascagoula, MS          13.23 21.97 511.54 44.33 2.47
Binghamton, NY                        9.40 13.68 366.10 27.25 1.66
Birmingham, AL                        18.06 28.09 651.44 91.13 2.90
Bismarck, ND                          8.81 12.38 309.93 31.91 1.41
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Bloomington, IN                   11.62 14.16 643.17 56.72 3.28
Bloomington--Normal, IL     8.38 11.02 340.77 34.82 1.64
Boise City, ID                       11.84 18.67 409.83 37.13 1.98
Boston, MA--NH         19.26 24.6 813.65 46.43 2.34
Boulder--Longmont, CO       11.20 14.55 492.81 40.3 2.43
Brazoria, TX            12.18 20.12 408.70 50.28 2.22
Bremerton, WA           16.36 26.1 562.56 48.58 2.78
Bridgeport, CT           14.16 19.96 537.30 50.89 2.52
Brockton, MA         11.87 16.37 456.83 39.21 2.31
Brownsville--Harlingen--
San Benito, TX           
17.78 24.90 545.59 82.99 2.88
Bryan--College Station, 
TX            
6.32 7.21 318.23 47.43 1.72
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY   9.08 13.01 357.02 31.49 1.58
Burlington, VT                      15.92 21.54 649.99 40.75 3.09
Canton--Massillon, OH         9.70 15.85 342.29 30.63 1.54
Casper, WY                           14.25 25.14 534.98 37.1 2.39
Cedar Rapids, IA                   9.56 14.21 349.42 28.32 1.58
Champaign--Urbana, IL        7.83 9.5 396.84 38.68 1.98
Charleston, WV                     16.2 28.13 579.89 55.41 2.50
Charleston--North 
Charleston, SC            
15.21 21.16 610.34 58.05 2.89
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock 
Hill NC--SC           
18.09 25.85 634.77 60.69 2.98
Charlottesville, VA               10.81 14.44 456.28 41.85 2.14
Chattanooga, TN--GA           15.37 25.66 531.38 62.32 2.40
Cheyenne, WY                      8.08 13.93 289.47 26.67 1.38
Chicago, IL  16.15 21.41 652.53 67.63 3.19
Chico--Paradise, CA             9.42 13.96 407.47 30.10 1.90
Cincinnati, OH--KY—IN      13.05 19.44 494.43 43.71 2.20
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, 
TN—KY           
9.10 13.38 315.62 37.28 1.61
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria, 
OH            
11.99 18.09 478.62 43.51 2.11
Colorado Springs, CO           10.21 15.09 363.54 35.5 1.76
Columbia, MO                      10.43 13.63 477.33 38.45 2.24
Columbia, SC                        13.50 18.71 508.34 51.33 2.39
Columbus, GA--AL              10.31 15.07 435.34 46.39 2.1
Columbus, OH                      17.83 25.47 738.31 57.14 3.35
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 
2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Corpus Christi, TX                12.38 19.24 471.68 43.04 2.33
Corvallis, OR                        5.54 6.82 250.68 21.71 1.26
Cumberland, MD--WV         10.25 16.07 320.09 32.04 1.57
Dallas, TX            23.36 32.77 866.66 90.23 4.22
Danbury, CT         21.61 30.50 683.82 77.99 3.45
Danville, VA                         11.89 19.57 415.27 49.66 1.79
Davenport--Moline--Rock 
Island, IA—IL           
10.20 16.14 380.14 30.83 1.71
Dayton--Springfield, OH      12.19 19.00 461.75 40.55 2.05
Daytona Beach, FL               15.72 27.63 570.15 44.39 2.61
Decatur, AL                           16.32 27.43 512.11 77.32 2.35
Decatur, IL                           9.60 15.74 352.31 31.95 1.52
Denver, CO           19.35 28.12 774.51 63.66 3.64
Des Moines, IA                     15.72 23.75 549.34 44.84 2.46
Detroit, MI           10.51 15.24 432.13 38.57 1.98
Dothan, AL                            16.83 29.3 541.17 66.91 2.38
Dover, DE                             12.62 19.36 468.57 32.61 2.16
Dubuque, IA                          4.28 6.26 151.46 17.16 0.71
Duluth--Superior, MN--WI   7.57 11.37 302.37 24.43 1.37
Dutchess County, NY           13.33 18.05 483.37 45.1 2.53
Eau Claire, WI                       8.9 12.51 349.08 28.13 1.64
El Paso, TX                           13.19 18.86 438.56 61.14 2.26
Elkhart--Goshen, IN              10.92 17.12 368.61 29.19 1.77
Elmira, NY                            9.67 14.41 386.51 26.46 1.85
Enid, OK                              9.66 16.8 311.28 34.01 1.38
Erie, PA                              8.51 12.36 328.39 27.96 1.55
Eugene--Springfield, OR      13.53 20.41 564.96 37.16 2.62
Evansville--Henderson, 
IN--KY            
12.2 20.15 427.20 38.97 1.90
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--
MN               
8.55 10.97 366.02 32.00 1.70
Fayetteville, NC                    8.92 12.40 345.83 39.45 1.78
Fayetteville--Springdale—
Rogers, AR           
15.14 23.23 505.42 55.16 2.42
Fitchburg--Leominster, 
MA            
12.81 19.44 490.27 33.7 2.27
Flagstaff, AZ--UT                 11.39 15.09 494.33 34.74 2.48
Flint, MI           10.06 15.38 409.25 28.73 1.79
Florence, AL                         13.01 22.45 409.13 65.14 1.79
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Florence, SC                          10.53 15.46 372.30 40.62 1.68
Fort Collins--Loveland, 
CO            
8.44 11.33 341.70 29.77 1.68
Fort Lauderdale, FL          31.61 48.76 1287.06 90.66 5.77
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, 
FL            
21.03 39.35 688.17 53.95 3.12
Fort Pierce--Port St. Lucie, 
FL           
18.06 33.21 590.90 49.68 2.72
Fort Smith, AR--OK             13.51 24.19 438.26 47.53 2.01
Fort Walton Beach, FL          10.99 17.67 394.04 41.83 1.93
Fort Wayne, IN                     11.26 17.43 398.84 35.22 1.82
Fort Worth--Arlington, TX   15.32 23.32 535.34 55.72 2.57
Fresno, CA                            15.75 21.76 596.48 50.00 3.18
Gadsden, AL                         12.08 20.71 402.24 59.25 1.78
Gainesville, FL                      11.18 13.74 591.50 47.70 2.82
Galveston--Texas City, TX   17.90 29.36 646.08 60.96 3.01
Gary, IN           8.74 13.11 342.31 30.80 1.59
Glens Falls, NY                     9.34 13.76 344.43 22.68 1.66
Goldsboro, NC                      13.33 19.70 481.03 52.21 2.30
Grand Forks, ND--MN          5.04 6.40 217.72 22.43 1.07
Grand Junction, CO               12.95 21.56 434.04 41.16 1.99
Grand Rapids--
Muskegon—Holland, MI      
12.73 18.32 461.62 42.92 2.21
Great Falls, MT                     8.85 15.05 309.76 29.82 1.38
Greeley, CO           12.20 17.71 420.94 40.37 2.13
Green Bay, WI                      10.58 15.14 395.24 28.58 1.87
Greensboro--Winston-
Salem—High Point, NC        
15.93 23.82 548.39 55.51 2.48
Greenville, NC                      11.96 15.32 522.99 45.32 2.36
Greenville--Spartanburg—
Anderson, SC           
12.93 19.60 453.54 48.87 2.11
Hagerstown, MD  15.82 25.57 498.00 40.42 2.57
Hamilton--Middletown, 
OH           
9.96 14.94 352.35 33.15 1.69
Harrisburg--Lebanon--
Carlisle, PA           
13.16 19.36 461.03 39.90 2.13
Hartford, CT                          14.89 21.34 570.44 47.76 2.65
Hattiesburg, MS                    8.86 12.39 368.07 41.50 1.71
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Hickory--Morganton--
Lenoir, NC           
13.05 20.47 433.35 41.03 2.05
Honolulu, HI                         10.95 14.38 459.66 53.19 2.68
Houma, LA                            12.38 18.49 432.55 34.88 2.13
Houston, TX           19.33 27.06 703.09 75.10 3.49
Huntington--Ashland, WV-
-KY—OH           
12.99 21.57 439.49 50.48 1.99
Huntsville, AL                       11.97 18.98 409.37 57.91 1.88
Indianapolis, IN                     16.98 26.47 637.64 49.19 2.86
Iowa City, IA                         10.09 12.06 507.23 42.50 2.52
Jackson, MI                           12.12 20.83 393.43 33.05 2.03
Jackson, MS                          12.05 17.14 497.72 50.61 2.30
Jackson, TN                           12.02 18.90 445.73 50.73 2.01
Jacksonville, FL                    16.31 26.38 614.43 48.47 2.81
Jacksonville, NC                   6.04 7.28 266.72 39.75 1.75
Jamestown, NY                     9.37 14.00 355.58 25.72 1.65
Janesville--Beloit, WI           7.82 12.27 276.85 19.08 1.28
Jersey City, NJ           19.46 24.26 940.02 76.17 4.65
Johnson City--Kingsport—
Bristol, TN—VA           
12.42 21.62 401.76 51.85 1.81
Johnstown, PA                      8.76 12.76 323.02 38.86 1.56
Jonesboro, AR                       11.51 17.37 422.30 50.00 1.92
Joplin, MO                            8.31 14.73 270.43 23.70 1.22
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, 
MI           
10.92 16.20 432.65 32.91 1.99
Kankakee, IL           7.86 11.68 291.60 24.31 1.39
Kansas City, MO--KS           15.34 23.93 562.01 51.28 2.53
Kenosha, WI           11.15 16.66 420.84 31.67 2.00
Killeen--Temple, TX             8.98 13.04 314.56 41.19 1.68
Knoxville, TN                       14.05 22.60 496.86 57.64 2.23
Kokomo, IN                          12.31 21.14 406.06 39.85 1.77
La Crosse, WI--MN              6.28 8.48 253.42 20.98 1.18
Lafayette, IN                         7.8 9.88 360.39 36.29 1.92
Lafayette, LA                        12.59 18.66 475.00 38.51 2.17
Lake Charles, LA                  11.69 18.31 414.89 40.70 1.92
Lakeland--Winter Haven, 
FL            
17.62 30.67 617.38 51.28 2.91
Lancaster, PA                        11.23 16.19 360.90 34.14 1.73
Lansing--East Lansing, MI   11.71 16.11 499.90 40.07 2.33
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Laredo, TX                            15.38 19.57 463.48 85.59 2.62
Las Cruces, NM                    11.71 16.57 468.87 36.88 2.33
Las Vegas, NV--AZ              18.38 30.04 765.43 52.69 3.84
Lawrence, KS                        9.79 11.61 514.70 47.40 2.62
Lawrence, MA—NH           14.41 20.66 504.24 39.67 2.38
Lawton, OK                           6.77 9.99 271.63 36.42 1.48
Lewiston--Auburn, ME         15.31 24.73 605.49 34.47 2.69
Lexington, KY                      13.71 19.56 549.32 50.13 2.57
Lima, OH                              6.95 10.97 256.68 26.98 1.24
Lincoln, NE                           8.52 11.35 358.75 33.02 1.71
Little Rock--North Little 
Rock, AR           
15.53 24.80 548.74 61.86 2.44
Longview--Marshall, TX      14.99 25.86 481.34 56.60 2.20
Los Angeles--Long Beach, 
CA           
19.83 25.4 869.30 77.83 4.62
Louisville, KY--IN                14.63 23.15 563.12 47.90 2.50
Lowell, MA—NH           12.37 16.68 461.33 42.86 2.32
Lubbock, TX                         9.97 13.82 415.59 42.81 1.95
Lynchburg, VA                     11.05 16.79 367.65 39.59 1.68
Macon, GA                            11.32 17.32 432.81 42.27 1.93
Madison, WI                          14.66 18.78 651.27 46.6 3.04
Manchester, NH           14.45 21.57 557.05 36.37 2.64
Mansfield, OH                       9.53 16.09 353.88 32.9 1.68
McAllen--Edinburg--
Mission, TX           
16.78 22.17 495.97 95.46 2.76
Medford--Ashland, OR         17.59 31.08 621.02 46.80 2.84
Melbourne--Titusville--
Palm Bay, FL           
13.21 23.88 468.21 38.12 2.12
Memphis, TN--AR--MS        14.43 20.91 586.63 54.97 2.63
Merced, CA                           14.15 19.85 511.63 41.61 2.71
Miami, FL           20.92 30.28 865.30 77.58 4.47
Middlesex--Somerset—
Hunterdon, NJ           
13.95 18.48 477.50 56.05 2.43
Milwaukee--Waukesha, 
WI             
12.36 17.23 499.16 40.99 2.23
Minneapolis--St. Paul, 
MN--WI            
15.75 21.52 610.65 50.45 2.84
Missoula, MT                        8.97 12.36 404.47 29.01 1.93
Mobile, AL                            15.6 25.37 556.67 65.59 2.52
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Modesto, CA                         15.08 22.81 539.28 43.67 2.75
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ          13.95 20.34 459.73 50.21 2.15
Monroe, LA                           11.19 16.31 423.57 39.85 1.87
Montgomery, AL                  12.59 19.37 494.65 61.20 2.32
Muncie, IN                            12.91 18.84 528.04 46.86 2.44
Myrtle Beach, SC                  16.55 25.85 610.06 47.74 2.79
Naples, FL                            21.03 34.81 677.34 64.63 3.30
Nashua, NH           15.33 22.96 512.91 39.59 2.44
Nashville, TN                        16.88 25.51 638.74 64.20 2.97
Nassau--Suffolk, NY            15.07 20.03 501.88 69.54 2.68
New Bedford, MA           12.32 18.02 477.77 37.03 2.19
New Haven--Meriden, CT    15.45 21.47 614.17 54.99 2.85
New London--Norwich, 
CT--RI            
11.85 17.8 453.48 34.03 2.16
New Orleans, LA                  18.19 26.71 789.03 64.50 3.57
New York, NY           22.54 28.21 1009.86 94.52 4.71
Newark, NJ           15.78 20.82 598.61 59.27 2.93
Newburgh, NY—PA           16.61 22.95 573.71 51.90 2.96
Norfolk--Virginia Beach—
Newport, VA           
11.28 15.94 422.60 76.39 3.64
Oakland, CA          22.59 31.04 909.82 75.79 4.52
Ocala, FL                             17.17 34.39 546.69 41.04 2.05
Odessa--Midland, TX            12.39 20.92 381.48 46.02 2.46
Oklahoma City, OK              13.85 21.97 524.86 39.70 1.72
Olympia, WA           13.32 21.27 480.22 34.23 2.19
Omaha, NE--IA                     11.27 16.47 430.97 56.01 2.40
Orange County, CA          14.89 19.85 569.07 61.98 3.10
Orlando, FL                           21.87 32.44 856.85 38.91 1.97
Owensboro, KY                    8.22 14.02 281.22 63.05 4.11
Panama City, FL                   13.18 23.15 466.69 29.35 1.25
Parkersburg--Marietta, 
WV--OH            
11.53 20.19 386.82 38.37 2.15
Pensacola, FL                        13.19 20.5 518.34 34.44 1.73
Peoria--Pekin, IL                   10.90 16.95 377.70 51.26 2.57
Philadelphia, PA—NJ          15.40 20.78 607.61 55.13 2.83
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ               18.55 27.25 724.88 37.08 1.72
Pine Bluff, AR                       7.79 15.26 333.16 56.53 3.59
Pittsburgh, PA                       10.92 15.84 404.49 43.4 1.64
Pittsfield, MA                        10.98 17.2 414.20 42.11 1.79
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Pocatello, ID                         10.05 15.21 350.22 30.78 1.75
Portland, ME                         22.39 33.41 867.40 68.03 2.01
Portland—Vancouver, 
OR—WA           
18.54 27.76 727.11 52.61 3.43
Portsmouth--Rochester, 
NH--ME            
14.68 21.88 558.77 37.86 2.58
Providence--Fall River—
Warwick, RI—MA           
15.46 21.80 616.17 53.64 3.85
Provo--Orem, UT                  6.04 7.23 205.08 49.78 2.83
Pueblo, CO                            10.06 16.54 380.15 81.10 1.21
Punta Gorda, FL                    17.57 38.05 486.87 33.41 1.76
Racine, WI          11.97 17.93 409.97 34.44 1.95
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel 
Hill, NC            
16.64 21.84 636.53 45.77 2.15
Rapid City, SD                      6.95 10.75 263.96 62.94 3.00
Reading, PA                          11.35 17.00 399.62 20.17 1.21
Redding, CA                          12.41 23.29 442.00 29.42 1.91
Reno, NV                              16.92 27.94 731.23 33.58 2.00
Richland--Kennewick--
Pasco, WA           
12.36 19.34 418.29 48.29 3.56
Richmond--Petersburg, VA  14.83 21.37 550.22 38.97 2.04
Riverside--San Bernardino, 
CA            
19.32 28.11 712.05 61.7 3.77
Roanoke, VA                         14.50 23.72 503.89 51.23 2.48
Rochester, MN                      10.07 14.05 332.76 50.3 2.17
Rochester, NY                       13.36 18.95 515.97 32.29 1.53
Rockford, IL                          11.56 18.31 407.65 37.51 2.39
Rocky Mount, NC                 10.72 15.83 390.32 33.64 1.88
Sacramento, CA           17.72 26.75 690.17 50.67 3.25
Saginaw--Bay City--
Midland, MI           
9.24 13.81 335.39 39.06 1.76
Salem, OR          12.11 18.98 457.88 38.89 2.29
Salinas, CA                           15.85 22.95 611.32 41.53 2.11
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT   15.04 21.42 543.05 64.91 3.74
San Angelo, TX                     10.83 16.60 379.71 70.27 2.87
San Antonio, TX                   13.61 20.24 512.09 38.12 1.75
San Diego, CA                      19.41 26.12 827.08 49.87 2.49
San Francisco, CA           47.88 60.65 2315.38 183.15 11.83
San Jose, CA           15.56 20.06 634.97 68.79 3.58
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
San Luis Obispo--
Atascadero—Paso Robles, 
CA           
10.78 15.52 417.75 73.63 4.33
Santa Barbara--Santa 
Maria—Lompoc, CA           
14.91 20.11 596.82 40.97 2.23
Santa Cruz--Watsonville, 
CA           
15.99 21.59 730.12 49.84 3.86
Santa Fe, NM                        25.35 39.77 1014.70 60.22 3.25
Santa Rosa, CA            26.05 38.69 1053.95 72.69 5.14
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL       23.51 44.33 771.89 65.69 4.57
Savannah, GA                       17.63 26.12 704.50 63.53 3.33
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre—
Hazleton, PA           
10.54 15.45 407.14 66.02 3.26
Seattle--Bellevue--Everett, 
WA           
24.75 34.97 1031.92 77.05 4.86
Sharon, PA                            7.13 11.52 251.75 41.24 1.85
Sheboygan, WI                      8.92 13.34 295.72 27.35 1.18
Sherman--Denison, TX         16.24 29.05 550.94 28.56 1.42
Shreveport--Bossier City, 
LA  
10.27 16.12 404.08 59.70 2.52
Sioux City, IA--NE               8.95 13.35 337.64 37.28 1.78
Sioux Falls, SD                     8.37 11.94 311.37 25.98 1.58
South Bend, IN                      11.44 16.57 457.84 26.61 1.44
Spokane, WA                        13.09 20.59 492.64 39.05 2.11
Springfield, IL                       14.62 23.28 548.78 37.72 2.26
Springfield, MA                    11.55 15.82 503.68 42.23 2.10
Springfield, MO                    12.64 19.7 458.19 42.56 2.31
St. Cloud, MN                       6.11 7.67 256.17 29.48 1.52
St. Joseph, MO                      10.68 17.83 412.87 23.27 1.30
St. Louis, MO--IL                 12.46 18.72 473.42 33.13 1.93
Stamford--Norwalk, CT        21.19 28.62 715.78 85.45 3.35
State College, PA                  8.14 9.44 419.46 35.92 2.32
Steubenville--Weirton, 
OH--WV            
10.27 17.21 364.30 54.51 2.41
Stockton--Lodi, CA               16.47 24.35 575.50 35.67 1.63
Sumter, SC                            11.55 17.46 426.86 48.35 3.03
Syracuse, NY                        11.27 15.87 437.03 47.38 2.01
Tacoma, WA           12.29 19.30 469.21 36.27 2.25
Tallahassee, FL                     10.62 13.80 514.33 29.79 2.00
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Table A.3. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
Tampa--St. Petersburg—
Clearwater, FL           
21.32 36.36 815.68 43.66 2.37
Terre Haute, IN                     8.45 13.16 328.95 57.57 3.58
Texarkana, TX--
Texarkana, AR            
11.35 19.36 365.82 28.09 1.57
Toledo, OH                            11.10 16.61 456.37 46.5 1.79
Topeka, KS                            11.50 18.93 422.56 34.95 2.03
Trenton, NJ           14.69 19.67 558.69 54.07 2.83
Tucson, AZ                            16.17 24.35 672.57 38.06 1.84
Tulsa, OK                             15.83 26.10 552.46 49.15 3.09
Tuscaloosa, AL                     10.28 13.80 436.57 60.54 2.47
Tyler, TX                             15.01 24.47 463.74 58.22 2.01
Utica--Rome, NY                  10.52 15.15 414.66 59.84 2.12
Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, 
CA           
16.90 25.18 610.42 55.04 3.26
Ventura, CA            13.34 18.81 478.83 51.56 2.62
Victoria, TX                          10.86 16.96 359.15 32.58 1.98
Vineland--Millville—
Bridgeton, NJ           
9.61 13.58 404.40 29.59 2.28
Visalia--Tulare--
Porterville, CA            
15.36 21.65 541.75 36.66 1.70
Waco, TX                              11.95 17.65 447.47 46.77 2.94
Washington, DC--MD--
VA—WV           
23.18 30.57 908.33 84.96 4.32
Waterbury, CT        15.05 22.44 581.22 44.78 2.61
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA     7.68 10.51 315.01 53.95 2.11
Wausau, WI                           10.19 14.80 342.81 27.56 1.47
West Palm Beach--Boca 
Raton, FL           
23.45 38.47 845.62 31.04 1.64
Wheeling, WV--OH              9.23 15.15 338.83 68.60 3.77
Wichita Falls, TX                  7.82 12.44 267.48 51.53 2.10
Wichita, KS                           13.01 21.13 461.76 33.72 1.54
Williamsport, PA                  11.75 17.96 423.68 33.71 1.37
Wilmington, NC                    15.5 22.93 570.16 35.17 2.00
Wilmington--Newark, 
DE—MD           
15.72 22.64 604.63 46.65 2.87
Worcester, MA—CT          13.47 19.03 519.09 41.94 2.43
Yakima, WA                         11.22 16.65 399.52 50.55 2.56
Yolo, CA           10.17 12.96 454.65 39.81 2.31
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Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Gay 
Rate 1 
Gay 
Rate 2 
Gay  
Rate 3 
Gay  
Rate 4 
Gay  
Rate 5 
York, PA                              12.62 19.73 408.20 30.87 2.01
Youngstown--Warren, OH    8.22 13.27 305.30 31.26 1.92
Yuba City, CA                       11.04 17.79 391.59 30.93 1.40
Yuma, AZ                              13.64 21.69 439.94 34.19 1.98
 
 
 
 
                                  
   
251
Table A.4. Female Same-Sex Rates for 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000 U.S. Census 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Abilene, TX                        11.68 27.72 460.59 59.23 2.37
Akron, OH  9.57 20.62 425.1 41.25 2.13
Albany, GA                         9.52 19.33 478.08 49.80 2.56
Albany--Schenectady--
Troy, NY            
13.31 26.7 585.59 45.06 2.92
Albuquerque, NM               20.79 44.22 952.31 69.59 4.73
Alexandria, LA                   11.29 26.58 507.71 59.27 2.63
Allentown--Bethlehem--
Easton, PA          
10.39 23.19 426.14 37.86 2.21
Altoona, PA                        7.12 17.32 313.81 32.74 1.61
Amarillo, TX                       11.40 28.83 451.31 50.72 2.24
Anchorage, AK                   16.23 33.07 652.89 42.95 3.15
Ann Arbor, MI  14.89 25.27 641.26 64.67 3.27
Anniston, AL                      9.12 25.03 381.99 53.87 1.92
Appleton--Oshkosh--
Neenah, WI            
8.56 17.07 321.55 28.68 1.58
Asheville, NC                     21.33 52.62 888.76 93.84 4.44
Athens, GA                         9.99 15.15 519.32 55.57 2.77
Atlanta, GA 15.49 29.73 667.35 67.67 3.44
Atlantic--Cape May, NJ      11.18 24.95 515.25 41.96 2.66
Auburn--Opelika, AL         8.85 13.74 437.16 56.77 2.17
Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC   10.92 23.88 472.86 53.99 2.44
Austin--San Marcos, TX     19.58 34.71 864.09 75.00 4.24
Bakersfield, CA                  13.48 29.95 529.41 44.52 2.80
Baltimore, MD        12.94 25.07 597.28 53.28 3.10
Bangor, ME                         14.94 30.15 716.48 49.48 3.66
Barnstable--Yarmouth, 
MA              
17.34 47.17 708.79 77.07 3.57
Baton Rouge, LA                10.39 19.72 482.03 52.07 2.50
Beaumont--Port Arthur, 
TX             
11.20 30.22 459.23 59.07 2.32
Bellingham, WA                 15.21 28.7 654.64 55.04 3.29
Benton Harbor, MI              10.54 23.9 457.37 43.44 2.28
Bergen--Passaic, NJ  10.97 21.94 462.62 61.54 2.58
Billings, MT                        7.65 18.53 321.23 29.35 1.56
Biloxi--Gulfport--
Pascagoula, MS            
11.01 27.94 465.21 41.82 2.33
Binghamton, NY                 9.20 19.94 405.74 33.45 2.04
Birmingham, AL                 11.39 26.32 503.72 80.77 2.57
Bismarck, ND                     6.30 13.73 246.77 27.09 1.20
Bloomington, IN                 12.63 18.08 747.42 70.35 4.07
 
 
                                  
   
252
Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Bloomington--Normal, IL   10.25 16.59 471.59 53.54 2.52
Boise City, ID                     14.19 35.01 529.75 49.07 2.62
Boston, MA--NH ;  15.21 25.80 515.43 79.12 2.71
Boulder--Longmont, CO     21.67 37.72 963.25 77.57 4.68
Brazoria, TX            18.33 47.2 596.57 69.06 3.05
Bremerton, WA           17.75 46.87 640.32 54.86 3.14
Bridgeport, CT           11.18 22.76 497.52 53.60 2.66
Brockton, MA  11.04 21.45 485.14 45.52 2.69
Brownsville--Harlingen--
San Bendito, CA           
12.47 25.20 465.33 82.39 2.86
Bryan--College Station, 
TX            
7.45 10.04 399.97 59.91 2.17
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, 
NY            
8.20 17.07 376.13 37.70 1.89
Burlington, VT                    23.05 40.27 1048.61 71.17 5.39
Canton--Massillon, OH       8.51 20.69 352.71 35.61 1.79
Casper, WY                         13.23 35.13 535.83 39.42 2.54
Cedar Rapids, IA                8.59 17.81 353.38 30.66 1.71
Champaign--Urbana, IL      11.97 18.34 614.12 60.51 3.1
Charleston, WV                  9.80 26.75 417.14 45.41 2.05
Charleston--North 
Charleston, SC            
13.84 27.00 606.73 61.82 3.08
Charlotte--Gastonia--
Rock Hill, NC           
13.20 26.95 520.93 53.36 2.62
Charlottesville, VA             12.67 21.08 599.65 63.09 3.23
Chattanooga, TN--GA        10.76 28.77 449.57 59.23 2.28
Cheyenne, WY                    8.46 23.62 327.62 30.30 1.57
Chicago, IL 10.98 20.17 495.84 55.65 2.62
Chico--Paradise, CA           14.45 31.79 688.99 55.22 3.48
Cincinnati, OH--KY—IN 10.51 22.31 454.9 44.44 2.24
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, 
TN           
12.59 32.04 426.16 49.61 2.15
Cleveland--Lorain--
Elyria, OH            
9.04 19.70 422.88 43.72 2.12
Colorado Springs, CO         14.92 34.12 552.84 54.83 2.71
Columbia, MO                    12.80 20.03 639.32 56.54 3.30
Columbia, SC                      12.29 23.39 541.59 60.51 2.82
Columbus, GA--AL            9.81 24.13 452.58 50.96 2.31
Columbus, OH                    14.45 28.38 653.8 54.05 3.17
Corpus Christi, TX              11.46 26.01 478.24 46.95 2.54
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Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Corvallis, OR                      20.44 32.03 963.33 85.71 4.98
Cumberland, MD--WV       8.19 20.49 341.81 35.61 1.75
Dallas, TX            15.18 30.84 610.51 65.46 3.06
Danbury, CT  15.76 33.86 553.38 66.40 2.94
Danville, VA                       9.91 25.04 420.54 58.86 2.12
Davenport--Moline--
Rock Island, RI           
8.00 18.91 337.33 29.70 1.65
Dayton--Springfield, OH    10.11 22.87 446.81 43.99 2.23
Daytona Beach, FL             12.20 37.28 509.54 43.32 2.55
Decatur, AL                        11.91 34.09 422.17 68.67 2.08
Decatur, IL                          9.89 24.00 423.72 44.10 2.10
Denver, CO 17.97 37.03 755.72 63.30 3.62
Des Moines, IA                   11.50 24.73 468.49 42.00 2.31
Detroit, MI  8.63 17.79 401.79 39.48 2.03
Dothan, AL                         11.97 35.82 468.27 64.85 2.30
Dover, DE                           10.31 22.51 439.78 34.21 2.27
Dubuque, IA                       4.98 9.76 201.7 25.02 1.04
Duluth--Superior, MN--
WI              
9.20 20.62 410.71 35.40 1.99
Dutchess County, NY  14.07 27.27 552.5 52.44 2.94
Eau Claire, WI                    7.16 13.24 310.01 26.93 1.57
El Paso, TX                         10.17 20.96 416.00 65.90 2.44
Elkhart--Goshen, IN           8.92 20.69 333.41 27.69 1.68
Elmira, NY                          8.58 19.98 362.86 26.05 1.83
Enid, OK                             10.77 32.79 403.08 48.88 1.98
Erie, PA                              7.88 15.72 349.04 32.53 1.80
Eugene--Springfield, OR    21.42 45.31 958.73 66.82 4.71
Evansville--Henderson, 
IN--KY            
9.81 24.9 411.44 42.26 2.06
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--
MN               
5.91 9.85 269.14 24.47 1.30
Fayetteville, NC                  12.3 27.79 464.68 51.84 2.34
Fayetteville--
Springdale—Roger, AR      
13.83 34.59 476.06 53.62 2.36
Fitchburg—Leominster, 
MA            
11.57 24.83 499.48 37.24 2.51
Flagstaff, AZ--UT               15.50 25.32 702.97 51.13 3.65
Flint, MI  8.81 18.87 409.06 32.50 2.03
Florence, AL                       8.94 24.94 349.88 63.28 1.74
Florence, SC                       11.35 23.78 516.4 67.35 2.78
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Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Fort Collins--Loveland, 
CO            
16.32 29.48 678.58 59.90 3.38
Fort Lauderdale, FL      14.50 35.43 670.28 52.72 3.35
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, 
FL            
13.97 45.22 528.00 44.50 2.57
Fort Pierce--Port St. 
Lucie, FL           
12.43 39.96 475.62 42.92 2.35
Fort Smith, AR—OK          11.84 38.50 439.33 51.40 2.17
Fort Walton Beach, FL       10.65 30.71 376.62 39.22 1.81
Fort Wayne, IN                   11.23 26.04 448.29 42.48 2.19
Fort Worth--Arlington, 
TX            
14.06 32.36 538.82 58.77 2.71
Fresno, CA                          13.91 27.84 582.99 51.15 3.25
Gadsden, AL                       12.19 38.5 495.49 83.27 2.50
Gainesville, FL                   12.30 18.71 694.78 60.83 3.60
Galveston--Texas City, 
TX            
14.60 35.70 581.90 59.25 2.92
Gary, IN       8.41 18.03 376.62 37.68 1.95
Glens Falls, NY                  12.42 31.39 495.03 33.45 2.45
Goldsboro, NC                    11.60 26.91 466.19 53.28 2.35
Grand Forks, ND--MN       6.39 11.62 282.06 29.16 1.39
Grand Junction, CO            12.57 33.70 489.4 50.20 2.42
Grand Rapids--
Muskegon—Holland, MI    
10.31 20.72 414.28 40.91 2.10
Great Falls, MT                   8.46 24.28 328.46 33.13 1.54
Greeley, CO  14.20 26.89 538.25 52.93 2.80
Green Bay, WI                    9.37 18.19 384.53 28.76 1.88
Greensboro--Winston-
Salem, NC        
12.83 27.94 520.98 58.65 2.62
Greenville, NC                    8.92 14.35 455.03 45.69 2.38
Greenville—Spartanburg, 
NC         
11.33 25.81 454.17 53.33 2.30
Hagerstown, MD            11.44 29.17 435.49 34.10 2.17
Hamilton--Middletown, 
OH  
9.69 19.90 386 39.53 2.01
Harrisburg--Lebanon--
Carlisle, PA           
9.50 20.41 395.41 37.49 2.00
Hartford, CT                       14.39 29.06 632.66 58.55 3.25
Hattiesburg, MS                  6.28 12.10 306.38 39.74 1.64
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Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1
Lesbian 
Rate 2
Lesbian 
Rate 3
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian 
Rate 5
Hickory--Morganton--
Lenoir, NC           
13.49 37.08 489.26 48.49 2.43
Honolulu, HI                       10.48 19.72 449.57 52.22 2.63
Houma, LA                         12.93 28.11 508.05 44.26 2.70
Houston, TX  15.67 31.22 620.37 68.84 3.20
Huntington--Ashland, 
WV--KY—OH           
11.01 30.08 451.72 57.60 2.27
Huntsville, AL                    11.28 27.55 429.45 64.77 2.10
Indianapolis, IN                  12.85 28.32 549.98 46.18 2.69
Iowa City, IA                      16.79 22.99 893.15 76.95 4.56
Jackson, MI                         9.52 24.04 387.41 31.37 1.93
Jackson, MS                        9.14 17.71 443.2 52.12 2.37
Jackson, TN                        9.31 20.50 417.25 54.40 2.16
Jacksonville, FL                  13.02 31.73 551.75 47.62 2.76
Jacksonville, NC                 16.33 37.93 500.4 56.79 2.49
Jamestown, NY                   10.18 22.98 439.76 34.58 2.22
Janesville--Beloit, WI         11.04 25.94 446.07 32.82 2.20
Jersey City, NJ  11.61 19.65 592.4 51.26 3.13
Johnson City--
Kingsport—Briston, NJ      
10.24 31.82 393.56 56.03 1.95
Johnstown, PA                    7.39 18.10 307.87 39.40 1.58
Jonesboro, AR                     8.35 19.67 340.5 45.16 1.73
Joplin, MO                          10.14 29.35 386.18 37.28 1.92
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, 
MI  
10.81 21.83 483.55 40.35 2.44
Kankakee, IL 10.41 23.16 451.72 40.83 2.33
Kansas City, MO--KS         11.98 27.22 499.68 49.67 2.45
Kenosha, WI            10.05 22.29 414.14 32.81 2.07
Killeen--Temple, TX          12.89 32.00 419.34 54.69 2.23
Knoxville, TN                     12.68 31.75 519.16 66.74 2.58
Kokomo, IN                        9.67 28.84 388.08 42.03 1.87
La Crosse, WI--MN            9.92 17.52 452.32 41.23 2.32
Lafayette, IN                       9.15 15.32 420.83 41.32 2.18
Lafayette, LA                      12.37 25.94 540.44 48.82 2.75
Lake Charles, LA                13.09 30.94 539.56 57.97 2.74
Lakeland--Winter Haven, 
FL            
12.47 35.76 494.17 44.13 2.50
Lancaster, PA                      10.88 22.09 410.55 42.38 2.14
Lansing--East Lansing, 
MI             
12.66 22.66 599.87 52.96 3.07
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Table A.4.(cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Laredo, TX                          11.70 20.95 444.11 93.95 2.88
Las Cruces, NM                  14.82 27.75 638.78 53.86 3.41
Las Vegas, NV--AZ            14.45 35.62 602.15 40.76 2.97
Lawrence, KS                     12.81 18.31 683.95 64.76 3.59
Lawrence, MA—NH  15.52 32.39 626.46 54.68 3.29
Lawton, OK                        9.08 23.29 350.57 43.21 1.76
Lewiston--Auburn, ME       12.65 30.45 569.07 35.85 2.80
Lexington, KY                    13.68 26.72 611.13 60.05 3.07
Lima, OH                            7.37 18.32 299.75 32.60 1.50
Lincoln, NE                         11.50 20.46 521.3 48.95 2.54
Little Rock--North Little 
Rock, AK           
11.04 26.49 465.15 58.35 2.30
Longview—Marshall, TX   12.02 34.64 467.25 61.16 2.38
Los Angeles--Long 
Beach, CA          
13.04 22.52 606.36 57.59 3.42
Louisville, KY--IN             11.59 27.34 516.2 48.69 2.54
Lowell, MA--NH           11.48 22.58 465.82 46.00 2.49
Lubbock, TX                       10.21 20.23 459.66 51.37 2.33
Lynchburg, VA                   9.62 21.27 395.14 48.23 2.05
Macon, GA                         10.85 23.64 486.93 55.41 2.53
Madison, WI                       21.83 35.11 1012.18 75.61 4.93
Manchester, NH  13.49 27.64 569.1 39.47 2.87
Mansfield, OH                    8.48 23.46 333.99 32.05 1.64
McAllen--Edinburg--
Mission, TX           
15.56 28.72 541.31 115.96 3.35
Medford--Ashland, OR       17.95 50.80 738.48 61.09 3.70
Melbourne--Titusville--
Palm Beach, FL          
11.53 34.90 457.17 39.94 2.22
Memphis, TN--AR--MS     10.63 21.38 500.56 53.63 2.56
Merced, CA                         13.83 29.66 541.74 45.94 2.99
Miami, FL           11.49 25.01 541.14 54.05 3.11
Middlesex--Somerset—
Hunterdon, MA           
13.07 25.41 509.78 64.42 2.80
Milwaukee--Waukesha, 
WI            
9.18 17.47 419.86 38.11 2.07
Minneapolis--St. Paul, 
MN--WI            
15.62 28.56 415.59 57.38 3.23
Missoula, MT                      14.74 26.99 658.02 49.39 3.28
Mobile, AL                         12.03 28.29 674.95 68.26 2.62
Modesto, CA                       14.06 31.72 511.59 49.25 3.10
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Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian 
Rate 5 
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ       11.45 27.54 459.10 56.58 2.43
Monroe, LA                        10.91 22.25 561.78 56.87 2.66
Montgomery, AL                8.99 19.67 510.31 56.12 2.12
Muncie, IN                          8.24 16.13 409.87 38.71 2.02
Myrtle Beach, SC                12.18 29.28 388.42 41.25 2.41
Naples, FL                           12.05 37.01 492.81 41.25 2.11
Nashua, NH           17.57 37.54 628.33 50.74 3.13
Nashville, TN                      12.24 26.21 428.95 57.07 2.64
Nassau--Suffolk, NY 13.41 27.05 517.64 79.09 3.04
New Bedford, MA  10.42 22.74 470.43 41.75 2.46
New Haven--Meriden, 
CT  
12.63 24.32 590.65 59.53 3.08
New London--Norwich, 
CT--RI           
13.99 32.46 525.97 46.21 2.93
New Orleans, LA                12.95 25.72 583.02 60.67 3.35
New York, NY  12.67 21.16 652.36 71.27 3.55
Newark, NJ  12.10 22.29 536 59.66 2.95
Newburgh, NY--PA 16.18 33.59 606.2 56.41 3.21
Norfolk--Virginia 
Beach—Newport, VA         
11.08 23.07 648.18 47.17 3.16
Oakland, CA            22.65 43.81 1011.68 90.59 5.40
Ocala, FL                            11.92 39.10 457.63 43.39 2.36
Odessa--Midland, TX         11.26 30.48 461.7 49.03 2.32
Oklahoma City, OK            11.89 28.36 422.05 58.65 2.12
Olympia, WA  23.87 55.38 974.8 74.95 4.80
Omaha, NE--IA                   9.60 20.02 510.04 39.34 2.51
Orange County, CA  12.15 23.90 495.1 56.04 2.80
Orlando, FL                         14.30 30.95 407.69 47.31 2.00
Owensboro, KY                  8.75 23.56 603.7 41.10 3.08
Panama City, FL                 12.48 35.85 349.78 43.47 1.75
Parkersburg--Marietta, 
WV--OH            
9.34 27.61 502.43 36.39 2.43
Pensacola, FL                      11.55 28.87 365.27 49.46 1.82
Peoria--Pekin, IL                 8.82 19.88 485.4 38.99 2.48
Philadelphia, PA--NJ         11.13 20.91 515.51 53.25 2.73
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ             15.12 33.01 359.91 49.27 1.81
Pine Bluff, AR                    7.67 17.54 623.62 50.35 3.13
Pittsburgh, PA                     9.05 19.97 359.4 47.73 1.90
Pittsfield, MA                     10.68 26.22 401.2 41.52 2.03
Pocatello, ID                       9.43 19.65 488.97 39.46 2.36
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Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Portland, ME                       23.50 49.79 424.86 72.64 2.50
Portland--Vancouver, 
OR--WA      
20.95 44.86 881.47 66.36 4.33
Portsmouth--Rochester, 
NH--ME            
17.49 35.50 752.3 55.86 3.80
Providence--Fall River—
Warwich, RI           
13.01 25.94 1059.33 55.65 5.22
Provo--Orem, UT                6.28 9.00 605.58 99.87 3.16
Pueblo, CO                          8.60 21.82 237.75 35.50 1.49
Punta Gorda, FL                  10.34 45.02 372.67 38.76 1.87
Racine, WI 9.49 20.53 380.41 33.44 1.89
Raleigh--Durham--
Chapel Hill, NC           
15.03 26.26 367.33 68.53 1.82
Rapid City, SD                    5.92 13.57 646.87 19.21 3.27
Reading, PA                        10.20 22.23 241.33 32.26 1.15
Redding, CA                       11.80 36.54 404.13 40.19 2.09
Reno, NV                            16.18 39.20 481.18 45.73 2.40
Richland--Kennewick--
Pasco, WA           
11.30 26.73 702.17 37.28 3.37
Richmond--Petersburg, 
VA              
11.05 22.47 397.15 51.50 1.95
Riverside--San 
Bernardino, CA            
14.25 30.79 565.93 50.98 3.12
Roanoke, VA                      11.00 27.60 489.21 55.02 2.5
Rochester, MN                    10.64 20.52 474.47 39.81 2.37
Rochester, NY                     12.18 23.94 384.27 42.92 1.88
Rockford, IL                       10.42 24.21 537.18 36.03 2.74
Rocky Mount, NC               11.08 24.24 407.77 55.92 2.02
Sacramento, CA  17.84 39.85 776.25 61.45 3.94
Saginaw--Bay City--
Midland, MI           
7.95 17.45 476.85 32.72 2.52
Salem, OR 14.23 34.54 573.85 50.17 2.96
Salinas, CA                         15.91 33.00 433.92 65.34 2.18
Salt Lake City--Ogden, 
UT             
14.33 28.10 656.18 68.96 3.77
San Angelo, TX                  10.60 25.38 529.09 48.62 2.82
San Antonio, TX                 12.56 27.31 433.84 57.71 2.23
San Diego, CA                    14.66 29.35 538.82 56.95 2.88
San Francisco, CA  21.91 38.18 1105.60 88.62 5.72
San Jose, CA  14.92 27.60 606.13 64.65 3.37
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Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Santa Barbara--Santa 
Maria, CA          
13.25 25.56 620.04 60.76 3.16
Santa Cruz--Watsonville, 
CA        
26.39 49.63 1269.94 88.79 6.88
Santa Fe, NM                      28.24 63.04 590.30 87.75 3.28
Santa Rosa, CA           30.99 72.15 1384.06 101.66 7.19
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL     12.66 45.06 1264.40 48.36 6.10
Savannah, GA                     12.98 28.28 520.02 60.92 2.54
Scranton--Wilkes-
Barre—Hazlet, PA           
8.06 18.24 588.00 42.47 3.01
Seattle--Bellevue--
Everett, WA           
21.95 43.61 954.37 73.25 4.62
Sharon, PA                          7.79 19.09 369.49 37.79 1.91
Sheboygan, WI                   7.99 18.96 313.95 27.64 1.63
Sherman—Denison, TX     10.06 31.05 285.65 47.54 1.38
Shreveport--Bossier City, 
LA 
9.69 22.40 395.08 47.68 2.01
Sioux City, IA--NE             7.42 16.47 448.54 25.98 2.28
Sioux Falls, SD                   7.89 15.93 315.12 28.82 1.58
South Bend, IN                   8.79 17.95 320.93 38.32 1.56
Spokane, WA                      12.14 29.19 401.10 42.82 2.07
Springfield, IL                     9.66 22.62 522.32 38.37 2.57
Springfield, MA                  19.34 35.26 418.28 80.49 2.09
Springfield, MO                  10.20 23.85 431.25 42.07 2.08
St. Cloud, MN                     8.19 13.42 335.45 31.22 1.68
St. Joseph, MO                    8.92 22.49 340.8 32.70 1.75
St. Louis, MO--IL               9.76 20.85 380.08 43.02 1.91
Stamford--Norwalk, CT      11.40 22.77 462.8 61.99 2.43
State College, PA                8.61 11.98 973.64 54.97 5.20
Steubenville--Weirton, 
OH--WV            
7.41 19.65 439.08 34.47 2.43
Stockton--Lodi, CA            14.82 32.62 311.22 51.78 1.58
Sumter, SC                          10.65 23.21 594.18 56.73 3.24
Syracuse, NY                      11.35 22.33 459.56 37.81 2.41
Tacoma, WA  15.29 36.21 622.23 50.05 3.11
Tallahassee, FL                   11.08 17.57 503.42 58.26 2.54
Tampa—St. Petersburg—
Clearwater, FL           
14.31 39.22 600.14 50.14 3.16
Terre Haute, IN                   8.37 20.55 637.58 33.33 3.12
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Table A.4. (cont.) 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas 
Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Texarkana, TX--
Texarkana, AR            
9.87 27.39 367.48 55.59 1.86
Toledo, OH                         10.66 21.63 421.95 42.88 2.14
Topeka, KS                         11.05 27.36 500.91 49.15 2.49
Trenton, NJ 11.65 21.47 532.8 56.50 2.96
Tucson, AZ                         16.18 35.23 490.03 58.13 2.38
Tulsa, OK                            11.9 31.12 734.59 56.12 3.66
Tuscaloosa, AL                   10.09 18.18 471.06 74.79 2.29
Tyler, TX                            11.46 29.93 500.41 64.14 2.59
Utica--Rome, NY                10.08 22.81 436.8 36.83 2.27
Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, 
CA 
17.19 38.80 695.6 63.30 3.75
Ventura, CA            14.37 31.46 544.73 60.30 3.06
Victoria, TX                        10.21 23.98 444.56 41.70 2.24
Vineland--Millville—
Bridgeton, CA           
9.49 19.42 438.12 31.18 2.40
Visalia--Tulare--
Porterville,  CA           
15.65 32.72 372.08 53.39 1.93
Waco, TX                            10.11 22.00 599.11 58.82 3.36
Washington, DC--MD--
VA--WV           
13.77 24.00 606.85 62.04 3.16
Waterbury, CT       10.42 22.45 474.4 41.67 2.43
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, 
IA             
6.72 12.35 438.42 30.96 2.30
Wausau, WI                        7.59 17.26 314.47 24.67 1.65
West Palm Beach--Boca 
Raton, FL           
12.86 36.17 265.63 49.21 1.30
Wheeling, WV--OH            8.00 21.65 546.4 37.93 2.70
Wichita Falls, TX                10.69 28.58 486.47 52.23 2.32
Wichita, KS                         12.39 30.69 342.78 57.01 1.73
Williamsport, PA                9.01 21.15 422.61 32.55 2.12
Wilmington, NC                 10.83 23.95 363.83 43.33 1.85
Wilmington--Newark, 
DE--MD           
12.14 23.66 542.06 45.84 2.82
Worcester, MA--CT         13.31 26.87 585.63 51.96 3.01
Yakima, WA                       12.57 28.07 449.66 37.91 2.19
Yolo, CA           15.84 25.24 785.28 75.27 4.36
York, PA                             12.13 28.13 472.64 36.11 2.47
Youngstown--Warren, 
OH                
7.48 18.85 441.61 36.03 2.21
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Metropolitan Statistical 
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Lesbian 
Rate 1 
Lesbian 
Rate 2 
Lesbian 
Rate 3 
Lesbian  
Rate 4 
Lesbian  
Rate 5 
Yuba City, CA                    14.22 37.85 322.48 48.74 1.63
Yuma, AZ                           15.58 38.69 538.49 53.80 2.82
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Table A.5.  List of Counties with No Male or Female Same-Sex Couples 
Male Same-Sex Couples Female Same-Sex Couples No Same-Sex Couples 
Alamosa County, Colorado Denali Borough, Alaska Baca County, Colorado 
Conejos County, Colorado Yakutat City and Borough, 
Alaska 
Cheyenne County, Colorado 
Crowley County, Colorado Alpine County, California Custer County, Colorado 
Kiowa County, Colorado Dolores County, Colorado Hinsdale County, Colorado 
Kit Carson County, 
Colorado 
Lake County, Colorado Jackson County, Colorado  
Mineral County, Colorado Mineral County, Colorado Lincoln County, Colorado 
Ouray County, Colorado Phillips County, Colorado Liberty County, Montana 
Rio Blanco County, 
Colorado 
San Juan County, Colorado Blaine County, Nebraska 
Washington County, 
Colorado 
Glascock County, Georgia Boyd County, Nebraska 
Yuma County, Colorado Quitman County, Georgia Greeley County, Nebraska 
Taliaferro County, Georgia Camas County, Idaho Hayes County, Nebraska 
Comanche County, Kansas Oneida County, Idaho Hooker County, Nebraska 
Decatur County, Kansas Calhoun County, Illinois Logan County, Nebraska 
Elk County, Kansas Pope County, Illinois Loup County, Nebraska 
Ellsworth County, Kansas Scott County, Illinois Webster County, Nebraska 
Graham County, Kansas Adams County, Iowa Wheeler County, Nebraska 
Hodgeman County, Kansas Audubon County, Iowa Hettinger County, North Dakota 
Jewell County, Kansas Barber County, Kansas Slope County, North Dakota 
Logan County, Kansas Cheyenne County, Kansas Cimarron County, Oklahoma 
Morton County, Kansas Meade County, Kansas Buffalo County, South Dakota 
Wichita County, Kansas Rush County, Kansas Kennedy County, Texas 
Keweenaw County, 
Michigan 
Wallace County, Kansas Roberts County, Texas 
Kittson County, Minnesota Hickman County, Kentucky  
Pennington County, 
Minnesota 
Rock County, Minnesota  
Schuyler County, Missouri Knox County, Missouri  
Shelby County, Missouri Putnam County, Missouri  
Broadwater County, 
Montana 
Worth County, Missouri  
Judith Basin County, 
Montana 
Golden Valley County, 
Montana 
 
McCone County, Montana Musselshell County, Montana  
Sheridan County, Montana Petroleum County, Montana  
Treasure County, Montana Toole County, Montana  
Arthur County, Nebraska Wibaux County, Montana  
Grant County, Nebraska Arthur County, Nebraska  
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Table A.5.  (cont.) 
Male Same-Sex Couples Female Same-Sex Couples No Same-Sex Couples 
Hooker County, Nebraska Deuel County, Nebraska  
McPherson County, 
Nebraska 
Furnas County, Nebraska  
Perkins County, Nebraska Garfield County, Nebraska  
Sioux County, Nebraska Gosper County, Nebraska  
Billings County, North 
Dakota 
Hayes County, Nebraska  
Foster County, North 
Dakota 
Hooker County, Nebraska  
Golden Valley County, 
North Dakota 
Johnson County, Nebraska  
Griggs County, North 
Dakota 
Keya Paha County, Nebraska  
Kidder County, North 
Dakota 
Nance County, Nebraska  
Renville County, North 
Dakota 
Polk County, Nebraska  
Sioux County, North Dakota Sherman County, Nebraska  
Towner County, North 
Dakota 
Burke County, North Dakota  
Greer County, Oklahoma Sherman County, Oregon  
Aurora County, South 
Dakota 
Wheeler County, Oregon  
Corson County, South 
Dakota 
Edmunds County, South 
Dakota 
 
Hanson County, South 
Dakota 
Harding County, South 
Dakota 
 
Sanborn County, South 
Dakota 
Jerauld County, South Dakota  
Sully County, South Dakota Jones County, South Dakota  
Ziebach County, South 
Dakota 
Miner County, South Dakota  
Cochran County, Texas Potter County, South Dakota  
Concho County, Texas Borden County, Texas  
Cottle County, Texas Jeff Davis County, Texas  
Dickens County, Texas King County, Texas  
Foard County, Texas McMullen County, Texas  
Glasscock County, Texas Terrell County, Texas  
Reagan County, Texas Daggett County, Utah  
Schleicher County, Texas Wayne County, Utah  
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Table A.5. (cont.) 
Male Same-Sex Couples Female Same-Sex Couples No Same-Sex Couples 
Throckmorton County, 
Texas 
 
 
 
 
Morgan County, Utah   
Rich County, Utah   
Surry County, Virginia   
Garfield County, 
Washington 
  
N=66 
2.02% 
N=61 
1.86% 
N=22 
0.6% 
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